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DIFFICULT RELATIONSHIP: CONSTITUTIONAL ENACTMENT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

Conflict among individuals in their values, preferences, and perceived
interests is the primary basis of a felt need for government. 1 In the
American constitutional system, conflict among individuals is often resolved2 with a widely accepted idea: 3 the majority should rule.
Of course, "majority rule" is not the only principle for resolving
conflict in this system. In Marbury v. Madison, 4 Justice Marshall articulated
a more fundamental norm: "[T]he people have an original right to
establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion,
shall most conduce to their own happiness .... "5 Throughout America's

1. Cf J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 43-45 (1962) (Cooperative "collective action" may be required to
secure benefits that cannot be secured through purely private behavior. Individual protection
against fire, for example, may not be profitable.). Whether government is primarily a
mechanism for resolving conflict or for securing the benefits of cooperative action, only its
conflict-resolving function is relevant for issues of constitutional law, which after all, are issues
only because of conflicting values.
2. It is misleading to say that conflict is "resolved" by legislatures, courts, or any other
governmental organ. Rather, while a decision by one governmental body may resolve a
disagreement about which competing norms have claims to enforcement, the underlying
conflict will remain. Thus, while the Supreme Court decided that political communities have
only limited discretion to restrict abortion, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973), and
thereby may have ended disagreement about currently enforceable norms, it hardly resolved
the underlying dispute.
3. The existence of a legal order, or government, requires at least some agreement in
recognizing a source of norms that command obedience. Recognition of such a source might
be based on its power, or its goodness. Absent such recognition, disputes among individuals
would be resolved through the anarchy of exercised force. See McDougal, Lasswell, &
Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, in INTERNATIONAL LAw EssAYS
191, 192 (1981) (distinguishing effective control based on expectations from "naked power").
4. 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137 (1803).
5. Id. at 176; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 152 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)
("The fabric of the American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF
THE PEOPLE."); THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 313 (J. Madison) ("the people are the only
legitimate fountain of power"); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REv.
693, 696 (1976) ("The people are the ultimate source of authority; they have parceled out the
authority that originally resided entirely with them by adopting the original Constitution and
by later amending it.").
Alexis de Tocqueville perceived near universal acceptance of this principle during his early
nineteenth century study of America. Americans, he said,
are not always agreed upon the measures that are most conducive to good government, and they vary upon some of the forms of government which it is expedient to
adopt; but they are unanimous upon the general principles that ought to rule human
society. From Maine to the Floridas, and from the Missouri to the Atlantic Ocean, the
people are held to be the source of all legitimate power.
l A. DE TocQt:EVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 409 (P. Bradley ed. 1945); cf. Berger, New Theories
of "Interpretation": The Activist Flight from the Constitution, 47 OHIO. ST. L.J. 1, 3 (1986) ("[A]ll
federal power must be drawn from the Constitution.").
This notion of popular sovereignty may have been able to gain such widespread acceptance
because it is so vague. Indeed, it begs the fundamental questions, "Who are 'the people'?" and
"Who decides who 'the people' are?" These questions, and the difficulty of answering them,
reveal that the notion of popular sovereignty itself is a subject of conflict, begging agreement
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constitutional history, "the people" 6 have manifested a general preference
for democratic decisionmaking, subject to limitations imposed in the name
of the Constitution. The preferences of current majorities should not
always prevail, because "the people," apparently, do not want such preferences always to prevail.
These basic observations generate questions that have long bedeviled
constitutional analysts: What does the Constitution mean? What principles
of government have "the people" chosen for their own happiness? How
should the constitutional preferences of "the people" be identified? And,
less frequently asked, but of more fundamental significance, who are "the
people"?
There is a tension between the manner in which members of a political
community join to make constitutional decisions and the manner in which
courts oft<:·n have derived and defined constitutional meaning. Framing
and ratifying constitutional provisions is a competitive political process. To
the extent that individuals disagree, any resolution is likely to reflect
compromise. 7 Even if each political competitor pursued an apparently
coherent8 program for public action, 9 the process of political compromise
would undermine any possibility for a coherent corporate philosophy. 10 Yet
courts, in analyzing the Constitution, frequently purport to resolve social
conflict by pursuing the logical implications of certain values to generate
consistent, coherent, or "principled" constitutional doctrine.n
abc•ut how 11 should be resolved. See infra text accompanying notes 103-09, 248-56, 455c59;
notes 9·1, 306, 318, 325, 370, 376, 443, 455-59.
6. Throughout this Article, this phrase will be sun-ounded by quotation marks to
empha5ize it• ambiguity. See supra note 5; see also R.A. DAHL, PL!.:RALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE
UNITED Sr.ms: Co'\FLICT A'ID Co'lSENT 22 (1967); cf. infra text accompanying notes 248-56,
45[1-59; note~. 94, 306, 318, 325, :370, 376, 443.
7. See, 1'.f., J. Bt"CHAN.\N & G. Tt:LLOCK, supra note l, at 32 (group decisions are unlikely to
reflect rational choices toward specific goals); R.A. DAHL, supra note 6, at 33 ("If the framework
of government they finally proposed sho\\ed what the Founders could agree on, it also
reflected their di5agreemems and conflicts.").
8. By "coherent," I mean consistent with some identified value. To the extent that an
exprew:d idwlogy is coherent, it can be justified as logically derived from one value, or from
several con~h.tent values. An ideology lacks coherence to the extent that it is composed of
vahJe5 that conflict with each other.
9.John ·:tawls and Robert Nozick might be two people who could claim to advocate a
coherent pro;~ram for public action, although some would disagree. The rest of us have little
hope of acheiving a perfectly consistent philosophy, derived from a single principle of justice,
because we probably have concerns that conflict with, and at some point are more important
than, our notions of justice. For a discussion of conflict within individuals, see infra text
accompanying notes 51-64.
10. This i-. not to say that no statute could possibly reflect some degree of coherent policy.
Earh individual statute, although itself inevitably reflecting some degree of political compromi~.i;, is part of a large collection of statutes enacted during a legislative ses~ion and part of an
even larger collection encompassed within the entire statutory code. Cf infra note 224. Major
political compromises may be reflected among statutes, rather than within them, so that those
favoring a statutory policy might at least get one rational statute, though perhaps at the
expense· of another policy concern. Thus, individual statutes may well reflect relatively
coherent policies, while the statutory code as a whole is full of normative contradictions.
11. &e, e.g.. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROt:S BRANCH 261 (1962) ("[T]he Court is the
institution best fitted to give us a rule of principle, which we strive to attain along with the
principle of ~.elf-rule."). This view begs the question of whether, in fact, "we'"do strive for
principle-at least to the extent that such principle is to supersede the compromises wrought
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This judicial process of reasoning from normative premises has a
significant potential for distorting the compromises wrought by the politically combative process of constitutional creation 12 and, thus, for violating
a premise that "the people" have a right to govern. Indeed, much
contemporary constitutional doctrine-equal protection and privacy, for
example-looks little like the political compromises reflected in the original
understandings about particular constitutional provisions, precisely because courts have pursued the coherent implications of certain values at the
expense of competing values that themselves were essential elements of
constitutional meaning at the time of ratification. 13 As a consequence,
adherents to competing schools of constitutional analysis have engaged in
vigorous debate about whether and how one can justify such apparent
judicial transformation of hard-fought constitutional compromises. 14

by the political process. One might assert that the long history of Supreme Court decisionmaking justifies the Court's different modes of analysis. Nevertheless, this history might reflect
acquiescence rather than approval. See infra note 111. It would be much more comforting if
one could develop an alternative justification for a judicial pursuit of principle, rooted in a
basis other than silence after the fact.
In considering justifications for noninterpretive judicial review, Professor Perry articulates
a necessary, but insufficient, condition: courts should adjudicate on the basis of a principled
analysis and explanation. See M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND Hl'MAN RIGHTS
25-26 (1982). Perry's notion of "principled" judicial decisionmaking purports to rely on the
work of Herbert Wechsler. See id. Yet Wechsler's admonition that courts base their decisions
on "standards that transcend the case at hand," Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. l, 17 (1959), does not necessarily require principle in the
substance of judicially favored norms, but does at least require reasoned explanation, id. at 15,
justifying judicial intrusion on the processes of legislative compromise. See infra note 405.
12. Professor Monaghan argues that the common law method of constitutional interpretation "tends to obscure the compromise character of the enactment, and thus renders opaque
its 'imperfect' quality when measured against ideal norms." Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution,
56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 392-93 (1981). He advocates a statutory approach that fully recognizes
"the unprinci?led, and imperfect, nature of an enactment produced by compromise." Id.
By advocatmg a statutory approach rather than a common-law approach, Monaghan
assumes as much as those he criticizes. Monaghan must establish his premise as well. Given his
own adherence to a principle of popular soveriegnty, he must prove that the goal of
constitutional analysis, as established by the preferences of "the people" engaged in the
political process that he elucidated, is to identify some particular ad hoc compromise, and not
to develop the coherence of some preferred norm.
13. How does one justify interpreting the equal protection clause, originally understood as
prohibiting only certain specific forms of discrimination against blacks, as prohibiting all
discrimination undertaken because of racial prejudice, and indeed, discrimination undertaken
because of gender prejudice as well? See infra text accompanying notes 235-441. How does one
justify interpreting the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments, originally understood as
relating to specific interests against government intrusion, as implying a broad and general
autonomy interest called "privacy"? See infra text accompanying notes 169-232.
14. This problem applies to statutes as well. See Wellington, The Nature ofJudicial Review, 91
YALE LJ. 486, 494 ( 1982) [hereinafter Wellington, Nature ofJudicial Review] ("It is standard and
appropriate for courts to employ general legal principles to construe the open texture of
statutes."). A judicial pursuit of coherence in statutory interpretation is far less problematic
than in constitutional interpretation for at least two reasons. First, any judicial error is more
easily amenable to legislative correction. See infra note 452. Second, to the extent that statutes
pursue instrumental policies rather than intrinsically valued principles, see Wellington,
Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J.
221, 222-29 (1973) [hereinafter Wellington, Notes on Adjudication], it is more likely that even a
defeated minority would want all of its opponents' program to pass, rather than bits and pieces
of incompatible approaches-just in case their opponents are right. See infra note 224.
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Some constitutional analysts prefer to focus exclusively on the "intent"
of the framers and ratifiers, and treat constitutional provisions as if they
were intricate political compromises frozen in time, until formally
amended. Raoul Berger, for example, has asserted that because the equal
protection clause was originally intended not to prohibit racial segregation,
a ~.ound interpretation of the clause, even today, would continue to deem
racial segregation as constitutionally permissible. 15 Berger also criticizes the
notion of constitutional privacy, in which a broad and general right of
individual autonomy has been "logically" inferred from the specific protections of the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments. 16
Other constitutional analysts acknowledge the intent of the framers
and ratifiers as relevant, but not dispositive, for generating constitutional
meaning. Original intent must be related to the needs and conditions of
contemporary society. Thus, in Brown v. Board of Education, 17 Justice
Warren, while finding that historical evidence is "inconclusive" for determining the intent of the framers and ratifiers, 18 suggested that "[w]e must
consider public education in the light of its full development and its present
place in American life throughout the Nation." 19 On this basis, he found
racial segregation in public education to violate the fourteenth amendmcnt.20 Justice Brennan has suggested that while courts should "look to the
hi&tory of the time of [the Constitution's] framing and to the intervening
history of interpretation[,] ... the ultimate question must be, what do the
words of the text mean in our time." 21 Thus, Brennan supports the notion
of constitutional privacy in part because notions of sexual autonomy are
logically related to values underlying the protection of speech and religion
and, in today's social context, seem to deserve constitutional protection as
much as did speech and religion in the era of the framers and ratifiers.22
In consideting whether courts should treat statutes as materials for common law development according to judicial perceptions of prevailing social norms, Dean Calabresi has noted
that "(aj statute wltm passed frequently represents a majoritarian decision to favor a particular
group, or to compromise among groups despite any inconsistency of treatment this may create
with the legal topography." G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAw FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 106 (1982)
(emphasi~ added). Thus, an ideal of "consistency" with certain principles may well be at odds
with an ideal of democratic rule. Resolving by the political process panicular issues about
which there h substantial dispute must yield ad hoc compromise. Whether "the people" wish
the courts to develop consistency-coherence-in statutes is an issue of legislative intent.
Whether "th( people" wish the courts to de\'elop coherence in constitutional principles is an
issue of constitutional intent.
15. See R. BERGER, Go\'ERNMENT BY Jumc1A1tY 166-92 (1977). Berger acknowledges, however,
that it would be "utterly unrealistic and probably impossible to undo the past in the face of the
expectations that the segregation decisions, for example, have aroused in our black citizenry
••• •"Id. at 412-13; see also Monaghan, supra note 12, at 364-65.
16. See Berger, supra note 5, at 26.
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. Id. at 489.
19. Id. at 492-93.
20. Id. at 495.
21. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, at A36, col. 3.
22. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). In Roberts, Justice Brennan
inferred a cc·nstitutional right of "intimate association" -essentially an aspect of another
similarly gen1~rated constitutional right called "privacy," see infra text accompanying notes
167-215-by referring to the logical implications of other rights, such a; speech and religion,
that also afford emotional enrichment. Id. at 618-20.
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Still other constitutional analysts emphasize a philosophical pursuit of
normative coherence in generating constitutional meaning, relatively abstracted from the intricate political concerns either of those who framed
and ratified constitutional provisions or of the electorate today.2 3 Ronald
Dworkin, for example, has asserted that there must be a "fusion of
constitutional law and moral theory" if there is to be a genuine advance in
constitutional analysis. 24 David Ridmnls believes that based on "moral
theory," the Constitution should be interpreted as providing rights to
engage in various sexual activities. 25 "[T]he unwritten constitution which
gives sense to the constitutional design,"2 6 provides the "inner moral
coherence in the development of the right to privacy."27
None of these approaches, however, has been justified with adequate
attention to the question of who has the right to establish principles of
government for their own happiness. Raoul Berger fails to explain why the
intricacies of past constitutional compromises should forever determine the
meaning of particular constitutional provisions and, indeed, why past
constitutional choices should today have any legal consequence at an.2s To
23. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149 (1977). For other works adhering to this
general approach, see generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1978); Karst, The
Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Fonvard: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV.
L. REv. 1 (1977); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Fonvard: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969); Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the
Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30
HASTINGS LJ. 957 (1979).
24. R. DWORKIN, supra note 23, at 149. Thus, Dworkin suggests that modern constitutional
doctrine has not pursued the logical implications of human equality (equal protection) far
enough-that a "Herculean" exercise of judicial craftsmanship would define broader constitutional rights that could not be compromised by unprincipled competing concerns. See
Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 514-15 (1981). In discussing whether
the Constitution should be deemed to prohibit discrimination against gay people, Dworkin
begins with norms suggesting the moral evil of racial discrimination, and the postulate, despite
the original understanding to the contrary, that all laws based on racial prejudice must be
deemed unconstitutional, and pursues the logical implications of this position on race to a
position on sexual orientation. Dworkin states:
Legislation based on racial prejudice is unconstitutional not because any distinction
using race is immoral but because any legislation that can be justified only by
appealing to the majority's preferences about which of their fellow citizens are worthy
of concern and respect, or what sorts of lives their fellow citizens should lead, denies
equality. If I am right, then constraints on liberty that can be justified only on the
ground that the majority finds homosexuality distasteful, or disapproves the culture
that it generates, are offensive to equality and so incompatible with a theory of
representation based on equal concern and respect.
Id. (footnote omitted). This may be so, but for one whose interpretive goal is to identify the
constitutional values of"the people" today, the question still remains whether "the people" are
so committed to Dworkin's ideal of equal concern and respect that they wish to sacrifice their
competing prejudices for its benefit. See infra note 30.
25. See Richards, supra note 23, at 972-1014.
26. Id. at 975.
27. Id. at 1016.
28. Berger justifies his position by referring to the framers' intent that their understanding
should govern constitutional interpretation. Cf Powell, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885, 948 (1985) (framers of original Constitution did not intend its
construction "i'h accordance with what future interpreters could gather of the framers' own
purposes, expectations, and intentions"). Even if Berger has correctly characterized the
framers' intent about the role their intent should play in future interpretation, such
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the extent that analysts such as Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan
have felt bound by past constitutional choices, they also have failed to
explain why past constitutional choices should have any contemporary legal
significance. Furthermore, to the extent that they have departed from past
constitutional choices, these analysts have not explained why contemporary
social circumstances should be deemed relevant for the purposes of
constitutional interpretation. Thus, they cannot justify which aspects of
contemporary political society they have chosen as relevant for interpreting
the Constitution. 29 Similarly, Ronald Dworkin and David Richards do not
suggest why their philosophies of justice should define constitutional
meaning, despite generating constitutional doctrines that not only are more
coherent than those chosen by past constitutional majorities, but also have
no necessary relationship to the complex and competing values of contemporary political society.so One might trace the indeterminacy of each

sell~justification would hardly be satisfying. Cf. infra note 443. Indeed, reference to the intent
of past decisionmakers begs the question of to whom the premise of popular determination
reft-rs. Who are "the people" with the right to establish principles of government for their own
happiness? S1•e infra text accompanying notes 93-109, 248-56; notes 306, 318, 325, 370, 376,
44::1.
29. In Br6wn v. Board of Educ., Warren compared the status of public education in 1954
with its statu~ in 1868, 347 U.S. 483, 489-93 (1954), without considering why a comparison of
such status i1 analytically significant and, therefore, without any basis for determining how
such a comparison should be analytically significant. Implicit in Warren's opinion is the
prciposition ti1at public education is more important to people today than in 1868. Id. at 493
("In these da:•s, it b doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of an education."). This begs the crude response, "so what?" Does
Warren mean to suggest that if public education had been as important in 1868 as it is today,
the framers and ratifiers would have chosen to prohibit racial segregation in education? If so,
docs he mean to suggest that the basis for the framers' and ratifiers' choices of those contexts
in which discrimination would be prohibited was the importance of the rights in those contexts
to blacks? If so, why the original understanding that the equal protection clause would not
prohibit raci~1I discrimination in voting? Should Warren have considered what values might
ha\•e impelled the framers and ratifiers to limit the protections accorded to blacks by the
fourteenth amendment? Does Warren, instead, mean to suggest that b:::cause education is so
much more important today than in 1868, he is discarding the past constitutional choice as
irrelevant? If so, whose constitutional values is Warren applying, and how is he inferring
them?
justice Brennan leaves similar questions unaddressed in Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
4611 U.S. 609 (1984). Brennan suggests that the "emotional enrichment" that people gain from
sm.111, family-like associations are constitutionally protected, see supra note 22, but does not
explain why constitutionally significant "emotional enrichment" extends l:eyond speech and
religion, which are mentioned in the first amendment, to small, family-like associations, which
are not mentioned in the first amendment, but fails to extend to other sources of "emotional
enrichment" that are not mentioned in the first amendment. 468 C.S. at 1319-620.
30. Ronald Dworkin justifies his resort to moral theory by pursuing the implications of
"taking right·; seriously." Whether or not his rigorous logic truly captures the implications of
taking rights seriously, his approach begs the question of whether "the people" want to take
rights seriom.ly. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 23, at 205.
In a later work, Dworkin seems to acknowledge this question, and attempts to justify his
rek·ntless pursuit of coherence in law. See R. DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986). He posits that "we"
have a notion of"fairness," by which he means a norm that looks something like democracya right of each individual to participate equally in public decisionmaking. See id. at 177-78. He
al5o posits that "we" have notions of ·~ustice," which consists of each individual's preferred
morality. See id. He notes that fairness may lead to results that most voters might view as not
perfectly just, simply because the product of fairness is political compromise. See id. He terms
tllC'se compromises "checkerboard solutions." See id. at 178-79.
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approach to the absence of any explicit statement about what, exactly, the

Dworkin posits that "we" are uncomfortable with the checkerboard-that in addition to the
values of fairness and justice is a third value, "integrity." See id. at 183. Integrity is a desire for
normative coherence,for consistent adherence to principle. See id. at 183-!H. Indeed. DworJ;.in
posits that:
many of us, to different degrees in different situations, would reject the checkerboard
solution not only in general and in advance, but even in particular cases if it were
available as a possibility. We would prefer either of the alternative solutions to the
checkerboard compromise.
Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
Even assuming that Dworkin has correctly identified a broadly based value in American
society-and I believe he has-one wonders whether he overestimates its significance relative
to other concerns, whether concerns of justice, fairness, or simply expedience. If some people,
indeed, did prefer the fully unjust moral alternative to a compromise that is half just and half
unjust, they could vote in such a way as to ensure that the fully unjust alternative was selected
in preference to the checkerboard. But even as Dworkin notes, see id. at 184-85, checkerboard
solutions are pervasive in American politics. The original understanding of the fourteenth
amendment, for example, is a classic checkerboard. See infra notes 240-42 and accompanying
text. Although this does not refute that people have some concern for political integrity, it does
suggest that concerns for integrity are less significant than Dworkin would hope.
Dworkin attempts to deal with this problem by reconceptualizing the political community
from a collection of individuals into a single moral agent. See R. DWORKIN, supra, at 167-75.
Through this "personification" of the community, id. at 168, Dworkin judges the community
as he would judge an individual. While a community's checkerboard can othenvise be
explained as a function of political compromise, hence making injustice a function of fairness,
an individual's checkerboard can be explained only in terms of the individual's own sense of
justice-an inadequate commitment to justice that might be termed hypocrisy.
The "inadequacy," however, is from an observer's perspective, not necessarily from the
perspective of the individual, himself. Indeed, the individual might acknowledge that his value
scheme and choices are hypocritical, in the sense that he chooses to compromise his concepts
of morality to competing concerns that might be simply mundane and expedient. See infra text
accompanying notes 57-64, 274-86.
But if this is "hypocrisy" that the individual-or the community personified-chooses, what
does Dworkin, as the observer, intend to do about it? He can either accept it, or try to mandate
Jess hypocrisy-more integrity-against the individual's will. Although one may perceive a
necessary evil when a community's majority forces individuals to make choices against their
will, see supra note 1 and accompanying text, one might be Jess likely to characterize so benignly
a philosopher's effort to impose integrity on an unwilling individual. Thus, even transforming
the community into an individual with the notion of "personification" does not vitiate the need
to justify taking the community farther than it wants to go-although personification does make
the value of fairness (democracy or some other principle for resolving interpersonal conflict)
within the community irrelevant. Indeed, I suggest that personification of the community
clarifies the need for justifying an unauthorized pursuit of normative coherence, for it
sharpens the issue of fairness as between a philosopher and the community he would seek to
lead. Can the philosopher justify taking two votes against the single vote exercised by the
personified community? See infra text accompanying notes 57-64.
The foregoing should not be taken to suggest that individuals, or groups, could not choose
to be Jed toward a more coherent value scheme. Indeed, I believe they can, do, and have. This
proposition, discussed as the notion of self-constraint, will be pursued throughout the
remainder of this Article. I suggest only that in the context of disagreement about how far to
pursue coherence or integrity, one must justify the mechanism employed for determining
which competing value will prevail. Cf infra note 456.
David Richards' approach is blatantly apolitical. Richards identifies a value, such as equal
concern and respect, see Richards, supra note 23, at 977, and pursues one logical implication
after another; without considering whether "the people" who create constitutional provisions
want quite so much weight placed on that particular value (assuming that Richards has
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goals of "constitutional interpretation" should be, 31 given the problem of
conflict to which government is a response.
This Article considers whether and how the product of political
combat-constitutional provisions reflecting a series of ad hoc compromises-can be judicially transformed into a normative scheme more coherent-mon;! "principled" -than the framers and ratifiers originally chose,
consistent with a premise that "the people" have a right to govem. 32 Part II of the
Article seeks to provide a basis for a more comprehensive understanding of
"original intent" by examining the relationship between different types of
constitutional choices and different types of democratic discretion. It poses
a question of fundamental motivation: Why would a constitutional majority
of "the people"33 want to restrict the everyday political discretion of "the

accurately identified the value as a constitutional concern) at the expense of other competing
concerns, or indeed whether it matters wlzai "the people" think. See id. at 922-1014.
31. The< onflict among these three camps is particularly significant today as Raoul Berger's
approach of frozen historicism has shaped the views of Edwin Meese and Ronald Reagan, who,
in tum, are shaping the federal judiciary. On Sept. 12, 1986, for example, in the midst of
proceedings toward the confirmation of Chief Justice Rehnquist, William Bradford Reynolds,
A~'listant Attorney General for civil rights, openly attacked Justice Brennan's judicial methodology. He charged that Justice Brennan's view of the fourteenth amendment reflects a
radically egalitarian jurisprudence. It is a theory less concerned with the past or the
present than with the future. It is a theory less solicitous of the Constitution's
structural arrangements than it is of a Justice's appreciation of evolving moral
standards. It is a theory that seeks not limited government in order to secure
individual liberty, but unlimited judicial power to further a personalized egalitarian
vision of society.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1986, at AlO, col. 5. For distinctions between the Berger approach and
that of Chief Justice Rehnquist, see infra text accompanying notes 129-44.
32. One alternative that might quickly dispose of the issue would be to define "the people"
as being Raoul Berger, or justice Brennan, or Ronald Dworkin. This would justify each
analyst's approach, respectively. The difficulty, of course, would be justifying any of these
alternative definitions of "the people." See infra text accompanying notes 458-59. For other
po~sible ways of defining "the people," sec infra text accompanying notes 93-107, 248-56;
notes 306, 318, 325, 370, 376, 443.
Professor Unger points to the limits of coherence that, in his view, must characterize any
body of law:
[I]t would be strange if the results of a coherent, richly developed normative theory
were to coincide with a major portion of any extended branch of law. The many
conflicts of interest and vision that lawmaking involves, fought out by countless minds
and will~ working at cross-purposes, would have to be the vehicle of an immanent
moral rationality whose message could be articulated by a single cohesive theory. This
daring and implausible sanctification of the actual is in fact undertaken by the
dominant legal theories and tacitly presupposed by the unreflective common sense of
orthodox lawyers.
Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 571 (1983). This observation
may reflect the fact that ordinary people lack the capacity to achieve a "richly developed
normative theory" in the manner of philosophers. It also may indicate that ordinary people do
not necessarily view normative consistency as an ideal that must be maintained at all costs. Cf
supra note 30. Rather, individuals have many conflicting concerns for justice and personal
gratification. Their concern for justice may not always prevail.
33. By "constitutional majority" I mean a national majority sufficient to satisfy the
requirement;; of article V. This is to be contrasted with the notion of a "congressional
mi\jority," or a "national political majority," by which I mean a national majority sufficient to
satisfy the rtquirements of articles I and II. Cf Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the
Constitution, !13 YALE L.J. 1013, 1051-57 (1984) (processes other than those prescribed by article
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people"? 34 The essence of that fuller conceptualization of an original
understanding involves not simply awareness of the substantive values that
might have motivated a constitutional majority of "the people" but, equally
important, awareness of why the constitutional majority of "the people" might have
determined that their substantive concerns should be left for local political resolution,
or should be resolved in everyday national politics through Congress, or should be
resolved in extraordinary national politics through constitutional marrdate.
Part II then suggests that members of a national majority who wish to
frame and ratify constitutional provisions toward restricting ordinary
political discretion might act with two distinct motivations. First, members
of a national majority might seek simply to constrain the political discretion
of local majorities that disagree with national values (constraint of others).35
Second, members of a national majority might seek to constrain the political
discretion both of dissenting localities and of themselves, toward serving
ideals that might be vulnerable in everyday national politics (constraint of
selj). 36 This notion of self-constraint suggests that individuals recognize a
tension within their value schemes, and that they wish to favor some of their
own competing concerns, at the expense of others, to a greater extent than
they otherwise would in everyday decisionmaking. The Article posits that
the choice to pursue national values by constitutional mandate, rather than
by authorizing Congress to legislate, can reflect a desire among a constitutional majority of the nation for self-constraint-a desire to vindicate certain
favored values to a greater extent than Congress could be trusted to
achieve-in other words, to a greater extent than the national majority
trusts itself to achieve in ordinary, everyday politics.37
After suggesting this basis for better understanding the meaning and
implications of the framers' and ratifiers' intent-the "original understanding" about various constitutional provisions-Part II further probes the
premise that constitutional meaning must be based on the values of "the
people." It examines the relationships between past constitutional majorities, present ordinary political majorities, and present potential constitutional majorities. 38 Who are "the people" possessing the right to establish
principles of government for their own happiness? Does the past have the
right to bind the present? This section suggests an explicit goal for
V may be sufficient to establish constitutional amendment). For an examination of Ackerman's
thesis, see infra note 233.
34. See infra text accompanying note 51.
35. See infra text accompanying note 52.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 53-56.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 65-92. This analysis reflects the proposition that the
essence of constitutional policymaking involves choosing the political forum in which
individuals want political disputes to be resolved. Should particular issues be resolved in the
forum of local politics, the forum of congressional politics, or the forum of constitutional
politics? This question characterizes the evolution of the American constitutional system. In
1787 and 1791, the primary question was whether certain disputes were better resolved in local
legislatures or the national legislature. In 1866, with the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and in 1868,
with the fourteenth amendment, the primary question was whether certain disputes were
better resolved in the national forum of congressional politics or the national forum of
constitutional politics.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 93-106.
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constitutional analysis: to identify the constitutional values of "the people"
today. 39
The Article next considers how the constitutional values of "the
people" today might be identified. It posits a premise that there is a
continuity of constitutional values from one generation of "the people" to
another, and that past constitutional choices can therefore provide good,
but incomplete, evidence of present constitutional values. 40 It suggests that
one might identify additional sources of evidence for constitutional values
among "the people" today and determine how to employ that evidence, by
accounting for the fundamental distinction between national values pursued with the motive of constraining others (national values intended to
constrain the political discretion only of dissenting localities) and national
values pursued with the motive of self-constraint (national values intended
to constrain the political discretion of both local majorities and national or
congressional majorities). 41 Part II concludes, based on the premise of
constitutional continuity, that if constitutionally mandated restrictions on
local democratic discretion chosen by past constitutional majorities of "the
people" indeed reflect a desire for self-constraint-a desire to favor some
value to a greater extent than ordinary political majorities would choose in
everyday congressional decisionmaking-the impetus for developing constitutional mandates more coherent than those chosen by ''the people" of
the past must be the development of ordinary, everyday political values, held by
"the people" today, beyond those held by "the people" of the past, toward the
original constitutional mandates. 4 2 Thus might the tension of constitutional
self-constraint be maintained both in check and intact, at the level desired
by "the people."
In part III, the Article applies this general analysis to the two
paradigmatic contexts in which the tension between the political source of
constitutional provisions and the philosophical methods of judicial analysis
has been particularly intense: privacy and equal protection, as applied to
se:mal acts and homosexual people, respectively.43 The Article suggests
that given a goal of identifying the constitutional values of "the people"
today, the notion of a broad and generic constitutional right of privacy,
derived from the "logical" implications of (or "emanations" from) relatively
specific "privacy" rights established by the first, third, fourth, and fifth
amendments, has likely been an unwarranted judicial invention-an excessive pursuit of normative coherence at the expense of concerns that "the
39. See ir.fra text accompanying notes 107-09. By no means does this goal necessarily
release the constitutional analyst to pursue the methodology of Justice Brennan, or that of
Ronald Dworkin. Rather, as later analysis will suggest, this goal conceives "the people" as being
no less conwntious political competitors than were those who actually framed and ratified
constitutiomil provisions. Ronald Dworkin underplays such contentiousness by emphasizing
th.:· value of "integrity.'' He suggests that people have an impulse for consistency-coherence-in pursuing their values. S1•e R. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 183-84. One may accept this
a5 true, but still question how much weight people place on the value of integrity. See infra note
209.
40. See i1!fra te:'t accompanying notes I I 0-28.
41. See i1!fra te:'t accompanying notes I45-60.
·12. See i1!fra te:<t accompanying notes I61-66.
43. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
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people" probably wish to retain for democratic compromise.44 The Article
reaches this conclusion by comparing the everyday political values among
"the people" who apparently made constitutional choices of self-constraint
to protect relatively specific areas of "privacy" in the first, third, fourth, and
fifth amendments with the everyday political values among "the people"
today. It suggests "the people" today are just as inclined to violate the
prohibitions established by these amendments as were "the people" who
originally struck a constitutional balance between their desire to protect
certain values against undue intrusion, and a concern that their everyday
democratic discretion not be excessively constrained. Reasoning from the
premise of constitutional continuity, this section concludes that there has
not been a development of relevant everyday political values among "the
people" that could justify the judicial development of "the people's"
preferred constitutional mandates so far beyond those chosen by past
constitutional majorities.
Part III then examines the judicial development of the equal protection clause from an original understanding that intended not to prohibit
racial segregation, and indeed, not to prohibit many other forms of racial
discrimination, to today's far more expansive interpretation. Under modem equal protection clause doctrine, not only has racial segregation been
deemed constitutionally impermissible, but all governmental actions undertaken because of racial prejudice and certain majoritarian choices undertaken because of gender prejudice have been deemed constitutionally
impermissible. Given a goal of identifying the constitutional values of "the
people" today, the Article suggests that this evolution of constitutional
mandates under the rubric of the equal protection clause is supportable. It
reaches this conclusion by comparing the everyday political values among
"the people" who framed and ratified the fourteenth amendment with the
everyday political values among "the people" today. This section notes that
"the people" today are far less inclined in their everyday politics to violate
the relatively limited prohibitions originally established by the fourteenth
amendment than were "the people" who chose those original prohibitions.
Based on the premise of constitutional continuity, and the premise that the
choice of constitutionally mandated restrictions on local discretion reflects
a desire among "the people" to favor certain values to a greater extent than
ordinary political majorities would choose in everyday congressional
decisionmaking, the Article concludes that because relevant values in
everyday politics throughout the nation in 1987 have developed toward
(and, indeed, well beyond) the original constitutional mandates desired by
the framers and ratifiers of 1868, there must have been a commensurate
development in the constitutional mandates of self-constraint desired by
"the people" of 1987.45
This section next suggests that public discrimination against homosexuals in 1987 presents an issue of gender discrimination, and poses much the
same analytical problem as did public discrimination against blacks in 1896,
44. See infra text accompanying notes 169-234. This statement would not be true, however,
if one defined "the people" as being, for example, Justice Blackmun. Cf supra note 32.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 240-380.
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when Plessy v. Ferguson 46 was decided. 47 The com.mon problem is this: Even
after dete1·mining as a general proposition that the development of
everyday political values throughout the nation can provide a basis from
which to infer that the constitutional mandates preferred by "the people"
today could reflect a more coherent pursuit of favored constitutional norms
than did the constitutional mandates chosen by the framers and ratifiers, a
court still must determine whether there has been sufficient development of
everyday political values to justify an inference of specific developments in
"the peopl1::!'s" preferred constitutional mandates. In other words, a court
still must determine whether "the people" today want to impose new
constitutional mandates against competing majoritarian preferences reserved by previous generations as a matter for everyday democratic
discretion. Part III suggests that this question of timing may be unanswerable for many significant constitutional conflicts.48
The Article concludes with an effort to soften the consequences of this
interpretive indeterminacy. It suggests a new manner in which courts can
more fully serve the constitutional ideals of "the people."49 In the face of
doubt about whether "the people" today would authorize courts to impose
the coherent implications of an acknowledged constitutional ideal in a
context reserved by previous generations of "the people" for democratic
discretion, a court, rather than starkly ruling that a statute is constitutionally valid or invalid, could speak to the electorate with a suggestive
declaration. A court might uphold a statute as constitutionally permissible
today, while declaring that the statute conflicts with "the people's" own
constitutional ideals of self-constraint, and that it someday must fall as
constitutionally impermissible.
Thus, the Article explicitly states a goal for constitutional analysis-to
identify the constitutional values of "the people" today. It further explicitly
posits that "the people's" values-their constitutional choices-exist only as
a function of conflict, politics, and compromise. By working from these
premises, and by working with some specific definitions of "the people" at
every step, the Article seeks to develop a view of what "the Constitution" is,
from "the people's" perspective, and what court's should be doing in interpreting the Constitution, from "the people's" perspective. From this perspective,
and by asking why "the people" would want to constrict the democratic
discretion of "the people," the Article seeks to suggest how one might better
determine whether and when the judicial declaration of constitutional
meaning moves from the conflict and jumble of politics-the politics of
both constitutional ratification and everyday legislation-toward the coherence and internal unity of philosophy.
Beyond this, the Article seeks to raise questions that may circumscribe
the usefulness of this primary analysis and, indeed, of any theory about how
judges should interpret the Constitution. By adopting "the people's" perspective, always while providing its own definition of "the people," and by
46. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
47. See mfm text accompanying notes 235-47, 380-90.
48. See mfm text accompanying notes 302-09, 314-34, 380-90.
49. See mfm text accompanying notes 391-441.
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pursuing their constitutional values for resolving contemporary social
conflict, the Article insistently begs the foundational question of how
conflict about who "the people" are-about what people have the right to
establish principles of government for their own happiness-should be (or
is) resolved. 50

JI.
A.

THE NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES

The Conflict Among Us and the Conflict Within Us: Constraint of
Others or Constraint of Self?

The Constitution constrains the discretion of legislative majorities to
· employ public power in particular ways. Constitutional restrictions are
theoretically chosen by "the people" -the same people who might pursue
their preferences through ordinary politics. Why would "the people" want
to impose constitutional restrictions on the democratic discretion of "the
people"? Put more starkly, why would those individuals who have the
power to enact a constitutional amendment, and who thus could prevail
through the national legislative process, feel any need to restrict ordinary
democratic discretion?SI
There are two fundamental explanations. The first is a consequence of
the federal structure of the United States. There are many political
communities-each with a degree of autonomy-and, therefore, many
democratic majorities. Thus, preferences held by certain local communities
50. Cf infra text accompanying notes 248-56, 456; notes 94, 306, 318, 325, 370, 376, 443,
456. This is a weakness not so much for a judge who decides a priori to pursue the values of
some self-identified group of people-for example, the strict interpretivist who seeks the
choices of the framers and ratifiers, or even one who pursues the constitutional values of "the
people" today. Much less is it a problem for those whose values the judge decides to pursue.
It is a weakness, however, for the analyst who seeks to justify his or her definition of the
relevant electorate-indeed, to justify his or her view that Llie values of that relevant electorate
should prevail. See infra note 456 and accompanying text. As Ronald Dworkin has stated:
Some part of any constitutional theory must be independent of the intentions or
beliefs or indeed acts of the people the theory designates as Framers. Some pan must
stand on its own political or moral theory; othenvise the theory would be wholly
circular .... It would be like the theory that majority will is the appropriate technique
for social decision because that is what the majority wants.
Dworkin, supra note 24, at 496 (footnote omitted).
51. Groups make choices as a function of choice-making by individuals. Thus, to understand the process of group choice-making, the motives and values of individuals must be
considered.
Additional problems posed by rationalizing-interpreting-the corporate product of political compromise are not immediately relevant for addressing this question, and the special
implications of interpersonal compromise for the issue of politically resolved conflict versus
judically interpreted coherence will not be considered until the next section. The question for
this section concerns the motivations that individuals might have for seeking restrictions on
democratic discretion. Thus, for purposes of this discussion, the will of "the people" will be treated as
if it were the product of perfect agreement among a portion of the population sufficient to comprise a
constitutional majority.
This approach of equating an individual's values with those of a legally empowered group
has been pursued in literature developing theories of group choice. See, e.g.,]. BUCHANAN & G.
TULLOCK, supra note 1, at 9 ("[T]he analysis of group interests leaves us one stage removed
from the ultimate choice-making process which can only take place in individual minds.'').
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might conflict with those held by a majority of the nation. If "the people"
who comprise that national consensus were sufficiently offended by the
policies of dissenting localities, the national majority might seek to disable
those communities by withdrawing the relevant local political discretion. 52
Call this motive "constraint of others."
The ~econd reason that "the people" might want to restrict the
democratic discretion of "the people" is a consequence not of conflicting
values held by different people, but of conflicts within each individual's
value scheme. An individual might hold inconsistent values. Such an
individual must make choices about those conflicting values, designatii:ig a
normative hierarchy according to each value's priority. Yet, individuals
evaluate their competing preferences every day, with every decision they
make. Whv would individuals want to constrain their own discretion to
pursue their political priorities at any given time?
One answer has been provided by Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton
suggested that through extraordinary and deliberate constitutional
decisionmaking, people may seek to insulate certain important values from
the relatively careless passions they themselves othenvise would pursue in
ordinary politics. Thus, in Federalist No. 78, Hamilton notes the supremacy
of constitutional values over choices made by legislatures. He states:
"[W]here the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in
opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges
ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought to
regulate thdr decisions by the fundamental laws rather than by those which
are not fundamental."53
Although this passage by itself does not explain why "the people"
would choose to restrict their own political discretion through a constitution-for, presumably, a legislature roughly reflects the current desires of
"the people" - Hamilton goes on to make the necessary argument:
[The] independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those
ill humors which the arts of designing men, or the influence of
particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people
themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better
information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in
the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community. Though I trust the friends of the proposed Constitution will
never concur with its enemies in questioning that fundamental
principle of republican government which admits the right of the
people to alter or abolish the established Constitution,. whenever
they find it inconsistent with their happiness; yet it is not to be
inferred from this principle that the representatives of the people,
whenev1?r a momentar)' inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of
!'12. These .:ompeting impulses-to impose one's will on others, and to insulate oneself
from others-have been the root of the federalist struggle from the foundation of the United
States, and indeed, have been at the root of all interpersonal conflict.
53. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 468 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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their constituents incompatible with the provisions of the existing Constitution would, on that account, be justifiable in a violation of those
• •
prov1s10ns
. . . .54
This view thus posits a large component of "the people" -a constitutional
majority-who choose a route of delayed gratification55 and charge a
relatively independent fiduciary-a court-with the task of protecting their
own preferred yet vulnerable values from themselves. Call this motive
"constraint of self."56

54. Id. at 469 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The emph~sized passage demonstrates
that constitutional limits on legislative discretion were intended as insurance not simply against
a government that inaccurately represents popular sentiment, but also against a government
that responds too well to popular passions that "the people" themselves have identified as
constitutionally problematic. Cf. Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1027-31 (blurring distinction
between accuracy of legislative representation and type of popular values legislature is equipped
to represent). See infra note 56.
55. The motive of self-constraint may be reflected not only in affirmative restrictions on
one's own democratic discretion, but also in the choice to join a federal political community
and to submit oneself to the authority of others. For example, the choice by thirteen relatively
independent states to grant Congress authority over "Commerce . . . among the several
States," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, reflected a decision by some to sacrifice short-term
economic interests in favor of the greater potential for long-term economic development. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 90 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("A unity of commercial, as
well as political, interests can only result from a unity of government.").
56. One must emphasize that unless society unanimously agrees about some ideal of
self-constraint, this motive must be supplemented by a desire to constrain others as well. Cf. C.
BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 107 (1960) (''.Judicial review is the people's institutionalized
means of self-control."); L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 14, 35, 238 (1986) (examining
first amendment's IJrOtection of speech as species of "self-restraint").
Bruce Ackerman has detected a notion of constitutional dualism in The Federalist No. 78, but
has characterized the dualism less in terms of individuals' internally conflicting values, than in
terms of Congress as a false or distorted representation of popular desires, and the
Constitution as the true representation of popular desires. See Ackerman, supra note 33, at
1029-30.
Although this conceptualization seems supported by Hamilton's own juxtaposition of "the
will of the legislature" versus "that of the people, declared in the Constitution," THE FEDERALIST
No. 78 at 468 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), one could hardly deny that legislatures at
least roughly reflect contemporary popular sentiment, or that sometimes they quite accurately
translate popular desires into legislation. One must at least accept that they do so better than
courts, if one accepts that legislatures should, in general, govern in a democracy.
Indeed, Hamilton did not deny that legislatures well express popular sentiment. His
concerns were with the type of popular desires that moved legislatures-the whims and
passions of the moment. Thus, Hamilton did not baldly juxtapose "the will of the legislature"
against the will "of the people," but "the will of the legislature" against the will "of the people
declared in the Constitution." Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, the question is not so much whether the Congress or the Constitution truly reflects
the will of "the people"; both do. The question concerns which expression of their will "the
people" want to prevail.· Elsewhere, Ackerman does frame such a distinction between
constitutional values and ordinary political values. "The Federalist nonetheless places a high
value on public-regarding forms of political activity, in which people sacrifice their private
interests to pursue the common good in transient and informal political association."
Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1020; see also id. at 1033-34 (discussing the dilemmas of private
citizenship).
John Stuart Mill implied that choices for self-constraint might be essential to human nature,
and consistent with utilitarianism:
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Do these two motives for constraining democratic discretion-the
intent to constrain only the offensive political discretion of others and the
intent to constrain both the errors of others and one's own discretion to
pursue everyday political passions that will be regretted in the constitutional morning-have different implications for the extent to which courts
properly seek to develop coherent principle from perceived normative
conflict? An observer who picks apart any given value scheme articulated by
a constitutional majority might identify the same normative clashes
whether "the people" intended the value scheme to constrain only the
political discretion of dissenting localities or to constrain their own political
discretion as well. 57 Nevertheless, although the same loci of normativeconflict "logically" may exist in each of these species of constitutional
constraint, the source of relevant normative conflict-"the people" -might
choose different loci of normative conflict as relevant for defining constitutional meaning.
To put the matter more concretely, imagine a parent who hires a
nanny to supervise a child's welfare and development. The parent authoriz1:!s Nanny to regulate the young daughter's diet and exercise. The parent
also instructs Nanny that the daughter may watch as much television as she
wants.
Nanny perceives normative tension-one might unfairly call it hypocrisy-in the parent's directives regarding the daughter's behavior, as well as
between those directives and the parent's own behavior. Nanny believes
that the child watches too much television. Beyond this, she concludes that
the parent. her employer, eats too much, exercises too little, and watches
too much television. She says the following to her employer:
If you truly are concerned about the welfare and development
Men often, from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer good,
though they know it to be the Jess valuable .... Capacity for the nobler feelings is in
mo5t natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by
mere want of sustenance ....
. . . On a question which is the best wonh having of two pleasures, ... a pan from
its moral attributes and from its consequences, the judgment of those who are
qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them,
must be ~.dmitted as final. ... When, therefore, those feelings and judgment declare
the pleas•.1res derived from the higher faculties to be preferable in kind, apart from
the question of intensity, to those of which the animal nature, disjoined from the
higher faculties, is susceptible, they are entitled on this subject to the same regard.
j.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTI', AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 12-13 (1951).
57. For example, a norm holding that no state shall discriminate on the basis of race in
contract Jaw, but that states may discriminate on the basis of race in education, can be held with
the motive of constraining one's own everyday political discretion (as well as the discretion of
othl rs), or with the motive of constraining only other people's everyday political discretion. If
held with the former motive, the dccisionmaker fears that he or she, as well as others, will vote
to violate the norm in everyday politics, and wants to prevent that possibility from occurring.
If held with the latter motive, the decisionmaker is concerned only about other people
choosing to give inadequate weight to the norm, rather than with errors in exercising his own
political discretion.
In either ca;e, an observer might wonder why discrimination in contract Jaw is unacceptable,
while di~crimination in public education is acceptable. Why does the value that explains the
evil of racial discrimination in employment fail to suggest that racial disaimination in housing
is c\il as well? See infra text accompanying notes 271-86.

CONSTITUTIONAL INTENT

771

of your child, you should forbid her to watch so much television.
Furthermore, if welfare and development are appropriate values
for your child, they are also appropriate values for you. Therefore, I have taken the liberty of selling your daughter's television
set, and I have developed a health regimen for you.
Nanny is promptly fired.
Nanny was perfectly correct in sensing clashing values in her orders. A
value of child welfare and development, like any other articulated value,
has an expansive potential to be liberated and realized upon logical
reflection. The expansive potential reaches in two dimensions-what
activities are covered and who is covered-and its logical reach is extended
at every apparent limit with the simple question: "Why?" Nanny chose to
resolve those conflicts by favoring one particular value underlying her duty
to promote the welfare and development of the child, at the expense of her
employer's concern for the child's-and the employer's own-enjoyment of
everyday living. Thus, Nanny's pursuit of coherence exceeded her authority because she was hired to implement her employer's value scheme-with
all its conflicts and apparent inconsistencies.
Consider the implications of a situation in which our value definer is
concerned with self-constraint. Our subject values physical well-being for
himself, but does not trust himself to make the right decisions on a daily
basis. He believes that in the midst of distracting concerns that inevitably
plague everyday existence, he will give inadequate attention to his own
perceived interest in physical health. Consequently, he hires a personal
coach. He instructs Coach to prohibit him from eating ice cream, candy,
cookies, and other sugary delights.5 8
Coach perceives conflict in her client's value scheme. She well understands that enforcing a ban on ice cream and other sweets will serve her
client's desire for physical well-being, but wonders why her client persists in
lounging in front of the television all day. If her client is truly interested in
physical well-being, why does he fail to exercise? Toward a more coherent
pursuit of physical well-being, Coach attempts to force her client to
exercise. Not surprisingly, she is fired.
Although Coach correctly noted the clashing values comprising her
client's pursuit of physical well-being, she was not authorized to favor any
value beyond the extent desired by her client. The client demonstrated no
desire to sacrifice his passion for television in order to serve his ideal of
physical well-being.59

58. Because the client truly is interested in self-constraint, and because he realizes that he
will complain when Coach forbids him from eating his favorite sweets, the client gives Coach
the following directive: "No matter how much I complain, do not ignore my instructions for
self-constraint unless I give you superseding directives, conveyed in mirror writing and signed
with my blood." The amendment of constitutional restrictions on democratic discretion
requires the assent of "the people" manifested through an extraordinary process. See U.S.
CONST. art. V.
59. Coach faces additional problems if the client did not consider the conflict between his
desire for physical well-being and his passion for television. ·coach might, however, pursue
several alternative approaches. First, she might assume that her client did, in fact, evaluate the
relative worth of these two competing values-even if at a subconscious level-and therefore
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If we change our hypothesis about the client's priorities, Coach's
obligations change as well. Assume that the client now views physical fitness
not simply as a static value to be weighed against competing preferences,
but as an ideal toward which he should strive. He hires a coach not only to
prevent him from eating food that will harm his health, but also to force
him to engage in activities that will promote his physical well-being. Thus,
Coach has been authorized to favor one value at the expense of others and
to help her employer strive toward an ideal.60
Yet Coach, who is also a philosopher, might still perceive normative
tension if she ponders why the client values progressive physical fitness.
Coach knows that her client values progressive physical fitness because the
employer 'Values personal accomplishment. There are avenues of personal
accomplishment in addition to physical fitness, however, and Coach sees
that her client, although progressing toward physical fitness, fails to
develop other faculties of potential accomplishment. Toward pursuing the

leave television to the client's daily discretion. Alternatively, Coach might assume that her
client did not consider the relevance of watching television to his ideal of physical well-being
and ask the client for more guidance. Of course, to get a fair reading of the client's values of
5elf-con~traint, Coach must put the client in a sober frame of mind, being especially careful to
avoid the i5sue during the client's favorite program. A court in the analogous constitutional
situ.:ition is not so fortunate. Professor Brest suggests that when the intent of the normative
authority i5 indeterminate, "the judge's [interpretive] decision must be rooted elsewhere," see
Bre<.t, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understandmg, 60 B.U.L. RE\. 204, 211 (1980), yet
Bre<.t does not develop criteria for determining where the proper "elsewhere" might be. Cf
infra notes 330, 362.
If Coach, (,ke the Court, cannot return to the client for more guidance, she can only
extrapolate from the decision her client did make and infer the decision the client might have
made had he thought about the conflict between watching television and his ideal of physical
well-being. One might note that television provides a different pleasure than does eating ice
cream. Coach lacks any information about how highly the client values watching television;
indeed, Coach faces similar problems if she considers the conflict between the client's passion
for red meat and the ideal of physical well-being. Although eating red meat and eating ice
cream provide what might appear to be pleasure in the same general category-pleasing the
palate-Coach does not know how highly her client values red meat. Even if the coach knew
thi5, she must postulate that the client, to serve his ideal of physical well-being, is willing to
suffer more tC•tal everyday pain than he originally envisioned. Given the specific nature of the
client's instrnctions, the relatively few pleasures that the client was willing to forgo, and the
many harmfo l pleasures that the client did not choose to forgo, Coach can reasonably
conclude that she is not authorized to impose more daily pain of self-constraint than the client
originally authorized. Cf Dworkin, supra note 24, at 486.
u; however the client loses his passion for sweets, and therefore no longer feels the pain of
self-con~traint from the earlier instructions, Coach might well have a basis for imposing new
remktions on her client's eating habits. See infra text accompanying notes 204-15 (discussing
prhacy), 302-Hl (discussing equal protection).
60. Depending on how clearly the employer stated the instrnctions, Coach may face
sigmficant dilemmas in deciding how far, and how quickly, to push her client. Does the client
want to be an Olympic athlete? For the next Olympic games, or for games in the distant
future? If the client has given no indication about how far, or how fast, he wi5hes to be pushed,
Coach must guess about her client's desires. The employer's complaints about any mandated
health regimen might suggest that Coach has gone too far, yet since she was hired precisely to
force her client to do what at one level he does not want to do, the significance of any protests
is undermined. See supra note 58. Given the nature of their relationship, the client could well
protest whenever Coach does what she was hired to do. For a discussion of similar issues in the
comext of equal protection, see infra text accompanying notes 287-309.

CONSTITUTIONAL INTENT

773

value of personal accomplishment in a more coherent way, Coach attempts
to force her client to read Shakespeare. She is fired.
Although Coach was correct in perceiving normative conflict, she was
not authorized to do anything about it. She was not authorized to favor the
general value of personal accomplishment by pushing her employer toward
its logical implications. Although the client was concerned about selfconstraint in the service of a specific goal, he did not choose to sacrifice
pleasures in the service of other logically related goals. This logical
incoherence, although perhaps messy from Coach's philosophical point of
view, is analytically insignificant given the job she was hired to perform.
The "incoherence" is simply a function of the employer's value scheme-a
function of his adherence to many competing concerns.
Thus, when the employer hires a coach, with the motive of selfconstraint, he wants his coach to help him pursue his value of physical
fitness in a relatively coherent fashion. But whether his commitment to
self-constraint is stated as a static ideal or as a progressive ideal, the
employer does not want to pursue coherent implications of physical fitness
beyond his own concern for self-constraint. Rather, the employer wants to
pursue his preferred yet vulnerable ideal to the extent articulated in his
special instructions to his coach-a degree of commitment that is coherent
with respect to the decisions the employer otherwise would make in ordinary, daily
decisionmaking.
This analysis has several implications for the tension between the
judicial pursuit of coherence in constitutional analysis and the political
source of constitutional values. First, and quite obviously, given a premise
that "the people have an original right to establish, for their future
government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to
their own happiness," 61 courts have authority to pursue constitutional
coherence only to the extent "the people" intend for them to do so. 62
Second, if members of a national majority are concerned only with
constraining the discretion of local communities that othenvise would
deviate from a national compromise, there is no basis for judicial pursuit of
normative coherence beyond that established by the national electorate's
daily accommodation of their competing interests. Individuals comprising
a majority of the nation, like the parent who has hired a nanny, have
determined their balance of competing norms, and are satisfied with their
ability to do so. The majority may change that balance ih the future, but
they, not their judicial fiduciary, must choose to change the balance. 63
61. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
62. Compare this personification of the community, and its implications, with that of
Ronald Dworkin, supra note 30.
63. More precisely, a court must change the balance only on the theoretical basis that a
current national majority would adopt some new ad hoc compromise. Any judicial decision
must seek to mirror current democratic preferences as precisely as possible. See, e.g., G.
CALABRESI, supra note 14, at 106. Furthermore, such judicial decisions must be subject to
revision by the legislature since they are based on a court's estimate of current democratic
preferences. Dean Calabresi advocates judicial revision of statutes that seem "out of line with
dominant principles, with the fabric of the whole statutory and common law." Id. at 90. This
"occasional use of judicial powers to allocate the burden of inertia" would "permitD a
legislative reconsideration." Id. at 90-91; see infra text accompanying notes 145-56, 216-29.

774

72

IOWA LAW REWEW

753

[1987]

Third, if members of a national majority are concerned with selfconstraint, they lack faith in their own ability to make proper choices on a
daily basis. A national majority's choice to constrain itself, as well as
dissenting localities, is reflected in a desire for a court, like the coach, 64 to
favor the coherent implications of some values over others by realigning the
matrix of values that otherwise would be struck in everyday national politics. Such
a desire for self-constraint is a function of normative conflict within
individual decisionmakers, rather than among many competing
decisionmakers.

B.

Self-Constraint and the Implications of Constitutional Relationships

In the previous section, the interpretive problems posed by conflicting
values were viewed from the perspective of individual choice-the internal
compromise of an individual's many competing values. The problems of
interpreting individual choices were made relevant to the problems of
interpreting constitutional provisions by assuming that all people necessary
to ratify a constitutional provision had exactly the same value scheme. 65 We
can now consider how conflict among individuals might affect the propriety
of a court's pursuit of normative coherence in defining constitutional
meaning.
This section will confront two questions. First, do constitutionally
mandated restrictions on local discretion reflect a motive of self-constraint,
or might people ratify such constitutional restrictions simply to constrain
others? Second, if one determines that "the people" are concerned with
constraining the political discretion of both dissenting localities and themselves, can one justify judicial pursuit of normative coherence beyond the
political compromises wrought by "the people" in framing their constitutional mandates of self-constraint?66

64. For another analogy between the Court and a sports figure, see C. BJ.ACK, supra note 56,
at 178 (At bsue is whether it is "undemocratic" for the people themselves to decide they "want
a body ~uch as the Court to do the job of constitutional umpiring."). I choose the coach analogy
because "umpire" implies one who resolves disputes among contending parties, while coach
implies one who exhorts an individual to favor and develop some among his or her own
competing concerns.
65. See su/Jra note 51.
66. One might employ Ronald Dworkin's terminology and suggest that the question
concerns the extent to which constitutional provisions reflect chosen "policies" or chosen
"principles." ''Policies" may reflect the accommodation of many competing considerations, and
tiJ{·refore can be completely articulated only as a complex collection of specific choices.
"Principles," however, reflect one (or a few) normative consideration(s) that cannot be
compromised by other concerns. See R. DWORKIN, suprn note 23, at 22-23; see also Wellington,
Nutcs on Adjudication, supra note 14, at 222-25 (discussing distinction between "principles" and
"policies" in Judicial context). A similar notion has been expressed by Robert Nozick. Nozick
distingui511es "moral goals," which may be compromised by more important considerations,
from "moral side constraints," which are absolute and inviolable by any competing value. See
R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28-33 (1974).
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Do Constitutionally Mandated Restrictions on Local Discretion
Reflect a Motive to Constrain Self as well as Others?

Democracy is a process for resolving conflict among people. It is often
conceived as a system in which each person has equal voting power with
which to pursue personal preferences. 67 Whether or not political power is
distributed equally among individuals, the individual's capability to achieve
personal desires is a function of the political power and value schemes of
other people. 68 An individual can vindicate personal desires through public
power only if those preferences are supported by a majority of the relevant
electorate. 69
Because of this mutual dependence, and because different individuals
are not equally committed to their various competing concerns, people can
maximize public implementation of their own value schemes only by
trading votes and joining coalitions. Thus, for corporate decisionmaking,
given conflict among people and limited individual power, compromise is
inevitable, because compromise is a matter of rational self-interest. 70
Indeed, assuming that each individual can bargain with whatever political
power she has, a political compromise reflects each individual's view of the
best she could get, given her limited status71 in the political structure.
Constitutional provisions such as the equal protection clause and the
first amendment (assuming that "the people" intended its incorporation
against the states) 72 reflect 'a desire among "the people" to disable local
democratic discretion. Constitutional provisions are more difficult to enact
and to change than are statutes. Thus, a national political compromise is
less vulnerable to amendment if framed as a constitutional provision rather
than as a statute. 73 Although the motive of self-constraint is implicit in the
Hamiltonian justification for judicial review, and to this extent implicit in
constitutionally mandated restrictions on ordinary democratic discretion,
one can speculate that people might frame a particular national compromise as a constitutional mandate, relatively invulnerable to political change,
67. See, e.g., R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 35-61 (1956) (to extent that system
deviates from principle of "one person, one vote," political power is distributed unequally).
68. See, e.g., R. ABRAMS, FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
THEORY OF COLLECTIVE CHOICE 21-22 (1980).
69. By this I mean a majority among those voting, or the active plurality of the political
community.
70. See]. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note I, at 145 (A voter's "welfare can be improved
if he accepts a decision contrary to his desire in an area where his preferences are weak in
exchange for a decision in his favor in an area where his feelings are stronger. Bargains among
voters can, therefore, be mutually beneficial.").
71. See supra note 68 and accompanying te.xt.
72. See infra note 194.
73. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 49 (1980)
(discussing difficulty and rarity of constitutional amendment); Tribe, A Constitution We are
Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 HARV. L. REv. 433, 441-42 (1983) ("Highly
specific and controversial substantive restrictions-amendments banning intoxicating liquors,
federal budget deficits, or handguns, for example-seem out of place in the document
regardless of the desirability of the substantive policies they codify. As the history of
prohibition illustrates, enacting such measures through constitutional amendment rather than
by statute renders them dangerously resistant to modification."); see also infra note 87.
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simply to constrain the political discretion of localities with obnoxious
values.N Thus, it will be helpful to determine the extent to which people
might seek to undermine the forums of everyday democratic politics by
freezing a particular national compromise as a constitutional mandate.
Consider the implications of conflict among people pursuing a norm
without any concern for constraining their own everyday political discretion, but :;olely with the desire to constrain the democratic discretion of
dissenting localities. Assume, for example, that there is a rough national
consensus holding that a fetus has certain rights to birth and, consequently,
that abortion is immoral. More specifically, suppose that one quarter of the
population favors an absolute prohibition of abortion. Another quarter of
the population wants to prohibit abortion except when the life of the
mother is endangered by the pregnancy. A third quarter of the population
wants to prohibit abortion except when the life of the mother is endangered, or when the pregnancy results from rape. The final quarter of the
population believes that abortion should be a woman's personal decision.
Because there is a disagreement among those who comprise this rough
national consensus about what particular rights a fetus should be deemed to
possess, some must compromise their preferences if they are to enact an
anti-abortion provision. One possible compromise would be corporate
adoption of the middle position-prohibition of abortion except when the
mother's life is endangered by the pregnancy.75 The first quarter of the
population would sacrifice their preference that abortions be prohibited
even if the mother's life is endangered; the third quarter would sacrifice
their desire that abortions be permitted in the event of rape. 76

74. One might note an additional motive for constitutional restrictions on governmental
actions. People may wish to constrain abuse and corruption by officials seeking to insulate
themselves from accountability to the electorate. This motive, although significant, is
deddedly promajoritarian. Examples of provisions that, at least in part, reflect this motive
im lude the first amendment's prohibition of governmental actions restricting the freedom of
spt!cch and of the press, see A. l\IEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONITITL'TIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE I 6 (1960) ("[T]he government which controls us must itself be controlled."), and
the fourteemh amendment's restrictions on political gerrymandering, see Davis v. Bandemer,
106 S. Ct. 2797, 2810 (1986); see al5o Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give
It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1223, 1246 (1985) (''The Court's current application of the
delegation doctrine, by way of an amorphous and ultimately meaningless definition of
legislative power, undercuts the accountability the Constitution seeks to protect."). Justice
White has suggested that broad delegations of rulemaking authority, and legislative vetoes,
present constitutional problems of accountability. See INS v. Chadha, 462 L".S. 919, 985 (1983)
(White, J., dissenting) ("The wisdom and constitutionality of these broad delegations are
matter5 that still have not been put to rest.").
75. Thi~ may be based on several assumptions: first, that people hav·~ equal bargaining
power in other political contexts; second, that each person would prefer a prohibition of
abortion that is imperfect from her perspective, over no prohibition at all; and third, that the
mc·mbers of the pro·choice group are unwilling to compromise with the anti-abortion coalition
in any way. Cf illfra note 86. Other conditions would yield this compromise as well. The
following analysis is concerned with the d}namics of political interaction and employs this
compromise as an illustrative point of departure. Cf infra note 76.
76. Unequal bargaining power with respect to this particular issue, of course, would
su1mest a different result. Several variables might contribute to unequal bargaining power.
These include the popular support for one's point of view, the strength of one's commitment
to this particular issue compared to the commitment of one's opponents, and the relationship
of these first two factors to other political issues.
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Why would those who are part of the rough national consensus seek to
impose their will through some sort of constitutional provision? If Congress
lacked constitutional authority to protect the unborn with national legislation, one might have an obvious answer. Under those circumstances, "the
people" of the nation could impose their preferences on dissenting localities only by amending the Constitution. Would they, however, prefer to
amend the Constitution by granting Congress aut..liority to regulate abortion, or by restricting abortion through a constitutional mandate, or both?
Toward addressing this question, assume that Congress does have
constitutional authority to protect the unborn by regulating or prohibiting
abortion. With this assumption, one can consider whether and why people
concerned not with constraining their own political discretion, but with
constraining the political discretion only of dissenting localities, would view
congressional legislation as inadequate, and constitutional mandates as
necessary, to serve their ends. Because the distinctive effect of using a
constitutional mandate, rather than a congressional statute, to impose a
national norm on local dissenters is a political compromise relatively
invulnerable to change, an individual's preference for imposing a present
national compromise by constitutional mandate, rather than by statute,
must depend on two factors: first, the extent to which other people today
adhere to that individual's precise value scheme; and, second, any foreseeable
change in public values.
Assume, for example, that no member of the present national consensus will reevaluate his or her position and someday support a more
restrictive or less restrictive provision regulating abortion. Under these
circumstances, it would not matter whether today's national compromise is
framed as a constitutional mandate or as a statute. 77 No one could gain or
lose by choosing one mechanism or the other, 78 because the present
political compromise would never be altered. Thus, given foreseeably static
social values, there is no reason for people to seek both a constitutional and
statutory restriction on local discretion. 79
Now assume that the members of this national coalition anticipate the
electorate's values moving toward a more extreme pro-fetus position and
foresee greater limitations on local democratic discretion to permit aborFor example, if A feels strongly about abortion, but does not care so much about taxation,
and B feels strongly about taxation, but not so strongly about abortion, then A has a strong
bargaining position against B with respect to the abortion issue, and B has a strong bargaining
position against A with respect to the taxation issue. If, however, A does not need B's vote on
abortion-because there are enough other people who agree with A on both abortion and
taxation-then A's bargaining position against B is greatly strengthened. B simply does not
have that much to offer A. See R. ABRAMS, supra note 68, at 5-39.
77. This ascription of strategic motives for determining whether national action should be
taken through a statute or a constitutional mandate is entirelr. realistic.
Ordinanly, we have some idea of whether we are more hkely to be in a majority or
minority in a particular group. In fact, a good deal of the political process consists of
ascertaining the vote count. Moreover, we learn relatively quickly over time whether
we have political allies and the kinds of issues which concern us.
R. ABRAMS, supra note 68, at 26; cf. infra note 90.
78. Indeed, people increase the risk of losing their preferences through erroneous judicial
interpretations immune to legislative correction. See infra note 84.
79. Cf. infra note 83.
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tion. For example, members of the national consensus believe that some
individuals who today favor the "life of the mother exception" will someday
adopt the position that abortion should never be permitted. Under these
circumstances, again, the electorate would gain nothing by framing today's
national compromise as a constitutional mandate. Any future inclination
toward greater restrictions on local discretion to permit abortion could be
achieved l·~gislatively, given our premise that Congress has authority to
protect the unborn by regulating or prohibiting abortion. so
If, however, members of the coalition perceive that some among them
might weaken in their opposition to abortion-for example, that those who
today favor only the "life of the mother exception" might someday support
a rape exception as well-it would be in the interests of those who
unwaveringly hold a pro-fetus position more extreme than a future congressional majority might adopt to frame the current national compromise as a
constitutional mandate. This is so for the following reason: If the Constitution itself mandated certain rights of the unborn, and left states with the
di5cretion to permit abortion only to save the mother's life, Congress'
legislative discretion would be similarly bound. Thus, a future Congress,
representing the national electorate's less intense commitment to the
unborn, would lack the discretion either to remove those constitutionally
mandated restrictions on local discretion, or to enact federal abortion
programs that themselves violate principles formally applicable against
only the states.Hi

80. Sec Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966) (because § 5 of fourteenth
am1;·ndment is grant of legislative discretion, Congress may choose to protect intended
beneficiaries •)f amendment from victimization by states and localities to greater extent than
required by amendment itself); see also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (state
legislature may afford greater protection to constitutionally favored class than Constitution
itself requires).
Of course, those who unwaveringly hold an anti-abortion position that is more moderate than
a future cor1gressional majority can be expected to adopt might want to amend the
Constitution to limit Congress' legislative discretion to regulate or prohibit abortion. Thus, the
prochoice pe•Jple and the people who object to abortion except when the mother's life is
threatened arid when the pregnancy is the result of rape, might get together to circumscribe
Congw.s' preexisting authority to regulate or prohibit abortion. See infra note 86. Regardless
of whether these unwavering moderates have the political clout to prevail, one must
emphasize that a desire to limit Congress' discretion to impose a national compromise on
locHlities is antithetical to a desire to impose a national compromise on localities by means of
a constitutional mandate. The first motive is prolocal; the second motive is pronational. The
first motive characterized the antifederalists of 1787; the second motive characterized the
Northern nat<Onalists of 1868. Cf infra note 86.
81. Congr·~ss' hypothetical authority to pass protective legislation for the unborn would not
be authority w abrogate constitutional restrictions on local discretion by purporting to restore
local authoritV. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318 (1851) ("If the
Constitution excluded the States from making any law regulating commerce, certainly
Congress can,1ot regrant, or in any manner reconvey that power."); see also Katzenbach, 384
U.S. at 651 n. 10 ("Congress' power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the
guarantees of the [Fourteenth] Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict,
abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.");]. CHOPER, supra note 73, at 199 ("\\.'hen the Supreme
Court invalidates state (or private) action under the initial sections of the thirteenth,
fourteenth, or fifteenth amendments, ... these decisions may not be overturned by ordinary
federal legisl<1tion."). Indeed, if § 5 did give Congress authority to "dilute" or othenvise
"abrogate" th•~ restrictions on local discretion imposed by the fourteenth amendment, the
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Conversely, still assuming that Congress does have legislative authority
to restrict abortions, and that "the people" are acting only to constrain
dissenting localities, it would be against the interests of the wavering
moderates to pursue a constitutional mandate reflecting their current (and
shaky) preferences. Those very considerations that would motivate the
unwavering pro-fetus extremists to seek a constitutional mandate reflecting
today's nationai compromise should motivate those individuals who might
adopt progressively less extreme pro-fetus views to oppose framing a constitutional mandate reflecting today's national compromise. Without such a
constitutional mandate, the waverers could achieve their anticipated ends
through Congress. They have every reason not to bind their future
discretion with a constitutional knot. 82
Thus, those who unwaveringly wish to protect the unborn to a greater
extent than a future national majority might choose would want to frame
amendment would have provided no truly constitutionally mandated guarantees at all. Rather,
the amendment would have been simply a grant of national legislative authority.
That Congress itself would lack discretion to violate constitutionally mandated restrictions
on state discretion is suggested by Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). In that case the
Court determined that the requirements of equal protection, formally applicable only against
the states, are applicable as well against the federal government through the fifth
amendment's due process clause, because to hold othenvise "would be unthinkable." Id. at 500.
This notion of "reverse incorporation" has long been criticized. Indeed, to suggest that an
older provision can "incorporate" a newer provision is illogical nonsense. Nevertheless,
because a newer provision can supersede, or othenvise change the meaning of, an older
provision, there may be a better rationale based on inferences about political motivation from
the structure of constitutional choices: It is implausible to posit that if a majority of people in
three quarters of the states wish to prohibit violation of certain values within their own states,
they would nevertheless choose to authorize a mere majority of their own representatives in
the Congress to violate those same values. If this rationale for "incorporating" against the
national government constitutional restrictions that formally apply against only the states
resembles that of self-constraint, it is because I have moved from considering the motives of
a minority {the unwavering moderates) in seeking constitutionally mandated restrictions on
local discretion, to considering the motives of a constitutional majority necessary to enact such
a constitutional provision.
Even if one continues to doubt that constitutionally mandated restrictions formally
applicable only against the states should be viewed as applying against Congress as well, the
unwavering extremists simply could seek to frame the present national compromise in a way
that explicitly limits both state and national legislative discretion. The wavering moderates,
however, would be no more favorably disposed to this proposal than they would be to the
original proposal formally applicable only against the states. With this option, it would be even
clearer that the wavering moderates, by supporting the constitutional amendment, would be
choosing to constrain their own discretion. See infra text accompanying notes 82-85.
82. This rationale for refusing to entrench a particular political compromise as a constitutional mandate parallels a rationale of self-interest for protecting the freedom of speech.
Even those people with a moderate commitment to some current community norm are well
served by a doctrine that ensures others the opportunity to convince them to adopt another
point of view. If those people with moderate preferences for a majoritaria.n view are indeed
convinced to change their minds, their welfare, as they perceive it, will be augmented. Only
those who are unalterably committed to a certain idea will question whether there should be
a constitutionally guaranteed right to speak about the idea. This dynamic of motivations
explains why extremist minority points of view have been so vulnerable to public suppression
despite the strong commitment to speech when viewed in the abstract, or in the context of
relatively insignificant contests between Democrats and Republicans. Cf L. BOLLINGER, supra
note 56, at 22-42 (protection of extreme viewpoints difficult to justify as a matter of
conventional first amendment theory).
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the present national compromise as a constitutional mandate; those waverers who are the very basis for the anticipated moderation in the national
m;,tjority's commitment to the unborn would not want to frame today's
compromise as a constitutional mandate. Of course, the unwavering
extremists could enact such a constitutional mandate only if they were
sufficiently numerous to comprise a constitutional majority. If they comprise such a solid national majority, however, they would have little to fear
from the wavering moderates and, therefore, would have no reason to seek
a constitmional mandate to supplement their legislative authority. 83 Indeed, if these unwavering extremists framed today's national consensus as
a constitutional mandate, they would unnecessarily invite the complications-and risks-of judicial review. 84
One might conclude, therefore, that if Congress has relevant legislative autho:city, "the people" are not likely to enact a constitutional mandate
intended to constrain the political discretion only of the localities that
otherwise would deviate from some national compromise. Given the basic
motivation of constraining the political discretion only of local majorities,
those with enough political clout to enact a constitutional mandate have no
need to do so, and those with a need to enact a constitutional mandate lack
the votes to do so.85
This analysis has broader implications. Those considerations undermining the desirability of framing today's national compromise as a
constitutional mandate when the national electorate already possesses
83. Some might argue that no majority can be certain that it is invulnerable to erosion, and
that it therefore makes sense for a present majority to seek a constitutional provision to
entrench its point of view. Yet, the majority is truly vulnerable only when some of its members
may change their minds in favor of fewer restrictions on local discretion. The waverers are not
going to sup:Jort a constitutional provision that restricts their discretion to waver unless they
arc· concern•:d with self-constraint as well as constraining others. This follows a first
amendment 1 heory that even members of a majority would want to protect minority speech to
protect their ow11 ability to adopt the minority viewpoint. See supra note 82.
It might b~, however, that a current majority of unwavering extremists is concerned not
about constraining the discretion of the current minority of vacillating moderates, but about
constraining the discretion of some as yet unborn political majority of vacillating moderates.
Acting with this purpose, the unwavering extremists would still be seeking to constrain the
discretion of others, not of themselves. They would be seeking to constrain the discretion of
both a present minority and future majorities. This motivation for seeking a constitutional
provision squarely presents the question of whether the past has a right to bind the present.
For discussion of this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 103-09 & note 166.
84. Such constitutional provi~ions as the equal protection clause w1;re understood as
requiring judicial interpretation. "If any original doubts existed that the Constitution
authorized the Court to fill in the interstices of constitutional provisions, the conduct of the
American judiciary made it clear that the couns felt they could not exercise their legal
mandates without such power." Cottrol, Static History and Brittle jurisprudence: Raoul Berger and
the Profhm oj Constitutional Methodolog), 26 B.C.L. REV. 353, 364 (1985); see infra note 291.
85. If a constitutional majority did enact a provision with the desire to constrain only others
and to cheat the democratic process toward protecting present majoritarian values from future
ero5ion, they would be likely to frame the constitutional provision as specifically as possible. Cf
infra notes 166, 266. If they view the best they can get from political compromise today as the
bc~.t they can ever hope to get (which one must posit to conclude that people would enact a
constitutional provision, relatively resistant to change as it is, simply with the motive of
con5training only others), then they would make sure that the precise compromise is clearly
articulated. railing to do so would defeat their purpose. See infra text accompanying notes
235-441 (disrussing equal protection clause).
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relevant legislative authority, similarly undermine the desirability of framing today's political compromise as a constitutional mandate when the
electorate lacks the authority to legislate. 86 Thus, if "the people" wish only
to disable the political discretion of localities that diverge from some rough
national compromise, and if Congress lacks constitutional authority to
vindicate those national values legislatively, "the people" would choose to
amend the Constitution not by framing t~day's national co1npromise as a
constitutional mandate, but by authorizing Congress to act. 87
86. This observation is a bit more complicated when the electorate anticipates that national
values will drift in a direction more restrictive of local discretion. Under these circumstances,
and still assuming that "the_ people" lack a motive of self-constraint, one might suggest that
those who unwaveringly hold a view that is more moderate-more permissive regarding local
discretion-than a future congressional majority can be expected to adopt might be reluctant
to empower Congress to legislate. One might suggest that to deny Congress this undesirable
legislative authority, the unwavering moderates might choose to impose today's relatively
moderate national compromise through a constitutional mandate, rather than through a
provision authorizing Congress to legislate, thus contradicting the position taken in the text.
There are two responses. First, returning to the abortion variation in which the electorate
anticipates that those presently adhering to the "life of the mother exception" will someday
adopt the pure anti-abortion position, the class of unwavering moderates might include those
who presently adhere to both the "life of the mother exception" and the "rape exception," and
those who are prochoice. For the unwavering moderates to have credible political clout, the
prochoice people must join with the more moderate anti-abortion people to frame an
anti-abortion provision. It is questionable whether the prochoice people would support an
anti-abortion position simply to ensure that an inevitable national anti-abortion compromise is
more moderate than it othenvise might be.
Second, even assuming that the prochoice people do join with the unwavering moderates
toward ensuring that an anticipated drift toward a more extreme anti-abortion position cannot
be vindicated by Congress, it is hardly clear that this goal is best served by framing today's
anti-abortion compromise as a constitutional provision rather than by framing a provision
authorizing Congress to legislate. One can restrict Congress' authority to legislate by narrowly
defining its legislative discretion. The prochoice people might view a constitutional provision
saying that "Congress shall have the power to regulate abortion, except that a right to choose
an abortion when the mother's life is endangered shall not be infringed," as less offensive than
a constitutional mandate saying that "No state shall permit abortion, except when the life of
the mother is endangered." In the former provision, any national judgment about abortion is
made by congressional choice, for which the political voice of the prochoice minority remains
formally significant. In the latter provision, the national judgment about the morality of
abortion is made directly in the Constitution and brands the prochoice electorate's continuing
objections as constitutionally irrelevant. The implicit position that the rights of the unborn
supersede the rights of the mother is framed more permanently, more solemnly, more
authoritatively, and therefore to a prochoice individual, more offensively.
Thus, even when the electorate anticipates that national values will drift in a direction more
restrictive of local discretion, and when Congress lacks preexisting authority to legislate, one
would expect any national desire to restrict local discretion to be effectuated by means of a
provision authorizing Congress to legislate, rather than by means of constitutional mandate.
Even if the unwavering moderates gain enough political clout to dictate the form in which
national action is taken, their purposes are best served by authorizing Congress to legislate in
a narrowly defined way.
87. Professor Tribe has suggested that "[a]ssuming that the commerce clause as construed
in 1919 would not have authorized Congress to legislate temperance, amending the Constitution to broaden Congress' commerce power in a general way would have been sounder than
directly constitutionalizing a controversial regulation of specific primary conduct." Tribe,
supra note 73, at 441 n.40. Tribe supports this argument with the notion that specific
regulations, such as Prohibition, "trivialize the Constitution and diminish its educative and
expressive force as part of our political and legal culture." Id. at 442; see also Tribe, Issues Raised
by Requesting Congress to Call a Constitutional Convention to Propose a Balanced Budget Amendment,
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One must emphasize, however, that the foregoing analysis has assumed a stable national electorate-that "the people" who decide whether
to frame and ratify constitutional mandates are the same people who
otherwise would have legislative discretion through Congress. Such an
as-;umpticn does not apply to the fourteenth amendment, which was
framed and ratified by the Northern electorate in anticipation of the
Southern electorate's readmission to Congress.ss Thus, further analysis is
required to determine whether the fourteenth amendment's provisions
were ratified with a motive of self-constraint, as well as that of constraining
the discredon of dissenting localities.s 9 Nevertheless, despite its limitations,
this general analysis can provide a point of departure for understanding
constitutional policymaking under circumstances of national electoral instability. It also suggests that at least when "the people" have chosen to
restrict local democratic discretion by constitutional mandate under circumstances of national electoral stability, there is a substantial basis for inferring
that they have acted with a psychology of self-constraint, in addition to a
desire to constrain the discretion of dissenting localities. 90

10 PAc. L.J. 627, 632-40 (1979). The discussion in the text suggests a reason more obviously
related to real human motivation: in the context of a stable national electorate, it makes no
sense for people concerned solely with constraining the political discretion of others to freeze
an ad hoc cc·mriromise as a rigid constitutional provision.
Why, then, Clid "the peopfe" pursue Prohil:iition through a constitutional amendment,
rather than by authorizing Congress to legislate? Perhaps Prohibition reflected an unusually
deep motive of se{f-constraint-to constrain their own behavior not only in the political arena,
but in their private lives as well. This would explain the constitutional pursuit of Prohibition
in a manner consi5tent with the dichotomous implications of constraining only others versus
constraint of others and self, which this Article seeks to develop.
88. Sec 1r1fra text accompanying notes 248-56.
89. Ste 11~(ra text accompanying notes 257-66.
90. Rath(r than viewing basic constitutional motivation as a choice between constraining
only di5senters, or constraining dissenters and self, some constitutional analysts postulate a
motive of self-protection against unpredictable future majorities. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
jurncE 136-42 (1971). Although people might be in a majority today with respect to a
particular issue, they fear that they might be in a minority tomorrow. This motive of
self-protectic•n for constraining democratic discretion is the flip side of a desire to constrain
others.
Postulatin1~ this motivation requires examining and justifying several premises. First, it
presumes that membership in present majorities and future minorities is a matter that
participants in political combat cannot predict. This is obviously true for some issues and
ob,•iou~Iy untrue for others. Cf supra notes 77, 83. Whether the Republican or Democratic
party will r•xeive more votes in four years is uncertain. Whether the Republican or
Communist party will be favored by more people in four years-or indeed, in forty years-is
far less so.
This "tran•;luscent veil of ignorance" explanation for constitutional provisions might apply to
issues in which competition is truly close and unpredictable, but cannot plausibly apply to
i&sues in which the constitutional majority is in no way vulnerable to future political defeat.
Thus, this postulated motive of self-protection for disabling democratic discretion might
justify a first amendment that prohibits content regulation of Republicans or Democrats, but
would not easily justify the same for Communists. See generally L. BOLWIGER, supra note 56, at
22-42; J. R\WI.S, supra, at 136-42. Rawls posits an entirely opaque veil, behind which people
lack knowledge not only about their future welfare and status with respect to public values, but
also about their present values and circumstances. Id. On the dangers of overemphasizing the
5ignificance of uncertain results in political decisionmaking, see J. Bt.:CHANAN & G. TULLOCK,
s11fara note 1, at 37.
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Coherence with Respect to What?

Even after concluding that a choice by "the people" to restrict local
discretion through a constitutional mandate, rather than through authorizing Congress to legislate, reflects a motive of constraining self-as well as
dissenting localities-an analyst still must interpret the content of that
constitutional choice. A court still must confront the potential for distorting
the political compromises through which the constitutional mandate was
framed and ratified by erroneously pursuing-or failing to pursuenormative coherence in defining constitutional meaning. 91
Although the preceding analysis derived from analogies to Nanny and
Coach has suggested that people acting with the motive of self-constraint
seek to protect a preferred yet vulnerable value to a greater extent than possible
through everyday decisionmaking in the ordinary national legislative process, it has
suggested no basis from which to infer that "the people" would authorize
Second, even for those issues about which foreseeable competition is close and uncertain,
positing that "the people" would choose to restrict democratic discretion with a motive of
self-protection must rest on the premise that "the people" see something special about the
contexts in which they choose to disable majoritarian action. There must be something special
about what a person loses by being in a majority that makes potential loss so significant as to
outweigh the benefits gained through present membership in a political majority. Uncertainty
about whether one's economic policy preferences will forever be supported by a majority
hardly leads to the conclusion that majorities should be constitutionally disabled from making
economic policy. Indeed, as the textual discussion suggests, close and uncertain competition
may justify protecting-indeed facilitating-the democratic process of conflict and compromise. See supra notes 82, 83.
Third, one must distinguish between a desire to disable only national legislative discretion on
"transluscent veil of ignorance" grounds and a desire to disable both national and local
discretion. Given the nation's federal structure, one might doubt future national preferences
without doubting the future of one's own state or locality. See]. CHOPER, supra note 73, at 247
(homogenous local communities are likely to seek to retain discretion because "small groups of
like-minded persons would be much more disposed than would a distant national government
to impose laws that were locally desired"). It is far more likely, therefore, that this "transluscent
veil of ignorance" explanation would motivate a desire to disable national legislative discretion
than it would motivate a desire to disable local legislative discretion. Thus, the first eight
amendments, reflecting a desire to disable Congress and protect local discretion, are far more
likely to reflect this "transluscent veil" motivation than the fourteenth amendment, which
purports to disable state and local discretion. The motive of self-protection is an issue more
relevant to community formation than to questions of disabling political majorities from
pursuing certain values once a stable political community has been formed. Consider, for
example, the applicability of these considerations to the first amendment's religion clauses, for
which the "transluscent veil of ignorance" rationale seems to have been a contributing
element. The concern was "that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in
exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of
Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects[.]" Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. l, 65 (1947)
(Rutledge, J ., dissenting) (quoting J. MADISON' MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOCS
AssESSMENTS ~ 3).
This motive of protecting oneself against intrusive majoritarian decisions should not be
confused with the motive of protecting from erosion by future majorities one's desire and
discretion to intrude on others. Cf supra note 83.
91. See BICKEL, THE SUPREME CouRT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 6-7 ( 1978). Justice Jackson,
ruminating during oral arguments for Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), said, "I
suppose that realistically the reason this case is here was that action couldn't be obtained from
Congress." ARGUMENT: THE ORAL .ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BRO\\'N v. BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55 244 (L. Friedman ed. 1969).
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courts to pursue the coherent implications of that favored value beyond the
extent agn;ed upon in the constitutional compromise. Compromise is the
inevitable consequence of each individual's attempt to maximize his or her
interests in political competition. 92 Like statutes, constitutional provisions
arc products of political combat. Even if committed to the same ideal of
self-constraint, different people will vary in their commitment to the ideal
and, therefore, in how much they are willing to give up to serve the ideal.
Returning to the analogy of the client and his coach, some clients may
want to give up cake, ice cream, and television; others only cake and ice
cream; and still others only cake, even if all are dedicated to an ideal of
physical well-being with a motive of self-constraint. When several clients
must act together to make a corporate decision, none would choose to
sacrifice that which he has the political clout to preserve. Thus, because a
political compromise reflects the best that each individual could get, none
of "the people" engaged in creating constitutional provisions would agree
to forgo benefits already won through political bargaining and compromise.
In short, the desire for self-constraint suggests that "the people" want
their court:; to play the role of Coach rather than that of Nanny. But it does
not suggest that they want their coach-like courts to force them to read
Shakespeare when they are concerned only with progressive physical
well-being.
These conclusions might appear to favor Raoul Berger's approach for
defining constitutional meaning, rather than those of Justice Brennan or
Ronald Dworkin. Courts are not authorized to develop constitutional
meaning beyond the compromises wrought by "the people" through
constitutional politics. But Berger assumes that in defining constitutional
meaning, one should consider only the particular compromises from which
each constitutional restriction on democratic discretion was framed and
ratified. This premise must be examined.

C.

The Tense of Constitutional Choices: Past Peifect or Present
Participle?
1.

Who Are "the People"?

We have considered the manner in which individuals might want to
resolve the conflict within themselves and among themselves. This inquiry
is essential for any theory that views the values of "the people" as the proper
source of constitutional meaning. Yet, embedded in this search for popular
concerns is a nagging and fundamental question: Who are "the people"
possessing "an original right to establish, for their future government, such
principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happines<."?93 Whose values are relevant, and why? 94
92. Sa su/JTa text accompanying notes 67-71.
93. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
9-1. This se.;tion considers who "the people" are by focusing on the relationship between
past and pre5cnt populations. At any given time, however, and for whatever era is authori-
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This question also is implicit in the analytical methodologies of those
who resort to the intent of the framers and ratifiers for defining constitutional meaning. Almost everyone does. Despite this common regard for
past constitutional choices, analysts disagree about what additional information, if any, courts should consider in defining constitutional meaning.
Some, like Raoul Berger, suggest that courts should consider only past
constitutional choices.95 Others, like Chief Justice Rehnquist and Henry
Monaghan, believe that exclusive reliance on the intent of the framers and
ratifiers cannot possibly resolve modern constitutional questions, and
therefore resort to drawing "analogies" between present value conflicts and
past constitutional judgments. 96 Still others, like Harry Wellington,97 Paul
Brest, 98 and Justice Brennan,99 advocate open consideration of contemporary values to supplement the ambiguous relevance of past constitutional
choices to present constitutional issues.
Despite the existence of these three self-defined camps, the nature of
their disagreement is not so clear because their reasons for looking to the
past have been neither precisely articulated nor adequately developed.
Unless one understands why, if at all, the constitutional intent of the past
tative, one must consider who "the people" are. See infra text accompanying notes 248-56;
notes 306, 318, 325, 370, 376, 443, 456. Indeed, a majority of the global population today
probably would be far happier having more control over the United States than "the people"
of the United States will allow. Cf infra note 443.
95. See R. BERGER, supra note 15, at 364 ("A judicial power to revise the Constitution
transforms the bulwark of our liberties into a parchment barrier. This it was that caused
Jefferson to say, 'Our peculiar security is in the possession of a written constitution. Let us not
make it a blank paper by construction.' "). This begs a question. What does it mean to "revise"
the Constitution? For discussion of the proposition that Berger's approach, in fact, revises the
Constitution, see infra text accompanying notes 346-60.
96. See Rehnquist, supra note 5, at 693-94 ("Where the framers of the Constitution have
used general language, they have given latitude to those who would later interpret the
instrument to make that language applicable to cases that the framers might not have
foreseen.''). But see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649-64 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Sugannan involved a challenge to a state policy of discrimination against aliens in
the civil service. In determining that classifications based on alienage should not be deemed
"suspect" for purposes of the equal protection clause, Justice Rehnquist gave no consideration
to the notion of interpretive "latitude." Instead, he mechanically relied on the observation that
"there is no language used in the Amendment, or any historical evidence as to the intent of the
Framers, which would suggest to the slightest degree that it was intended to render alienage
a 'suspect' classification, [or] that it was designed in any way to protect 'discrete and insular
minorities' other than racial minorities . . . ." Id. at 649-50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Rehnquist has applied this rigid approach to gender discrimination as well. See Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 735-46 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) Goined by
Rehnquist,].); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67-83 (1981); Michael M. v. Superior Court,
450 U.S. 464, 466-76 (1981); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217-28 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see
also Monaghan, supra note 12, at 362-63 ("I suggest that the constitutional clauses range from
the most particularized, bright-line demarcations to a set of provisions characterized by the
need for ongoing interpretation and application not to the 'views of contemporary society,' but
to the contemporary manifestations of the problems identified fry the Framers.'').
97. See generally Wellington, Nature of judicial Review, supra note 14; Wellington, Notes on
Adjudication, supra note 14.
98. See Brest, supra note 59. Professor Brest suggests that "nonoriginalist adjudication"
serves the ends of constitutional government "better than either strict or moderate originalism.'' Id. at 238.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
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should be viewed as binding, one cannot have a clear idea about how past
inlent should be treated as binding.100
The most commonly expressed reason for requiring courts to consider
the framers' and ratifiers' intent rests on a fear of judicial excess-a fear of
judicial error.1°1 To the extent that a constitutional theorist fears 'judicial
tyranny," 102 he or she might insist that original intent should be the
dominant source of judicial analysis. An extreme fear of judicial tyranny
might lead one to conclude that the framers' and ratifiers' intent should be
the exclusi11e source of constitutional analysis.
Recoi~nizing that the dispute among these three methodological
camps may revolve around the relative risks that each assigns to judicial
tyranny, however, is by itself insufficient to crystallize the nature of their
disagreement. One must probe the concept of judicial tyranny. Restricting
judicial discretion to avoid judicial tyranny implies a standard of right from
which deviation is wrong. What is that standard of right?
Then~ are two temporally-oriented possibilities. First, one might claim

100. One might believe that the framers' and ratifiers' intent is the ei:clusive proper source
of constitutional meaning as an unexamined and, therefore, unjustified first principle.
Professor Monaghan has characterized the nature of his adherence to the idea of original
intent as follows:
The authoritative status of the written constitution is a legitimate matter of debate for
political theorists interested in the nature of political obligation. That status is,
however, an incontestable first principle for theorizing about American constitutional
law. That I cannot othenvise "prove" the constitutional text to be tlte first principle is
a necessary outcome of my first principle itself. . . . For the purposes of legal
reasoning, the binding quality of the constitutional text is itself incapable of and not
in need of further demonstration.
Monaghan, supra note 12, at 383 (footnote omitted).
By refusin;~ to consider why constitutional text, as evidence of the framers' intent, was and
is viewed a~. a fundamental-let alone the exclusive-source from which to interpret
constitutional meaning, Professor Monaghan risks overlooking essential subtleties in the
manner in which past intent should be treated as binding the interpreti,·e discretion of courts.
As Ronald Dworkin has suggested, such a posture precludes one from accommodating the
ambiguity and indeterminacy inherent in the need to apply the abstraction of original intent
to particular circumstances. See Dworkin, supra note 24, at 485-87.
Some readers might suggest that I have inadequately examined or justified the premise on
which the primary analysis of this Article relies-that "the people" have a "right" to establish
principles of government for their happiness. Cf supra notes 5, 6, 94; infra text accompanying
notes 248-5ti; notes 306, 318, 325, 370, 376, 443. For an analysis from "the people's"
perspective, :~iven a definition of "the people," this is not so much a problem. See supra note
50. For other purposes, of course, such as how a judge should decide to define "the people,"
or why a judge should feel obliged to do "the people's" bidding, the premise of popular
SO\'ereignty i·1deed must be more deeply explored. See infra text accompanying notes 455-59.
I will addres!i the5e matters further in future work.
101. St'e, e.g., Berger, supra note 5, at 31. ("In truth, the principal anti-activist argument is
tlrnt the Constitution confers no judicial power to revise it."). Beyond this, Berger has
frequently noted James Madison's cautionary words:" '[If] the sense in which the Constitution
wa<. accepted and ratified by the Nation ... be not the guide in expounding it, there can be
no security ... for a faithful exercise of its powers.' " Id. at 25 n.219 (quoting 9 J. MADISON,
WmTINGS 191 (G. Hunt ed. 1910)); see also R. BERGER, supra note 15, at 3, 364; Perry, The
Aullwrity ofTPxt, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation", 58 S. CAL. L.
RE\'. 551, 55'7, 565 (1985).
102. See Tushnct, Following the Rules Lmd Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Princi/1les, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 787 (1983).
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that the intent of the framers and ratifiers should be binding because the
past has a right to bind the present-to bind its future. 103 Under this view,
judicial tyranny involves violating the right of past majorities to choose
constitutional principles to govern their progeny. Alternatively, one might
claim that "the people" of the present have the right to establish governing
principles for their own happiness. Under this view, judicial tyranny
involves deviating from the constitutional preferences of the present.
In considering whether the past has a right to bind the political
discretion of the present, imagine that "the people" of 1787 wanted to
prohibit their progeny from making constitutional choices for themselves.
Thus, imagine that instead of providing an amendment process, article V
stated, "This Constitution shall not be amended in any manner or by any
means, despite any desire among the people to the contrary." 10 4 This
scenario poses a question of right, because the hypothetical desire of the
past to bind its progeny conflicts with the subsequent desires among "the
people" to amend the Constitution-desires successfully vindicated twentysix times since 1787.
Given a postulated conflict between the constitutional values of the
past and those of the present, the notion that past intent is the proper
theoretical source of constitutional values is problematic. A parent's belief
that he has the right to bind his adult child matters little if his adult child
believes the contrary. It matters not at all once the parent has died.
Ultimately, the past cannot bind the contrary preferences of the present
because the past lacks the power of enforcement. 105 Indeed, it is revealing
that this issue is posed at this moment between us, a contemporary writer
and a contemporary reader. Each of us, and others of our generation, must
evaluate our preferred relationship to the past for ourselves. Thus, simply
as a matter of power and logistics, the question whether the past has the
right to bind the present is a question of whether the present wants to be
bound by the past.106

103. Of course, even under this view, consideration of contemporary values would be
appropriate if the framers and ratifiers intended future values to shape constitutional
meaning. Such a view is implicit in interpretations of the ninth amendment as a license to
courts, granted by "the people" of the past, to develop unspecified constitutional rights. See,
e.g., M. PERRY, supra note 11, at 24. Perry argues that "[i]f in fact the framers had authorized
the judiciary to exercise (some sort of) noninterpretive review, there would be no problem of
legitimacy. To the contrary, there would be a serious question as to the legitimacy of the
judiciary's foresaking that office." Id. The thrust of that "serious question" would be either that
the judiciary is failing to vindicate the constitutional preferences of the past (assuming that the
past has the right to bind the present), or that the judiciary is improperly postulating that the
constitutional values of the present no longer authorize such judicial creativity (assuming that
the values of "the people" today are the proper theoretical source of constitutional meaning).
On the implausibility of this view of the ninth amendment, see infra notes 198, 200, and
accompanying text.
104. Cf U.S. CONST. art. V (proposed constitutional amendment requires ratification by
three-fourths of the states ).
105. Cf infra note 443.
I 06. Cf A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 98 ("[T]he future will not be ruled; it can only possibly
be persuaded.").
John Locke suggested that parents retain no authority to govern their adult children without
their children's consent. See J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 111161-76, at 31-39
Q.W. Gough ed. 1976) (3d ed. 1698). Whether this view was a function of"right" or power (or
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By rt:Jecting the notion that the past has the right to bind the political
discretion of the present, 107 one concludes that 'judicial tyranny" is the
failure to enforce the constitutional values of "the people'' today. 108 This
conclusion, however, begs the questions of what the constitutional values of
"the people" today might be, and how those values should be ascertained.
Indeed, if the goal of constitutional analysis should be to identify the
constitutional values of "the people" today, then why look to the past at
aJl?I09

2.

The Oversight of Raoul Berger's Strict Interpretivism

Given the goal of ascertaining the constitutional values of "the people"
today, the practice of looking to the framers' and ratifiers' intent must be
indo:ed, whether Locke's view of "right" was a function of power) is not clear. See id. ~ 66, at
33 (5ugge~ting "there be a time when a child comes to be as free from subjection to the will and
command of his father as the father himself is free from the subjection to the will of anybody
else"); id. ,; 7,1, at 38 (any parental right over adult children exists only "by the consent" of the
children).
A notion of "right" that depends entirely on power is less than satisfying. Cf supra note 50;
i11f1<1 notes 306, 318, 325, 370, 376, 443, 456 & text accompanying notes 248-56. But even "the
people" of 1'!87 apparently did not believe that they had a right to preclude their progeny
from making constitutional policy, as suggested by the amendment process provided by article
V of the Constitution.
This view was also expressed in the Declaration of Independence:
[W]henever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends [Life,
Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness], it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish
it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their
Safety and Happiness.
The Declaration of Independence, para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also Dellinger, The Legitimacy of
Com-tit11tio11al Cha11ge: Rethinking tlzt? Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1983). Dellinger
points out that "[s ]ection 3 of the Virginia Constitution of 1776 ... provided that 'whenever
an} government ~hall be found inadequate . . . a majority of the community hath an
indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner
as :;hall be judged most conducive to the public weal.' " Id. at 43 n.232. Note the conflict
between thi5 proposition, as stated, and article V of the Constitution of the United States. See
su/JTa note 104.
107. Cf. i11fra note 109.
108. See suj•ra text accompanying note 39.
109. The e:dstence of article V, and the extent to which "the people" have, in fact, amended
the Constitut·on through article V, suggest that the American political culture does not, and
ne\cr did, believe that the constitutional discretion of the present should l:e restricted by the
choices of the past. Of course, although tl1e constit11tio11al discretion of the present is not
disabled by p lSt choices, it might 5eem that the ordinary political discretion of the present is.
By framing the question of constitutional meaning as one concerning the constitutional values
of"the people" today, however, any constitutional interpretation would be, at least theoretically,
a function of "the people's" own constitutional choices to define the parameters of their own
ordinary political discretion. Given the limits of judicial capabilities, one is left with the
significant problem of transforming that theoretical identification of modern constitutional
concern5 into reality. See infra note 452. Thu&, although this section has defined constitutional
values in terms that eliminate the tyranny of the past, it has not addressed the remaining
problem of ''.judicial tyranny"-how to avoid judicial failure to identify accurately, and to
enforce effectively, the constitutional values of"the people" today. For a consideration of how
courts might confront the potential for judicial tyranny thus defined, see infra text accompanying notes 111-66.
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based, at least in part, on a premise that past constitutional choices are good
evidence of present constitutional preferences. Those who advocate exclusive reliance on the framers' and ratifiers' intent implicitly suggest that past
constitutional choices are the only good evidence of present constitutional
concerns. 110
If one accepts that the concerns of "the people" today are the proper
theoretical source of constitutional values, however, one simply cannot
avoid making some judgment about modern constitutional preferences. 111
llO. Alternatively, they implicitly suggest that "the people" today want to be bound by
precisely those constitutional choices made in the past. See infra note ll l; cf. supra note 106.
111. Some might draw certain conclusions about "the people's" contemporary constitutional
preferences from a formalist perspective. Absent any amendment, "the people" today
continue to accept all (and only) the constitutional judgments made by the framers and
ratifiers. See Monaghan, supra note 12, at 376 ("Our legal griindnorm has been that the body
politic can at a specific point in time definitively order relationships, and that such an ordering
is binding on all organs of government until changed by amendment.").
This view is vulnerable. "The people" today simply are unaware of constitutional judgments
made by another group of people in another era. Indeed, to the extent that a constitutional
provision is a product of political compromise, it may be that the people who actually adopted
the provision did not clearly understand it to have some precise content. Courts and scholars
are all but ovenvhelmed in pursuing the intent of past constitutional majorities. It would be
unreasonable to assume that "the people" can do the same, and to conclude from this
assumption that absent any amendment, "the people" remain dedicated to the precise
constitutional choices of the past.
One might argue instead that popular inaction constitutes popular approval of the Supreme
Court's interpretations of past constitutional intent. See Brest, supra note 59, at 236. This
argument proves too much and too little. The argument proves too much as it applies equally
to decisions written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, purportedly interpreting the intent of past
constitutional majorities, and to decisions written by Justices Blackmun or Douglas, relying
vaguely on notions of contemporary social values. In no way does it suggest the analytical ideal
toward which both Rehnquist and Douglas should strive. The argument proves too little
because popular inaction is as likely, if not more so, to reflect mere acquiescence to the status
quo, rather than popular desires or preferences. Cf J.J. Rm:ssEAt:, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 254
(E. Barker ed. 1980) ("Yesterday's law has no authority to-day, but silence is held to imply
consent, and the sovereign is deemed to confirm all laws that it does not abrogate ....");
Dworkin, supra note 24, at 474.
A standard of popular acquiescence does not justify any particular decision or analytical
philosophy. Legislative action is difficult. Popular mobilization is rare. People may care about
issues, yet not care quite enough to expend the energy required to overturn a judicial decision.
See G. CALABRESI, supra note 14, at 101-02 (statutes may remain on books, neither amended nor
repealed, despite their failure to reflect evolving community sentiment). What applies to
judicial (and other) decisions theoretically subject to legislative displacement-e.g., administrative rulemaking, statutory interpretation by courts, and common law development-applies
with greater force to judicial decisions made in the name of the Constitution, which, of course,
"mere" legislative majorities theoretically may not displace. As Dean Choper has argued:
Having surveyed the various constitutional sources of indirect congressional and
presidential authority that may serve as political brakes on the power of judicial
review, we may fairly conclude that their highly infrequent and largely ineffective use
gravely undermines the view that the people have continuously approved of the
Court's function simply because, in the main, they have let the Court be.
J. CHOPER, supra note 73, at 55.
Thus, a standard of acquiescence poses a question of raw power. What can the Court get
away with without engendering an uncontrollable popular backlash? Cf A. BICKEL, supra note
ll, at 21 (resignation of majority to Court's judicial review power does not mean "consent to
the power on its merits"). The standard of acquiescence would pit Rehnquist and Brennan in
a power play with each other, and each of them, to the extent that each prevails on the Court,
in a power play with the electorate. For legal realists and members of Critical Legal Studies,
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Simply asserting that past constitutional choices are the only good evidence
of modern constitutional concerns provides an incomplete justification for
strict interpretivism. Even the strict interpretivist who accepts the present
electorate as the proper theoretical source of constitutional values must, in
addition, posit and establish that "the people" today view past constitutional
choices as the only evidence of their constitutional concerns that courts may
properly consider.112
There is, therefore, a critical weakness in the strict interpretivist's
claimed exclusive reliance on the framers' and ratifiers' intent. At least for
det iding what sort of evidence courts should consider in ascertaining the constitutional r1alues of "the people" today, the constitutional values of "the people"
alive today must be confronted and evaluated-implicitly or explicitly-by
interpretivists, strict or othenvise, and noninterpretivists alike. Those, like
Raoul Berger, who claim that past constitutional intent should be the
exclusive source of judicial analysis fail to address this issue and thereby
assume an answer.113 Most courts fail to address this question and thereby
assume an answer. By assuming an answer, these analysts abdicate the
re&ponsibility of justification.

3.

The Hamiltonian Premise of Constitutional Continuity: A Reason for
Looking Toward the Past

The task of justification is formidable. One must consider whether
"the people" of the present wish to be bound by the constitutional choices
of the past and, if so, for what reason and to what extent. Why, after all,
should the constitutional choices of the past be better evidence of contemporary constitutional values than the contemporary legislative choices of
"the people"? To the extent that "the people" adhere to constitutional
values, why would they not account for those values in their daily political
endeavorsr'
An answer rests on the fundamental motive that this Article has
postulated as a basis for constitutional restrictions on democratic discretion-the motive of self-constraint-and its natural allv, the Hamiltonian
justification for judicial review. People have ideals tha't are vulnerable to
their everyday passions. If they want help in achieving those ideals, they
may hire a court (like a coach) to carry out special instructions. One must
this characterization is accurate and desirable, respectively. But for people concerned about
ju&tifying judicial review, judicial power is a matter to be constrained rather than exploited.
What criteria of constitutional decisionmaking serve the system's foundational premise of
popular determination?
112. The same applies to those who suggest that even though past constitutional choices
might not be the 011/y good evidence of contemporary constitutional preferences, these past
choices arc at least good evidence to be considered along with other indicia.
113. If Rac•ul Berger accepts the proposition that "the people" today are the proper
theoretical source of constitmional values, then his claimed exclusive reliance on past constitu·
tional intent <issumes that "the people" today want courts to consider only past constitutiona
int< nt for inforring present constitutional values. If Berger rejects the proposition that "th<
people" today are the proper theoretical source of constitutional value~. he must justify th<
problematic proposition that the past has a right to bind the present It is probably mon
accurate to s1y that Berger assumes an answer to neither question, because he has no
confronted the fundamental question, "who are 'the people'?"
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emphasize that the instructions are special. Their distinctiveness is shaped
by the essential motive of self-constraint. Their identification by "the
people" requires a rare and self-conscious evaluation of higher ideals that
deserve protection from the ordinary concerns of everyday politics. Thus,
by definition and by nature, contemporary constitutional values of selfconstraint are unlikely to be fully reflected in the battles of daily legislative
combat. 114
Concluding that today's political squabbles provide poor evidence of
contemporary constitutional concerns, however, does not establish that past
constitutional choices provide better evidence. Although it is probably true
that values of self-constraint are not reflected in everyday politics, it is not
necessarily true that "the people" today continue to hold the values of
self-constraint manifested by the past-or, indeed, that they hold any values
of self-constraint at all.
It is this question-whether "the people" continue to embrace constitutional principles chosen in the past-that Alexander Hamilton might
have had in mind when cautioning courts to adhere to the Constitution,
even to the extent of thwarting the preferences of current political
majorities. Hamilton said:
Though I trust the friends of the proposed Constitution will never
concur with its enemies in questioning that fundamental principle
of republican government which admits the right of the people to
alter or abolish the established Constitution whenever they find it
inconsistent with their happiness; yet it is not to be inferred from
this principle that the representatives of the people, whenever a
momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of their
constituents incompatible with the provisions in the existing
Constitution would, on that account, be justifiable in a violation of
those provisions; or that the courts would be under a greater
obligation to connive at infractions in this shape than when they
had proceeded wholly from the cabals of the representative body.
Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act,
annulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon
themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant their
representatives in a departure from it prior to such an act. But it
is easy to see that it would require an uncommon portion of
fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the
Constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been instigated
by the major voice of the community. 115

114. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
115. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469-70 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (citation
omitted). Hamilton elsewhere expressed doubts about a court's ability to remain immune to
majoritarian pressures:
What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which would not leave
the utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it to be impracticable; and from this I infer that
its security, whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution respecting
it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people
and of the government.
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Thus. after declaring that "the people" intend their will expressed in
the Constitution to supersede their will expressed in legislation, 11 6
Hamilton emphasizes that mere legislative declarations are not to be
interpreted as revisions of "the people's" constitutional will. Such revisions
must be made only by acts as "solemn and authoritative" as were the acts
that created the constitutional provisions being amended. 117 But Hamilton
must have recognized that as the generations pass, "the people" who are
governed by those aging constitutional provisions 118 are not "the people"
who created them. Because he justifies the superiority of constitutional
provisions to "the people's" current momentary passions as a function of
their own choices, Hamilton must have presumed that the constitutional
values of "the people" persist through the generations.
One should presume, Hamilton implies, that "the people" of 1987 are
sufficiently like "the people" of 1787-and 1868-that "the people" today
would make the same constitutional judgments as did "the people" of the
past. 119 If "the people" of the past restricted their own democratic discretion for the sake of certain important yet vulnerable values, then, more
likely than not, so would "the people" today. The notion that past
constitutional choices, until amended "by some solemn and authoritative
act," reflect current constitutional values will be called the "Hamiltonian
premise of constitutional continuity."120

THE FwERAllST No. 84, at 514 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
I 16. See sujlra te:"t accompanying notes 53-56.
I 17. Bruce Ackerman paints an interesting picture of non-article V aw. that might satisfy
Hamilton's criteria of solemnity and authority. Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1051-57 (notion of
"structural amendment").For an evaluation of Ackerman's theory, see infra note 233.
I 18. Ackerman characterized this problem as the "intertemporal difficulty." Id. at 1045-49.
I 19. Raoul Berger has misused this quote to suggest that Hamilton wanted to constrain
judges from exce5sively developing constitutional meaning against competing everyday
pohtical values. See Berger, supra note 5, at 4. The thrust of Hamilton's concern, however, was
contrary to Berger's suggestion. Hamilton sought to ensure judicial enforcement of constitutional restrictions, despite adverse legislative pressure. Although judicial excess surely must
have been a concern, it was not expressed in the passage cited by Berger. See Cottrol, supra
note 84, at 3'32 (Berger approach fails to present focus of framers' concerns).
I 20. Of course, the normatiYe choices to which the premise of continuity refers can be recast
when "the people, ... by some solemn and authoritative act,'' amend the Constitution. THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Presumably, in Hamilton's
vie1v, article V provides the proper basis for "the people" to express their solemn will to amend
the Constitution.
Bruce Ack·~rman is developing a theory for finding consitutional amendments, and, in my
terms, for rebutting the premise of constitutional continuity, by reference to political processes
other than those prescribed in article V. In Ackerman's view, the original Constitution was
framed and ratified according to irregular procedures that were not in accord with existing
law. See Acktrman, supra note 33. at 1017-23. Constitutional amendments might follow that
pr<•cedcnt of irregularity. Ackerman calls them "structural amendments." He suggests that the
apparent demise of constitutional federalism after the national elections of 1936 is an example
of ~uch i1Te1~ular "structural amendments," not prescribed according to proper article V
procedures, but equally authoritative, nevertheless. Id. at 1051-63. The extent to which his
analysis is supportable depends on whether such postulation of constitutional amendment
au1~ments or diminishes the prospects for judicial tyranny. See supra notes 101-07 and
accompanying text. For further evaluation and criticism of the "structural amendment," see
i11fi-a note 23 3.
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The premise of constitutional continuity may be somewhat a matter of
faith, but it is not unreasonable. 121 Children are shaped biologically,
intellectually, and emotionally by their parents; cultures persist intact from
one generation to the next. Thus, how parents thought about the world can
at least suggest how their children would think about the world-especially
in the absence of better evidence. The premise is also far from invulnerahle.122 But the alternative to this premise is to undermine the possibilities

121. One must distinguish between a continuity of values between "the people" of the past
and "the people" of the present, on the one hand, and a congruence between choices that "the
people" of the past made and choices that "the people" of the pesent would make, on the
other. There cannot be congruence between choices made by past electorates and choices
facing the present electorate, simply because time has brought new issues that "the people" of
the past could not have considered. This alone would make exclusive reliance on past
constitutional choices as the basis for defining present constitutional meaning analytically
vulnerable. See infra text accompanying notes 129-39.
When I speak of "constitutional continuity," I refer to the relationship between a desire
among a majority of "the people" for democratic discretion, on the one hand, and a desire
among a majority of "the people" for constitutional self-constraint, on the other. How much
immediate gratification were "the people" willing to forgo in the name of their ideals of
self-constraint? What was the relationship between those democratic values they were willing to
forgo and their ideal of self-constraint? What was the relationship between those values they
were not willing to forgo in the name of their ideals of self-constraint? See infra text
accompanying notes 153-66 & note 208.
122. There are reasons to suspect that constitutional values might not remain stable through
time. It is clear that ordinary political values can change dramatically. Racism is far less intense
today than in the mid-nineteenth century, see infra text accompanying notes 325-26, 350-53,
and sexism may be following a similar pattern, see infra text accompanying notes 335-90.
Furthermore, one might suggest that,constitutional choices are influenced by circumstances
unique to an era-for example, the Revolutionary War or the Civil War. If the relevant political
pressures of those eras do not last through time, the constitutional choices made under the
influence of those pressures must be, at best, woefully imperfect evidence of the constitutional
values of "the people" today.
Beyond this, it 1s not necessarily true that "our parents" made these past constitutional
decisions. Many people in America today have recent immigrant backgrounds and cultural
heritages far removed from those who made significant constitutional choices in 1787, 1791,
and 1868. Many constitutional choices were made before the electorate included blacks and
women. Indeed, the population has greatly expanded. The number of states has increased
nearly four-fold since 1787, and by nearly a third (from thirty-seven to fifty) since 1868. See
infra note 376. ·
To recognize these vulnerabilities in the Hamiltonian premise is one matter; to determine
what should be done about them is quite another. One can work from the premise of
constitutional continuity, and refine its meaning by refining one's understanding of constitutional choicemaking. See infra notes 306, 318, 325, 370, 374, 376. This Article suggests that the
essential question for constitutional choicemaking concerns identifying the forum in which
political conflict is to be resolved. Why not leave issues to be resolved locally? Why should the
national electorate resolve conflict legislatively in Congress? And if the national electorate is to
resolve matters, why by constitutional mandate rather than by Congress? These questions are
as fundamental as questions can be in ordered politics. The depth of values that shape a
participant's view of these questions is likely to persist through the generations, if any sort of
value (other than the moti,ve of self-interest) can persist from one generation to another. In the
end, one must recognize that although the Hamiltonian premise may be far from perfect, the
functions it is intended to serve-to enable the electorate to protect its own preferred yet
vulnerable values-might not humanly be served any better without it. See infra note 123; text
accompanying notes 124-66.
Despite the theoretical vulnerability of the Hamiltonian premise of constitutional continuity,
there is empirical evidence of its validity. Among the thirty-seven states involved in the
struggles to ratify both the fourteenth amendment and the Equal Rights Amendment (two
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for effectively vindicating whatever values of self-constraint "the people"
today might have.123

4.

How Do "the People" Today Want Courts to Infer Their
Constitutional Values?

By defining ''.judicial tyranny" as failure to vindicate the constitutional
values of "the people" today, and by justifying an examination of past
constitutional choices with the Hamiltonian premise of constitutional
continuity, one can begin to consider what evidence "the people" today
would want courts to examine in ascertaining their substantive constitutional con•:erns. As Raoul Berger has noted, those framers and ratifiers who
thought about the issue seemed to believe that courts should seek to define
constitutional meaning by referring to the intent manifested in particular
constitutional provisions. 124 They, as does Raoul Berger, feared the erroneous judicial constriction of democratic discretion. Yet, as suggested by the
Hamiltonian rationale for judicial review, and apparently unlike Raoul
Bc:rger, the framers and ratifiers also feared that courts might erroneously
fail to thwart political passions that violate the constitutional values of "the
pcople." 12:;
Which potential judicial error-the erroneous constriction of preferred democratic discretion or the erroneous failure to enforce a preferred
constitutional limit on democratic discretion-did the framers and ratifiers
vit;!W as more important? Their views on these questions are unclear. 126
provisions with similar normative roots, see infra text accompan}fog notes 360-79), the pattern
of comtitutional choicemaking was almost identical. See infra note 376.
123. Thomas Jefferson's preference for popular reconsideration of constitutional norms
every ninetc en years would mitigate doubt about (and the need for) the premise of
constitutional continuity. See ilzfra notes 135-36. But it also could blur the distinction between
constitutional politics and ordinary politics, thereby blurring the distinction between constitutional values of self-constraint and ordinary political values intended to constrain only the
political discretion of others. Cf. infra note 138. The Hamiltonian notion of self-constraint
implies that constitutional politics must be rare and special, and therefore inevitably must rely
on a premise· of constitutional continuity. Popular rejection of the Jefferwnian option-the
al>'lence of a•l ethic calling for a frequent and active reconsideration of constitutional values
and provisions-suggests that the premise of constitutional continuity is supportable, and that
"the people" still regard the Constitution as a desired means of self-constraint. See infra text
accompanying notes 129-39.
124. See R. Berger,supra note 15, at 364-65; cf. Powell, supra note 28, at 948 (framers of 1787
did not intrnd that Constitution be interpreted by reference to their "own purposes,
expectations, and intentions"). Powell's conclusions about the framers of 1787 are far less likely
true for the \ramers of 1868. See infra note 291.
125. See su/1ra notes 115-19 and accompanying text; see also Cottrol, supra note 84, at 362
(Berger approach fails to present focus of framers' concerns about legislative excess); cf. R.
DWORKIN, supra note 23, at 148 (danger of judicial error lies with pos~ibility of excess activism
aml excess restraint).
126. The statements on which Raoul Berger relies to justify his "strict'" interpretivism hardly
supply unambiguous support. For example, Berger quotes Madison: "[If] the sense in which
the· Comtitution was accepted and ratified by the Nation ... be not the guide in expounding
it, there can be no security for a consistent and stable government, more than for a faithful
excrci~e of its powers." R. BERGER, supra note 15, at 364. The word "guide" implies more
fle:i.ibility than Berger acknowledges. Perhaps more significant, Madison speaks of "the sense
in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified." Id. (emphasis added). This suggests a
general attittJ.de as much as it does the particularized meaning that Berger seeks-a general
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Beyond this, and apart from determining the relative importance of the two
kinds of judicial error, one must devise mechanisms so that each might be
effectively circumscribed. In what manner should constitutional provisions
be interpreted? The framers' and ratifiers' views on this question also are
unclear. 127 Thus, toward determining how "the people" of 1987 would
want courts to infer their constitutional values, one has little choice but to
identify and compare the risks presented by contending approaches to
constitutional analysis. One might pursue such an inquiry even if the
framers and ratifiers had left a clearer indication of their views. After all,
"the people" of 1987 have far more experience with the practice-if not the
theory-of constitutional decisionmaking by courts than did "the people"
of 1787, 1791, or 1868.
In examining the relative risks of judicial error, either in failing to
serve "the people's" contemporary constitutional values of self-constraint,
or in erroneously circumscribing democratic discretion that they wish to
retain, one must make a fair comparison. It will not do to compare the
possibilities of judicial error flowing from an idealized conception of
interpretivism against the possibilities of judicial error flowing from a
pessimistically conceived parade of wild-eyed and unconstrained judicial
horribles. 12 8 One surely must consider the dangers of inadequate constraints on judicial discretion. But one must also consider the dangers of an
attempt to remain strictly constrained by the constitutional choices of the
past. One must consider not only whether such strict limits on judicial
inquiry, when rigorously pursued, might inadequately serve the constitutional values of self-constraint among "the people" today, but also whether
such limits on judicial decisionmaking, to the extent that they have not been
rigorously pursued, promise much more than they deliver. Finally, one
attitude such as those reflected in the distinction between the motive of constraining only
others, and the motive of constraining others and self, as well.
Berger also quotes Hamilton: "To avoid arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensible
that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point
out their duty in every particular case that comes before them." Id. at 365. This, of course, says
nothing about what those strict rules are, or where they come from. The phrase could refer as
easily to rules reflecting sensitivity to the judicial role-sensitivity to both the possible
erroneous intrusion on democratic discretion and the possible erroneous failure to enforce
constitutional limits on democratic discretion-as it might refer to Berger's notion of "strict"
interpretivism.
127. See supra note 126; cf. Powell, supra note 28, at 947-48 (although framers and ratifiers
of 1787 lacked notion that Constitution should be interpreted by reference to their intentions,
some framers and ratifiers of 1868 had developed such a view). With such ambiguity as to
whether the framers believed that their "intent" should be considered at all in interpreting the
Constitution, it is hardly surprising that there was no stable consensus among them about how
the Constitution should be interpreted. Indeed, one might speculate that people would
advocate modes of constitutional interpretation that would yield benefits they were unable to
attain politically. See generally id.
128. Cf. R. NOZICK, supra note 66, at 6-7. In considering whether "the state" is 'justifiable,"
Nozick notes that the question is a function of evaluating alternatives to "the state" in the
s;ontext of his Lockean normative scheme. Nozick suggests that the proper comparison would
not consider the worst scenario of a "state"-less society-the Hobbesian state of nature-but a
"realistic" scenario of a "state"-less society, in which people generally follow the Lockean
principles and an equally "realistic" conception of the "state." Whether or not Nozick's sense
of the "realistic" coincides with yours, his counsel that one must justify the sorts of comparisons
one makes is both fundamental and compelling.
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must consider whether alternative approaches might better serve the goal
of vindicating those principles of government that "the people" today
desire.

a.

Strict (or Closed) Interpretivi.sm: The Progressively Irrelevant
Constitution

If courts were to consider only value judgments made in the past, they
would be unable to decide constitutional issues that the framers and
ratifiers did not consider, or could not have considered. 129 "The people"
could evaluate and compromise only those competing concerns that they
had in mind. 130 If the framers and ratifiers in 1868 did not contemplate
discrimination against blacks on public golf courses, 131 or discrimination
against wc•men in the Air Force, 132 and did not determine whether
democratic discretion to pursue those concerns was more or less important
than some constitutional notion of human equality, then a court absolutely
restricted to past value choices could not decide cases presenting these
issues. 13 3
Thus, if courts took seriously the notion that they are permitted to
make constitutional decisions only on the basis of value determinations the
framers and ratifiers did make, or could have made, then constitutional
provisions would be progressively less relevant to society as the passage of
time brought unprecedented issues to the agenda of political concern. 134 If
129. The distinction between the notion of "what the framers did consider" and "what the
framers could have considered" is largely a function of how an analyst treats the inevitable
problem of imperfect historical knowledge. To speak of"what the framers considered" is really
to speak abot•t our knowledge of what the framers considered. Yet, it is probable that our
evidence of what the framers actually considered is woefully incomplete, and therefore reflects
only a sub~et of all the factors that were considered among the framers and ratifiers. Thus,
even Raoul Berger extrapolates from his available evidence to make his conclusions about
what. the framers and ratifiers intended. He does not know that they made certain determinations. But for issues that were extant at the time, he translates his best guess as to what they
mo~t Iikdy would have determined-if they had thought about it-into his best guess as to
what they did determine. See Dworkin, supra note 24, at 485-87.
1:10. S•'e A. J3tCKEL, supra note 11, at 102-03. Bickel suggests that asking for the intent of the
past is the wrong question for constitutional analysts, in part for this very reason. "No answer
is what the wrong question begets," because the framers and ratifiers did not, and could not
com;ider manr current constitutional issues. Id. at 104. Yet, Bickel cautions that knowledge of
past constitutional choices is an essential component of effective constitutional analysis. "We
require to kn(•W, as accurately as may be, whence we come, in order to be aware that it is our
own reasoned and revocable will, not some idealized ancestral compulsion, that moves us
fornard." Id. at 110.
1:11. Holmes v. Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93, 94 (5th Cir. 1955), vacated and remanded, 350 U.S. 879
(19tt5). In 181)8 there were no golf courses in the United States. See M. McCORMACK, THE
Wo:. DERFl'L WORLD OF PROFESSIONAL GOLF 361 (1973) (first permanent golf club in united States
formed in 18tl8).
1:12. Cf. RoHker '" Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 61-63 (1981) (addressing whether registratio.1
and con~cription of only males violates due process clause of fifth amendment).
1:13. Set' Bnst, supra note 59, at 211 (when issue concerns circumstances r.hat value definer
did not consider, there can be no judicial resolution based on intent of value definer). Even the
slightest consideration of issues that the framers and ratifiers could not have confronted
requires a theory to justify those additional sources of analysis.
<
1:14. According to Professor Tushnet, "interpretivism seems to constrain judges only at the
cost of leaving; legislatures too little constrained." Tushnet, supra note 102, at 789. This
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"the people" today want to restrict courts to such strict interpretivist sources
for generating constitutional meaning, and if courts took this restriction
seriously, then "the people" would be encouraged, and indeed compelled,
to consider their constitutional values actively and formally each generation.135 To justify Raoul Berger's strict interpretivism, therefore, the
question is this: Do "the people" today adhere to the Jeffersonian ideal of
actively considering constitutional principles every nineteen years {or
so)? 136 Only if they do is it plausible to infer that they would prefer that
courts be strictly limited to those constitutional choices that the framers and
ratifiers actually made, or could have made.
On this basis, one might seriously question the proposition that "the
people" want courts to consider only constitutional value choices that the
framers and ratifiers did make, or could have made. The Jeffersonian
model of constitutional politics undermines the distinction between constitutional choices and ordinary national legislative choices. 137 If each generation of "the people" actively and formally struggled toward ratifying a
constitution, constitutional politics would become less exceptional, less
special, more like the politics of everyday life, and, therefore, more
vulnerable to the pressures of everyday life. 138 Good or bad, such an active

statement is meaningless without criteria by which one might determine that legislatures are
"too little constrained." Given the context of seeking the proper relationship between
constitutional values and democratic discretion, the criteria for defining legislative excess
might refer to the contemporary constitutional values of "the people"-the values that "the
people" would adopt today if they thought in constitutional terms and pursued the amendment process. See infra note 136.
135. See Bickel, supra note 11, at 244-45. According to Bickel:
Everybody knows that the lifetime of applied principle is often no longer than one or
two generations. Principle may endure beyond that, of course, but not necessarily as
formulated in the application; if it does endure, it will often be through a process of
renewal. And so what one means by the ultimate, final judgment of the Court is
freqently a judgment ultimate and final for a generation or two. That, however, is
quite long enough to worry about, and the really interesting question, therefore, is
what happens within the generation or two.
Id. (footnote omitted).
The reconsideration of constitutional principle implied by the Jeffersonian ideal, and the
reconsideration characterized by Bickel, are distinguishable in the extent to which the
electorate actively participates, and in the extent to which each perspective views such active
participation as desirable.
136. 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 121 (P. Ford ed. 1895); cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 50,
at 318-19 U· Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (periodic resort to electorate for "revising the
Constitution, in order to correct recent breaches of it," runs excessive risk that questions will
be resolved by momentary passions rather than reason).
137.James Madison feared that even the politics of constitutional amendment could be
dominated by shortsighted public passion, rather than reason, if an amendment machinery
were activated in response to particular political issues, see THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 317 U.
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), or if activated on a routine or periodic basis, see THE
FEDERALIST No. 50, at 317-20 U· Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). One might question whetlier
this rather extreme fear of the electorate reflects "the people's" chosen fear of themselves, or
an elitist fear of "the people." Cf Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1025 ("[I]t is precisely The
Federalist's insight that constant appeals to public virtue could not be expected to sustain the
normal politics of the American people.").
138. See A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 105 ("If a constitution purports to settle, in detail and
for all time, most of the issues that are likely to be the grist of the political mill, it invites either

798

72

IOWA LAW REVIEVV

753

[1987]

constitutional politics is alien to apparently long-held notions that constitutional provisions are special1 39 -that they should be the products of
extraordinarily reflective politics. Indeed, despite the unpopularity of many
Supreme Court decisions, the political pressure for corrective constitutional
amendments has not even begun to approach a consensus holding either
that the very idea of constitutional self-constraint is undesirable, or that the
Constitution should be entirely reconsidered every generation.

b.

La,,.,. (or Open) Interpretivism: Bringi,ng Twentieth Century Issues to

Nineteenth Century Decisionmakers
Of course, courts have not generated constitutional meaning by
relying exclusively on value choices that the framers and ratifiers did make,
or could have made. Rather, courts have drawn "analogies" from the
framers' and ratifiers' value choices to determine the constitutional choices
th1~y might have made if they had been confronted by today's constitutional
questions. 140
Any daim that this process of "analogy" employs only past value
judgments is simply wrong. 141 Even if one could bring the "typical" framer
or ratifier into the twentieth century by magic, and ask him to apply the
abandonment or frequent amendment. The familiarity of amendment will breed a species of
contempt and incapacitate the document for symbolic service.",!.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57, 67-90.
140. Professor Brest distinguishes "strict" from "moderate" originalism. See Brest, supra note
59, at 222-23. He ~uggests that:
[A] moderate textualist takes account of the open-textured quality of language and
read5 tlw language of provisions in their social and linguistic contexts. A moderate
intentionalist applies a provision consistent with the adopters' intent at a relatively
high level of generality, consistent with what is sometimes called th·~ "purpose of the
provisior..'' Where the strict intentionalist tries to determine the adopters' actual
subjectiw purposes, the moderate intentionalist attempts to understand what the
adopters' purposes might plausibly have been, an aim far more readily achieved than
a precise understanding of the adopters' intentions.
Strict originalism cannot accommodate most modem decisions under the Bill of
Right5 and the founeenth amendment.... Although moderate originalism is far
more expansive, some major constitutional doctrines lie beyond its pale as well.
Id. at 223 (footnotes omitted).
Brest's trea ..ment somewhat blurs two separate issues. One issue concerns the substance that
the analyst attributes to the framers' and ratifiers' choices. The second issue concerns the
extent 10 which an analyst feels constrained to consider only the framers' and ratifiers'
constitutional intent. The former issue would be reflected in a debate between Raoul Berger's
view of the founeenth amendment, which assumes that the framers and ratifiers had a static
view of the Mate activities that would be constitutionally prohibited and permitted, and a view
of the fourteenth amendment which suggests that the framers and ratifiers wanted a
progresr,ively coherent development of one value at the expense of competing concerns. Such
a debate would focus on whether the framers intended the fourteenth amendment, someday, to
prohibit antimiscegenation statutes. See infra text accompanying notes 235-46.
The latter issue is currently addressed in the text. Even assuming that the framers and
ratifiers inter.ded courts to develop the coherence of some ideal at the expense of their
competing concerns, is a constitutional analyst properly constrained to contemplate only the
progressive constitutional judgments that "the people" of the era did make, or could have
made, or may the constitutional analyst properly extrapolate from the value judgments
actually made to consider their relevance in disposing of modem constitutional issues?
H 1. Set' Tushnet, supra note 102, at 793-804.
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same value judgment to our world that he applied to his, he would still need
additional information. He cannot apply the same compromise and accommodation of his own competing concerns to our problems as he did to his,
because he has not experienced the problems we are asking him to solve.
Indeed, for this "typical" framer or ratifier to apply his nineteenth century
values to twentieth century problems, the constitutional analyst must
"explain" the modern world to him and, in doing so, necessarily imports
subjective perceptions of contemporary values. 142 Thus, this analyst is
accounting for contemporary values, yet is doing so in an intuitive and
unexamined manner. 143 The "lax interpretivist" is, therefore, unable to
demonstrate the particular relevance of those contemporary values to the
constitutional values of "the people" today.144

c.

A Candid (and Careful) Pursuit of Today's Coristitutional Values: All
Evidence in Its Proper Place

There is a third alternative. Courts might dare explicitly to ask, "What
are the constitutional preferences of 'the people' today?" Dean Harry
Wellington has been a prominent proponent of an analytical methodology
that openly seeks the values of "the people" today. Wellington counsels that
courts should make constitutional decisions that protect contemporary
notions of "conventional morality" 145 or "the moral ideals of the community."146 Based on a determination that a legislature, for some reason, has
transgressed conventional notions of morality, a court may invalidate the

142. Id. at 800; see also Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L.
REV. 1237, 1283 (1986) ("The interpretivistjudge asks how the framers of a particular text
resolved an issue that he knows they never faced. No historian can do more that [sic] speculate
about how people in the past would have reacted to a modern situation had they encountered
it, and any such speculations are likely to be influenced by the historian's political, moral, and
philosophical values.").
143. See Tushnet, supra note 102, at 800. Even Tushnet accounts for contemporary values
in an insufficiently analytical manner by portraying modern education as a "functional
equivalent" of nineteenth century freedom of contract. Id. The notion of "functional
equivalence" requires clearly justified criteria for comparison. Equating twentieth century
education and nineteenth century contract seems to rest on the individual right holder's
interests. This focus, although probably relevant, cf. infra note 380, inadequately accounts for
the competing concerns of the constitutional majority. See supra note 29. Racists may have
more reason to deny integrated education to blacks than to deny contract rights to blacks
because integrated education impinges more on the racist's emotions than does enforcing
contracts. Contractual relations are, after all, voluntary. Furthermore, that the criterion of a
right's importance to blacks was not dispositive in 1868 is emphasized by the fourteenth
amendment's original treatment of voting. The importance of the vote to nineteenth century
blacks can hardly be disputed. Yet, the original understanding of the fourteenth amendment
did not prohibit racial discrimination in voting. See infra text accompanying notes 267-302.
144. Indeed, Chief]ustice Rehnquist's methodology of drawing intuitive analogies between
past constitutional choices and present constitutional issues may have resulted in an erroneous
failure to enforce those contemporary constitutional values suggested by the Hamiltonian
premise of constitutional continuity. See infra text accompanying notes 342-62. The inadequacies of Justice Brennan's modes of analogy have been previously discussed. See supra text
accompanying note 29.
145. See Wellington, Notes on Adjudication, supra note 14, at 266-67.
146. See Wellington, Nature ofJudicial Review, supra note 14, at 494, 514 n.133.
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challenged statute in the name of the Constitution.147
This analysis begs an important question: Why should the court
intervene in the name of contemporary "conventional morality"? After all,
as the argument goes, courts, at least when compared with legislatures, are
ill-suited for ascertaining contemporary values. 148 By their very structure
and electoral accountability, legislatures would seem to be equipped better
than courts to ascertain the precise contemporary balance and compromise
of "the pc;-ople's" conflicting values. 149 Thus, Raoul Berger, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Henry Monaghan would suggest that the risk of judicial
tyranny is a powerful argument against judicial consideration of contemporary values in defining constitutional meaning. They believe that this risk
is mitigated when courts are restricted to identifying past constitutional
values and choices.
The propriety of judicial intervention depends on Dean Wellington's
definition of "conventional morality." Does his definition refer to everyday
values held by a contemporary local majority? Does it refer to everyday
values held by a contemporary national majority-values that a national
m;;tjority \vishes to impose on dissenting localities? Or does the notion refer
to ideals of self-constraint held by a contemporary constitutional majority?
In other words, when a court intervenes in the political process, pursuant
to Dean Wellington's "conventional morality," is it acting to help local
political majorities achieve what they want; is it acting to help a national political
majority achieve what it wants; or is it acting to protect contemporary constitutional values, despite what ordinary political majorities, local or national,
might want.
These distinctions are essential. They go to the heart of the relationship between constitutional norms and democratic discretion. If Wellington
means that courts should second-guess the legislative process and identify
contemporary local preferences, then the counter-majoritarian dilemma of
constitutional decisionmaking does not exist. With this notion of conventional morality, a court would be eliminating laws that, in its view, probably
do not reflect the desires of a current majority within the relevant

147. See Wellington, Notes on Adjudication, supra note 14, at 287-95. Dean Wellington
suggest5 that Connecticut's law prohibiting the use of contraceptives violated the conventional
morality of the mid-twentieth century. Id. at 291.
Brest posiu. "(mere) adjudication" as an alternative to "originalism.'' Brest, supra note 59, at
224. By "(mC>re) adjudication," he means the " 'common law' method, which derives legal
principlc5 from custom, social practices, com·entional morality, and precedent." Id. at 228-29.
MS. See J. fay, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 67 (1980) ("As between courts and legislatures, it
is clear that the latter arc better situated to reflect consensus"-to the extent that consensus

cxh.ts.).
Indeed, the premise of legislative supremacy reflects the judgment that the competitive
political process i5 the best available mechanism for resolving conflict among people and
defining social norms. There must be something special about certain issues justifying a
departure from this premise. This Article suggests that a distinctive element of constitutional
restrictions on local democratic discretion, and the allocation to courts of the responsibility to
protect those values, is the motive of self-constraint.
149. Dean Wellington disputes this premise. See Wellington, Notes on Adjiuiication, supra note
14, at 225. Fc•r an examination of Wellington's argument, see infra note 224.
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local community. 150 This is a prodemocratic rationale, which posits that a
legislature might have made a mistake, that some interest group asserted
undue power, 151 or that the statute was predicated on a moral judgment no
longer predominant in the community. To consider whether such a
prodemocratic rationale for judicial invalidation of local legislative choices is
supportable would go beyond the scope of this Article. 152 It is important to
note, however, that such a rationale for judicial invalidation ofstatutes does
not pose the troubling theoretical question presented by true constitutional
issues: on what basis is it proper to prohibit a current political majority from
achieving what it does want to achieve?
If, instead, Dean Wellington means that a court should base its
decision on prevailing national political preferences, then conventional
morality would be employed to disable localities from violating that national
morality. This rationale for judicial action is vulnerable from the perspective of constitutional f ederalism. 153 If the area of national moral consensus
is one over which the Constitution does not grant Congress legislative
authority, then a court, to justify disabling local discretion, must postulate
two elements in addition to this rough national consensus. First, the court
must postulate that a national political majority-a congressional majoritywants to impose its preferences on dissenting localities, but for some reason
has not followed through with legislation; second, because the idea contravenes constitutional federalism, the court must postulate that individuals
comprising a contemporary constitutional majority would choose to grant
Congress new legislative authority to address those moral concerns, but
I50. See G. CALABRESI, supra note I4, at I06 (although reflecting majoritarian preferences
when passed, statutes may "lose [their] majoritarian basis over time" and therefore thwart
premise that will of majority should prevail).
I5 I. This rationale requires a theory of fair power in democratic politics and would open up
a host of issues about the relationship between disparate economic power and political
influence. Indeed, it raises fundamental questions about the nature of popular sovereignty
and the premise that "the people" have a right to rule. See supra notes 5, 6, 100; infra, note 443.
I52. This issue has been elegantly considered by Dean Calabresi. See G. CALABRESI, supra
note I4, at 9I-ll9. It is interesting to note that a court might well have been on solid ground
had it struck down the Connecticut statute on the theory that it no longer reflected the state
majority's preferences. See Griswold, 38I U.S. at 53I n.8 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
Connecticut House of Representatives recently passed a bill ... repealing the birth control law.
The State Senate apparently has not yet acted on the measure, and today is relieved of that
responsibility by the Court." (citing New Haven journal-Courier, May I9, I965, at I, col. 4 &
I3, col. 7)); see also J. CHOPER, supra note 73, at 27 ("[T]he same inertia in the lawmaking system
that operates to block the passage of new statutes supported by the people may also work to
hinder the repeal of existing laws despite their loss of majoritarian backing."); id. at I30
(judicial invalidation may not be contrary to local popular will).
I53. The notion that if conventional morality is a proper basis for restricting democratic
discretion, then that conventional morality must be national, rather than local, also was
expressed by Alexander Bickel. See A. BICKEL, supra note I I, at 250 ("[E]ven if the task of the
Court were, in Mr. Dooley's phrase, to follow the election returns, surely the relevant returns
would be those from the nation as a whole, not from a ... majority in a given region.
Fragmented returns cannot count, any more than early ones."); see also Nelson, supra note I 42,
at I262-75 (criterion of judicial neutrality may be satisfied if judges generate constitutional
meaning by reference to quasi-legislative national consensus). Of course, if the relevant
conventional morality were local rather than national, one would not be disabling democratic
discretion in the name of a constitutional restriction. Rather, one would be seeking to help a
locality attain its true majoritarian desires.
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have not been sufficiently motivated to avail themselves of the article V
amendment process. 154 Given the Hamiltonian premise of constitutional
continuity, this devaluation of constitutional federalism is difficult to
justify.155
Despite these constitutional problems, one should note that judicially
enforced conventional national morality is still promajoritarian so far as the
national electorate is concerned. The rationale presumes an underlying
motive to constrain the political discretion only of dissenting localities,
rather than the additional motive of self-constraint. In this sense, the
rationale is essentially legislative rather than constitutional. If a court were
to pursue this promajoritarian rationale rigorously, its decisions would not
be final, but would be subject to "correction" by Congress-presumptively

154. If, incleed, a congressional majority does want to enact such legislation to restrict the
disnetion of dissenting localities, one might wonder why it has not done so. There are two
pos5ible responses. First, the national electorate might believe that it lacks the constitutional
authority to do so. This defect could be cured if the Court declared that Congress now has such
legislative di~.cretion. Indeed, Bruce Ackerman might find that "the people" wish to grant
Congress new legislative authority even if they have not manifested that intent through article
V procedure:;. See infra note 233. If the Court does find and declare such national legislative
authority, however, one might wonder whether it should continue to act as Congress'
quasi-legislative front, as it does under the dormant commerce clause. See infra note 156.
Alternatively, one might question the premise about the national electorate's ordinary,
evc·ryday values. Perhaps a congressional majority does not want to impose its values on
dis·;enting Joe alities. If so, one would Jack a foundation to deem local discretion constrained by
national values held with the motive of constraining others.
155. Cf. Conkle, Nonoriginalist Constitutional Rights and the Problem of judicial Finality, 13
HA~TINGS Co:..:sr. L.Q. 9, 19 (1985). Professor Conkle advocates this quasi-legislative judicial
function when courts seek to enforce "nonoriginalist rights." His advocacy suffers from several
fla\'IS,
First, by following Michael Perry's lead and relying on the putative distinction between
ori;:;inalism aad nonoriginalism, Professor Conkle begs the fundamental questions of who are
"the people," and how do "the people" want courts to discern their constitutional values. See
infra note 163.
Second, he seems unconcerned with the antifederalism implications of his analysis and,
indeed, rega1 ds the implicit augmentation of national legislative authority as an argument in
favor of judidal action.
Abortion, the death penalty, "reverse" discrimination, homosexual rights, religion in
the public schools-issues such as these evoke intense and passionate feelings ....
Despite our deep divisions on these questions of individual rights, the questions
require <nswers, and they must be American answers. On moral issues such as these,
there arc no differing local conditions sufficient to justify differing local answers, and
local "experimentation" is hardly well-suited to moral inquiry.... The issues simply
are too important to America, and too basic to each of our citizens, to be subject to
geographic dhparity. They cry out for national resolution, which the Supreme Court
can provide through the recognition of nonoriginalist constitutional rights.
Id. at 28-29 (footnotes omitted).
This statement seems to disregard the constitutional significance of federalism. The
"differing local conditions" that justify "differing local answers" are precisely the deep and
pa''lionate normative divisions that Professor Conkle recognizes. Thus, to justify his position,
he must confront the constitutional value of federalism. He must determine that "the people"
of 1987 wam to amend the Constitution by augmenting Congress' legislative discretion to
include authority over general moral or "police power" concerns. Cf Ackerman, supra note 33,
at 1051-57 (political action by non-article V procedures might be interpreted as "structural
amendment" of Constitution); infra notes 229, 232-33.
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the best conduit of the national popular will. 156
In addition to the notion of "conventional morality,'1 Dean Wellington
has suggested that courts should pursue the "moral ideals of the community."157 With his notion of moral ideals, we come closer to the second basic

156. But cf. C. BLACK, supra note 56, at 133 (political leverage, threat of filibuster, and
senatorial representation of equal states rather than equal voters, distort principle of majority
rule in national electorate); Easterbrook Implicit and Explicit Rights of Association, 10 HARV.J.L.
& PuB. PoL'Y 91, 94-95 (1987) ("A political body that can satisfy an intense minority here and
another intense minority there will be protected by its constituency even if time and again the
body injures the majority's interests.").
The dormant commerce clause has reflected such a relationship between a national
majority's values and judicial action since Justice Stone's majority opinion in Southern Pac. Co.
v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). In that case, the Court undertook the responsibility of
determining whether the national interest in commerce outweighed a state policy that
burdened interstate commerce. Justice Stone suggested that restrictions on state and local
discretion were derived from "the presumed intention of Congress," rather than from "the
commerce clause itself." Id. at 767-69. Whatever determination the Court made as to the
relative importance of local versus national interests could be corrected by Congress:
Congress has undoubted power to redefine the distribution of power over interstate
commerce. It may ... permit the states to regulate the commerce in a manner which
otherwise would be impermissible .... But in general Congress has left it to the courts
to formulate the rules thus interpreting the commerce clause in its application ....
Id. at 769-70 (citations omitted); see also J. CHOPER, supra note 73, at 207-08 (courts play
quasi-legislative role under dormant commerce clause, subject to congressional revision);
Conkle, supra note 155, at 36-37 (judicial enforcement of nonoriginalist rights should reflect
quasi-legislative norms, subject to congressional revision, akin to judicial-congressional relationship under dormant commerce clause).
This view, of course, conflicts with the orthodox notion of binding constitutional interpretation. See A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 202-03 (only Court has theoretical authority to reverse
or revise principle). Indeed, it is a marked departure from the early judicial enforcement of the
dormant commerce clause as established by Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
299 (1851), in which the Court viewed the commerce clause itself as restricting local discretion.
"If the Constitution excluded the states from making any law regulating commerce, certainly
Congress cannot re-grant, or in any manner re-convey to the states that power." Id. at 318.
Justice Curtis held that states were constitutionally precluded from regulating commercial
activities that were "in their nature national." Id. at 319. Whatever that might have meant at
the time, it is clear that states were constitutionally precluded from regulating certain activities,
• even in the absence of a conflicting congressional statute. Indeed, Congress could not, even if
it wanted to, permit such state regulation.
The distinction between the Southern Pacific view of the dormant commerce clause and the
Cooley view is the distinction between a constitutional provision implicitly resting on the motive
of constraining only others and one resting on the motive of constraining others and
constraining self. Southern Pacific sees no independent constitutional restrictions on local
discretion; rather, it sees national legislative authority, exercised by both the Court and
Congress in a purely partnership role. Such a grant of national authority reflects the desire to
constrain only those who dissent from a rough national consensus. In contrast, Cooley envisions
an independent constitutional restriction on local discretion and, hence, a restriction on
congressional discretion. Such an independent limit on local and national discretion implicitly
rests on a motive of self-constraint.
Note that under the Southern Pacific view, the Court is not authorized to pursue the coherent
implications of the national trade value beyond the extent to which it is valued by a current
national majority. Under the Cooley view, the Court is authorized to protect the value of
national trade against the competing desires for greater local autonomy (economic protectionism, for example), even if a national majority now supports state protectionism.
157. See Wellington, Nature of judicial Review, supra note 14, at 494; Wellington, Notes on
Adjudication, supra note 14, at 245.
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motive for imposing constitutional restrictions on democratic discretionthat of self-constraint. Dean Wellington states:
Moral ideals are different from moral principles. Their realization
is "an achievement deserving praise." They connect with moral
principles (which impose obligations) in that they are a guide to
the virtuous, inviting him "to carry fonvard beyond the limited
extent which duty demands," to be, for example, especially
concerned with the interests of others and to make sacrifices
which are not required.158
It should be apparent, however, that people do not wish to be forced
to pursue all of their ideals. Thus, not all ideals, even if broadly acknowledged as worthy, necessarily provide a basis for prohibiting contrary
democratic choices as unconstitutional. 159 To justify judicial protection of
certain ideals against democratic erosion, a court must postulate and
establish that "the people" want to constrain their own everyday democratic
discretion for the sake of those ideals. 160 Like the notion of conventional

158. Wellington, Notes

011

Adjudication, supra note 14, at 245; see also Wellington, Nature of

judicial Rt'v1ew, supra note 14, at 514 (moral ideals of community may be unduly compromised
in legislative politics).
159. Dean Wellington has stressed an analogous point:
When the Justices are right about the moral ideals of the community, their decisions
become settled and accepted. The turmoil, the resistance, and the threats from other
governmental entities, from private groups, institutions and individuals diminish
with time. Thus, few today can be heard to endorse government supported racial
segregation or other state practices that discriminate against blacks.
Wellington, .Vaturc of judicial Review, supra note 14, at 516.
The last sentence of this passage may be true, and it may be true that ending racial
di~crimination is a "moral ideal of the community." Cf infra text accompanying notes 287-334.
But it i5 not necessarily true that all moral ideals should be judicially protected in the name of
the Constitution. To say that moral ideals, even if accurately identified, properly constrain
blips or exceptions carved out by popular sentiment, is to assume the necessary conclusion.
Indeed, one could argue with equal force that a popular choice to compromise the moral ideals
of the community is evidence of the strength of the countervailing consideration. Thus,
a~mming that the legislature is accurately reflecting the majority's sentiments, a court has
warrant to step in only if it finds that the community has the constitutional intent that courts
protect the frustrated value against such blips and exceptions. See supra text accompanying
notes 95-109.
Furthermc•re, it is not necessarily true that the tempering of turmoil and resistance is
evidente that the enforced principle was, or is, a moral ideal of the community. Quietude may
nwan simply that the dissatisfied elements of the populace are not so dissatisfied as to resist.
Yet they ma:• remain dissatisfied. If this dissatisfaction is not theoreticall} problematic, then
one may require a notion of democracy that properly accounts for the intensity of feeling
about hsues in social conflict. See supra note 111.
IGO. After rejecting the proposition that the Court should declare its view of "an existing
national com•ensus" as constitutional principle, because "this \\ould charge the Court with a
function to \\ hich it is, of all our institutions, least suited," Bickel urges that "the Court should
declare as law only such principles as will-in time, but in a rather immediate and foreseeable
future-gain general assent." A. BtCKEL, supra note 11, at 238-39. This views the Court as a
leader of public opinion and Jllaces on the Court an obligation to succeed in leading.
This assenion raises several questions. Why should a consensus that does not yet exist
prevail over present normative conflict? .if the consensus develops, it will have claim to prevail
as a majoritarian value, yet no more claim to prevail than does the present ad hoc compromise
that the Court would be thwarting. Why would "the people" want ;;. court to predict future
values and give them mandatory effect before they emerge in ordinary politics?
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national morality, which courts can properly employ to restrict local
discretion only if they can establish that "the people" today would like to
grant Congress additional legislative discretion to address such moral
concerns, courts properly can strike down a democratic choice, local or
national, in the name of the "moral ideals of the community," only if they
can establish that "the people" today would endorse such a constitutional
principle of self-constraint. Dean Wellington does not provide a basis for
establishing either condition.

***
This Article has posited a goal for constitutional analysis: to identify
the constitutional values of "the people" today. It has suggested that past
constitutional choices can be relevant for inferring present constitutional
preferences, based on a Hamiltonian premise of constitutional continuity.
This Article also has sought to provide a basis for more comprehensively
understanding "original intent" by identifying the different implications of
national values held with the motive of constraining the political discretion
of only dissenting localities, and national values held with the motive of
constraining the political discretion of both dissenting localities and self. To
the extent that "the people" of the nation adhere to constitutional restrictions on local discretion with the motive of self-constraint, they want to
favor certain national norms to a greater extent than they otherwise could achieve
in ordinary national legislative politics. 161 To the extent that "the people"
adhere to norms simply with the desire to constrain the political discretion
of dissenting localities, they wish to favor norms precisely to the extent that
they would achieve in ordinary legislative politics.
One might conclude, therefore, that obsession with the labels
"interpretivism" and "noninterpretivism" 162 has posed an issue only tangentially relevant for mitigating the risks of judicial error in interpreting
the Constitution. 163 The relevant distinction for mitigating the chances for

An answer, I suggest, lies in identifying the basic motivation with which these values are
held. Values of self-constraint are ideals that "the people" want courts to help them attain. On
the other hand, values held with the motive of constraining only others do not justify judicial
intrusion into the political process. "The people" would not want courts to tamper with their
present compromises in order to anticipate future compromises. Cf infra text accompanying
notes 248-66.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 64, 91-92.
162. See generally R. BERGER, supra note 15; J. ELY, supra note 148; M. PERRY, supra note 11;
Berger, supra note 5; Brest, supra note 59; Monaghan, supra note 12.
163. Michael Perry has conceived the dilemma of constitutional analysis as "interpretivism"
versus "noninterpretivism:"
The Supreme Court engages in interpretive review when it ascertains the constitutionality of a given policy choice by reference to one of the value judgments of which the
Constitution consists .... The Court engages in noninterpretive review when it makes
the determination of constitutionality by reference to a value judgment other than
one constitutionalized by the framers .... Interpretivism refers to constitutional theory
that claims that only interpretive judicial review is legitimate and in particular, that all
noninterpretive review is illegitimate. Noninterpretivism describes constitutional theory
that claims that at least some noninterpretive review ... is legitimate too.
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'judicial tyranny" is not between the values of the past and the values of the
present; rather, the relevant distinction is between constitutional values held
by "the people" today-values of either self-constraint (constitutionally
mandated restrictions on local discretion) or self-empowerment (constitutionally authorized congressional discretion)-and the ordinary political
values held by "the people" today.
The foregoing analysis thus begins to suggest how past constitutional
choices might be used to infer present constitutional values in a manner
that mitigates the possibilities for 'judicial tyranny." It has identified three
necessary 1:!videntiary elements. First, one must understand the structure of
past political conflict. To what extent did past national political majorities
want to disable offensive local discretion?
Second, one must consider whether members of past constitutional
majorities chose to disable local discretion with the simple motive of
constraining the political discretion of dissenting localities, or with the
compound motive of constraining their own everyday political discretion as
well. What were the constitutional majority's goals? Why would a grant of
ordinary national legislative discretion fail to achieve the constitutional
majority's goals? Did the constitutional majority have an ideal of selfconstraint-a desire to favor some value to a greater extent than they could trust
themselves to achieve in ordinary politics? If so, what was the content of the
ideal? What compulsive national values that would othern'ise undermine
the constitutional ideal did "the people" choose to forgo for the sake of the
ideal? What compulsive national values did they choose not to forgo, despite
compromising their ideal of self-constraint?
Third, one must consider the everyday political values among "the
people" today, and the relationship of these values to the everyday political
values held by "the people" who made formal constitutional choices in the
past. By understanding the relationship between the everyday national
political ceincerns of the past and the constitutional choices of the past, and
M. PERRY, supra note 11, at 10-11. Perry suggests that "(n]o contemporary constitutional
theorist seriously disputes the legitimacy of interpretive review." Id. at 11. He also concludes
that
There is no plausible textual or historical justification for [noninterpretive] constitutional pdicymaking by the judiciary.... The justification for the practice, if there is
one, must be functional: If noninterpretive review serves a crucial governmental
function that no other practice realistically can be expected to serve. and if it serves that
fu11ctio11 in a manner that somehow accommodates the principle of electorally accountable
jJO!icymahillg, then that function constitutes the justification for noninterpretive
review.
Id. at 2·1 (emphash added).
Perry's criterion of "accountable policymaking" is as foundational to his analysis as Justice
Marshall's criterion that the government reflect the preferences of "the people" is foundational to the analysis presented in this Article. See supra notes 5, 6, 100. A requirement that the
government reflect the will of "the people," however, can undermine Perry's notion of
"interpretive review" just as it can undermine "noninterpretive review.'' To satisfy the will of
the framers i;; not necessarily to satisfy the will of the current electorate. Departing from the
will of the framers, as in "noninterpretive review," even to contradict it, might reflect the desires
of today's electorate. Thus, the essential questions are those confronted in this section: Who
are "the people" to whom the principle of accountability refers? Why refer to the preferences
of the framers and ratifiers?
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the relationship between the everyday national political concerns of the
past and the everyday national political concerns of the present, given the
Hamiltonian premise of constitutional continuity, one has a basis for inferring,
justifying, and criticizing a definition of present constitutional concerns.
One might represent the relevant relationships with the following
"constitutional equation":
[ord. nt'l prefs. : const'l choices](past) II [ord. nt'l prefs. : const'l values](pres.)1 64

By using the information that one has about past ordinary, everyday
national political preferences, past constitutional choices, and present
ordinary, everyday national political preferences, one might infer the
content of the fourth variable-the constitutional values of the present. 165
The operation and limits of this analytical structure will be illustrated in the
next section. 166

III.

GE!TING FROM THERE AND THEN TO WHERE-AND WHEN?:

CONFLICT, SELF-CONSTRAINT, AND THE QUALITY OF JUDICIAL
RESOLUTION

It is time to apply the general analysis rleveloped thus far to particular
constitutional conflicts. 167 At issue is the possibility that courts, in the name
of defining coherent constitutional principle, could distort the constitutional compromises that "the people" today would strike by excessively
restricting the discretion of ordinary political majorities. Also at issue is the
possibility that courts, in the name of remaining true to past constitutional
compromises, might fail to vindicate values of self-constraint held by "the
164. In plain language, this representation, whose form is borrowed from a familiar group
of questions on the Law School Admissions Test, would read:
The relationship between the nation's past ordinary, everyday political preferences
and the values underlying constitutional mandates chosen by "the people" of the past
reflects the relationship between the nation's present ordinary, everyday political
preferences and the values underlying constitutional mandates desired by "the
people" today.
165. Cf A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 110 ("We require to know, as accurately as may be,
whence we come, in order to be aware that it is our own reasoned and revocable will, not some
idealized ancestral compulsion, that moves us fonvard.").
166. The conclusion that the past has no right to bind the present suggests that the
postulated constitutional motive of constraining the discretion of future majorities to prevent
the development of values, one way or another, cannot be given effect consistent with the
Hamiltonian premise of constitutional continuity. If "the people" of the past acted with this
motive, they wanted and exercised the discretion to order certain values, and hired the Court
only as a nanny. Cf supra text accompanying notes 58-64. The Hamiltonian premise suggests
that "the people" today would want similar discretion to order values precisely as they please
in ordinary politics. If the proper theoretical source of values is "the people" of the present,
and if past constitutional choices are relevant only as evidence of present constitutional values,
the desire of "the people" of the past to satisfy their ordinary political whims (and to constrain
the future) would suggest, at least, a present desire among "the people" to satisfy their own
ordinary pqlitical whims. Thus, accepting the premise of constitutional continuity, the
fundamental motive with which constitutional provisions are enacted governs their future
significance. See infra note 266.
167. Wechsler, supra note 11, at 20 ("One who has ventured to advance such generalities
about the courts and constitutional interpretation is surely challenged to apply them to some
concrete problems-if only to make sure that he believes in what he says.").
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people" today. The vehicle for this analysis will be the increasingly frequent
claims of ~pedal constitutional concern for the interests of homosexuals.
These claims are derived primarily from two doctrinal sources: first, the
judicially developed constitutional right of privacy, and second, judicial
recognition of groups protected from "prejudice" under the equal protection clause.168 Can one determine whether "the people" today adhere to
constitutional values that would supersede ordinary politics as the basis for
re~olving disagreements about these issues?

A.

Privacy and Sexual Acts

1.

The Issue

Michael Hardwick was arrested by the Atlanta police in his bedroom
on August 3, 1982.1 69 Mr. Hardwick was arrested for engaging in certain
consensual sexual activities and thereby violating a Georgia criminal statute
that prohibits sexual acts defined as "sodomy." 170 Mr. Hardwick challenged
the statute as unconstitutional, claiming that it violates the right of
privacy. 171
Mr. Hardwick lost his case in the Supreme Court. 17 2 Justice White,
168. Homosexuals also have pursued constitutional protection under the first amendment's
prohibition of laws "abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. Co:"lsr. amend. I. In these cases,
hO\\ever, the question is not whether homosexual activity or homosexual persons have special
constitutional protection, but whether, for purposes of the first amendment, the political
is5ues of homosexuality should be protected as is any other political issue. See, e.g., Gay
Alliance of ~tudeuts v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 167 (4th Cir. 1976) (public university
discrimination against gay student organization violated first amendment protection of
speech); Gay Students Org. v. Bonner, 367 F. Supp. 1088, 1101-02 (D.N.H.), modified, 509
F.2d 652, 6fi0-62 (1st Cir. 1974) (public university discrimination against gay student
organization violated first amendment protections of association and speech); Wood v.
Davi~on, 351 F. Supp. 543, 546 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (same).
169. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204 (11th Cir. 1985), r.?V'd, 106 S. Ct. 2841
(1986).
170. See GA. CooE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984). The Georgia Code provides as follows:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy wlien he performs or submits to any
sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another.
A person commits the offense of aggravated sodomy when he commits sodomy with
force and against the will of the other person. (b) A person convicted of the offense
of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20
years. A person convicted of the offense of aggravated sodomy shall be punished by
imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20
years.
Id.
One should note that the statute docs not discriminate between heterosexuals and
homosexuals. The proscriptions are defined solely in terms of activities, and not in terms of the
gender of individuals engaged in those activities. This statute, therefore, is to be contrasted
with that challenged in Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (mem.), rev'd, 769
F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), ceit. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3337-38 (1986). For a discussion of Baker, see
infra text acceompanying notes 235-441.
171. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1204. Mr. Hardwick's action was for declaratory judgment. The
State did not bring charges before a grand jury, but left the case open for possible future
action.
172. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846-47 (1986).

CONSTITUTIONAL INTENT

809

writing for a majority of five, 173 held that the constitutional right of privacy
does not encompass sexual activity between people of the same gender. 174
Justice Blackmun, for a dissenting minority of four, 175 concluded that it
does. 176
The dispute between Justice White and Justice Blackmun is deeper
than a difference over results. The dispute, at least implicitly, is one of basic
analytical methodology. In Justice White's view, protectw privacy interests
are based on_ values "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"; 177
marriage and traditional family life are protected while homosexual relationships are not. By referring to past and present national political
consensus, as reflected in statutes and the practices of daily living throughout the
nation, 178 Justice White's analysis implicitly presumes that "the people"
adhere to privacy concerns with the motive of constraining the political
discretion of dissenting localities-that "the people" do want to restrict local
judgments that diverge from an ordinary political consens_us among "the
people" of the nation, but that they do not want to constrain their own
everyday political discretion.
Conversely, in Justice Blackmun's view, the right of privacy serves to
protect "the happiness of individuals." 179 Constitutional privacy protects
"the right to be left alone" 180 with respect to concerns that "makeO
individuals what they are." 181 This principle logi,cally extends to "intimate
sexual relationships" 182-even between members of the same gender.183 In
conceiving protected privacy interests as reflecting the coherent implications of a general concern with "the happiness of individuals" -even
unpopular sources of individual happiness such as homosexual relationships-Justice Blackmun's analysis implicitly rests on a premise that "the
people" of the nation adhere to privacy values with the motive of selfconstraint and, therefore, that courts have been authorized to protect the
coherent implications of a favored constitutional norm against local intrusion to a greater extent than ordinary national majorities would choose. 184
This analytical cleavage in deriving and defining the right of privacy
has roots deeper than the conflict between Justice White and Justice
Blackmun in Hardwick. It originated with the birth of constitutional privacy
173. Justice White's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell,
Rehnquist, and O'Connor. See id. at 2842.
174. See id. at 2842-47.
175.Justice Blackmun's opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. See
id. at 2848.
176. See id. at 2848-56 (Blackmun, J ., dissenting).
177. Id. at 2844, 2846.
178. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
179. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 2848 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
181. Id. at 2854 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 2851 (Blackmun, J ., dissenting).
183. Id. at 2852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun conceived the issue of
homosexual sodomy as a specific element of a general set. "The Court claims that its decision
today merely refuses to recognize a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy; what
the Court really has refused to recognize is the fundamental interest all individuals have in
controlling the nature of their intimate associations with others." Id.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 67, 92.
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in Griswold v. Connecticut.1 85 In Griswold, Justice Douglas constructed a
constitutional right for married couples to use contraceptives by postulating
that the "specific guarantees" of the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments "have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help to give them life and substance." 18 6 Each of these amendments, in
Douglas' view, protects individuals from state intrusion on certain interests
that Justke Douglas characterized as "privacy" interests. From their emanations, Justice Douglas inferred a generic right of privacy, which encompasses a married couple's desire to use contraceptives.1s7
In using the somewhat fanciful words "penumbras" and "emanations,"
Justice Douglas was describing the analytical process by which courts have
often developed constitutional meaning. "Emanations" refers to the common process of judicial analysis by which courts pursue the logical
implications of certain identified constitutional norms. "Penumbras" refers
to the relatively coherent body of principle that is the natural consequence
of this traditional judicial reasoning. Thus, by pursuing the coherent
implications of a putative constitutional value, Justice Douglas' analysis
implies that "the people" adhere to that value with a motive of selfconstraint. It was this approach to constitutional privacy that Justice
Blackmun followed in Hardwick.
In contrast, Justices Goldberg and Harlan in Griswold perceived
pnvacy as a function of the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our
people" 188 and the "balance [of traditions] struck by this country," 189
respectively. By referring to traditions, as reflected in statutes and daily
practice, 190 their approach looks for an ordinary national political consensus, and implies that "the people" of the nation adhere to privacy concerns
with a motive of constraining the political discretion of localities whose
values conflict with the national majority's ordinary political values. This
approach also implies that "the people" of the nation adhere to privacy
concerns without a motive to constrain their own everyday political
185. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
186. Id. at 484.
187. Id. at 485.
188. Id. at 493 (Goldberg,]., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1933)).
189. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The passage from
which the ex< erpt was taken follows:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined
by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through the course of this
Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon
postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty
and the demands of organized society. If the supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational process, it certainly has not been one
where judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them.
The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, ha'l<ing regard to
what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the
traditiom from which it broke. The tradition is a living thing.
Id.
One perhaps secs in Justice Harlan's juxtaposition of reason and living tradition the
essc ntial distinction between the methods of philosophy and legislative compromise for
defining public policy.
190. SPe infta text accompanying notes 216-26.
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discretion. It was this approach to "constitutional" 191 privacy that Justice
White followed in Hardwick.
The implications of both approaches-that which presumes a motive
of self-constraint among "the people," and that which presumes a motive to
constrain only the political discretion of dissenting localities-will be
considered in what follows. The issue is broader than Mr. Hardwick's claim
that constitutional privacy extends to pr0tect "sodomy" between people of
the same sex. At stake is whether the notion of constitutional privacy is at
all supportable given a goal of ascertaining the constitutional values of "the
people" today.

2.
a.

Self-Constraint: The Limits of Language

The Constitutional Choices of "the People" -There and Then

If "the people" adhere to a value of constitutional privacy with a
motive of self-constraint, they must want courts to protect the coherent
implications of that value to a greater extent than that attainable by relying
on the ordinary national political process through empowering Congress to
act. 192 One must note that although Justice Douglas' analysis considered the
logical implications of the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments, "the
people" who made the relevant choices were not those of 1791, but those of
1868. The framers of the first ten amendments were concerned with the
protection oflocal discretion against national intrusion and, therefore, were
motivated not by a desire for self-constraint but by one of self-protection
against intrusion by overreaching national majorities-a motive of local
empowerment. 193 Thus, the Douglas-Blackmun rationale for constitutional
privacy must rest on a premise that "the people" of 1868, by ratifying the
fourteenth amendment, intended to incorporate at least portions of the Bill
of Rights against the states, and thereby to constrict the very local discretion
that "the people" of 1791 originally intended to protect. 194
Although Justice Douglas' Griswold opinion was not entirely clear
191. This word is surrounded by quotation marks because the rationale of vindicating
national political values is not one of constitutionally mandated limits on democratic
discretion. It is, instead, an antifederalism postulation of national political discretion. See supra
text accompanying notes 150-56.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 67-92.
193. Cf supra note 90.
194. To examine the premise of incorporation is beyond the scope of this Article. This
section assumes the intent among "the people" of 1868 to incorporate the first, third, fourth,
and fifth amendments against the states, and considers whether such choices of self-constraint
can support a general notion of constitutional privacy. Cf infra note 207. For a discussion of
the ninth amendment, and the plausibility of its incorporation against the states through the
fourteenth amendment, see infra notes 198, 200.
.
For the roots and some branches of the incorporation issue, see, e.g., Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947) (privilege against self-incrimination not privilege or immunity of
national citizenship); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937) ("process of absorption"
grounded in belief that neither liberty nor justice would exist if sacrificed); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 108-14 (1908) (history of states incorporating privilege against selfincrimination); cf. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (fourteenth amendment guarantees
fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination).
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about what common value the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments
were intended to protect, Justice Blackmun's Hardwick opinion explicitly
raises a concern for individual happiness as the essence of the privacy
right. 1!l!i One might infer that Justice Douglas similarly perceived the
essence of constitutional "privacy" as a concern for individual happiness
and "the right to be left alone" 196 in areas that touch "the heart of what
makes individuals what they are." 19 7 If one assumes, as Justice Douglas
apparently did in Griswold, that "the people" were dedicated to some

195. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2851 (1986) (Blackmun,J., dissenting) ("[W]e protect the family
bt'c/J.ltse it contributes so powerfully to the happiness of individuals, not because of a preference
for stereotypical households." (emphasis added)).
196. Id. at :!848 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
197. Id. at 2854 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). A similar notion was crafted by Justice Brennan
a5 1.mderlyin~: the putative constitutional right of"intimate association." See Roberts v. United
States Jayce<•s, 468 U.S. 609, 618-22 (1984). Justice Brennan noted that constitutional
protection for certain kinds of personal relationships "reflects the realization that individuals
draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others. Protecting these
relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards die ability independently to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty.'' Id. at 619; see supra note
2~1.

Such an ideal of individual happiness is also implicit in the Court's conclusion that the "right
of personal privacy" is "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy." See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Justifying this
proposition, the Court noted the many inconveniences that an unwanted pregnancy would
cau>e a woman to suffer:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying
thb choke altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm, medically diagnosable
even in ·~arly pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may
impose upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be
imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the
distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the
problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and
otherwis1~, to care for it.
.
Id. at 153 (emphasis added). Thus, justifying a postulated special constitutional concern for
the•e hardships seems to be a function of their importance to the target of state regulationthe pregnant woman.
Such an ideal of protecting each individual's most important sources of happiness is
ultimately self-destructive-a potential prescription for anarchy. See J. CHOPER, supra note 73,
at 7-8 ("[I]f ... each person has the unqualified right to define liberty for himself, we have
entered a quagmire that rapidly swallows democracy's central feature of majority rule. Indeed,
the theory se<·mingly conflicts with all governmental rule ...."). Obviously, the mere fact that
an activity is important to an individual cannot conclusively insulate that activity from
regulation. Ao:cording to the judicially developed doctrine enforcing the judicially developed
"rip;ht of privacy," a protected privacy interest can be regulated, but only if the state has an
especially strcongjustification. Thus, whether the state, in the final analysis, will be prohibited
from regulati '1g those specially protected sources of individual happiness will be a function of
the Court's <!valuation of the state's justification. Even assuming that the principle for
generating specially protected individual interests is sound-i.e., supported among a constitutional majority of "the people" as an ideal for which they are willing to endure the pain of
self-constraim-it demands a judicial role in its application which, at be~.t, can be described as
quasi-legislative. See Easterbrook, supra note 156, at 100 ("Decisions based on 'liberty' ...
require the judge to select among values and to resolve tension when values clash-more an
exercise in moral philosophy than in interpretation."). It is unclear why "the people" would
chof.e to grant courts the final say in determing the "proper" balance between two permissible
state concern~..
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general norm of individual happiness in incorporating the first, third,
fourth, and fifth amendments against the states, 198 and if one assumes,
again as Justice Douglas apparently did in Griswold, that they held this norm
as an ideal of self-constraint, one must explain why "the people" chose to
protect only the specific sources of individual happiness mentioned in those
amendments.
The answer might well be that they had competing concerns that they
were not willing to sacrifice. The ideal of self-constraint was not sufficiently
important to override a desire for democratic discretion with respect to
those competing concerns. For the areas covered by the first, third, fourth,
and fifth amendments, "the people" apparently were willing to endure the
pain of self-constraint. They were willing to endure the pain of seeing
individuals engage in morally offensive sources of happiness 199 -the pain
of a society less "well ordered" than it othenvise might be. Beyond those
specified areas, there is·no evidence that "the people" of 1868 adhered to
a more generally defined ideal of individual happiness.
Thus, Justice Douglas' reasoning was as vulnerable as was that of the
coach who forced her client to read Shakespeare. Even assuming that
198. This assumption is vulnerable. Although constitutional protection for the free exercise
of religion may well be based on a view that religion is specially important to individual
happiness, many constitutional analysts seriously question the proposition that such a value
underlies the freedom of speech. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 148, at 105 (most supportable
values to protect against democratic choices are those which protect "channels of political
change"); A. MEIKELJOHN, supra note 74, at 54-55 (first amendment protects freedom of public
speech but "has no concern for 'the need of many men to express their opinions on matters
vital to them if life is to be worth living' .. (quoting z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES
33 (1942)); BORK, NELTRAL PRINCIPLES AND SO.\IE FIRST AMEND.\IENT PROBLEMS, 47 IND. L. REV. 1, 20
(1971) (constitutional protection to be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political);
Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1284, 1303-06 (1983) (underlying
theoretical justifications for principle of freedom of speech include both unitary and
multivalue theories); cf. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTDI OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970) (freedom
of ex.Pression serves "individual self-fulfillment").
It 1s worth noting at this point that although Justice Douglas cited and quoted the ninth
amendment, he did nothing more with the amendment in his analysis. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). To make the ninth amendment relevant as a matter of
self-constraint, one must posit and establish that "the people" of 1868 intended to incorporate
the ninth amendment as a limitation on state and local discretion. Furthermore, one must posit
and establish some normative content for the amendment chosen by "the people" of 1868.
Failing that, one must posit and establish that "the people" were willing to give courts carte
blanche authority to develop rights against state and local discretion. I express no opinion about
appropriate answers to these questions at this time. I do suggest, however, that these questions
must be confronted by those who would do more with the ninth amendment than did Justice
Douglas in Griswold. Cf infra note 200.
199. Assuming that the first amendment's protection of speech is rooted, in part, in a
concern for individual happiness, "the people" of 1868, see supra text accompanying note 194,
chose to endure ordinary political pain for the sake of individuals who had morally offensive
things to say. Similarly, through the free exercise clause, "the people" apparently were willing
to endure such pain of self-constraint in order to protect at least some morally offensive
religious practices.
If reference to morally offensive sources of happiness seems incongruous with respect to the
third, fourth, and fifth amendments, it may stem from a notion that these amendments do not
relate to notions of'privacy predicated on a value of individual happiness and autonomy. This
undermines Justice Douglas' contention that these amendments are all species of the same
general "privacy" concern. The analysis in the text, however, seeks to rest on the analytical
premises most favorable to Justice Douglas' conclusion.
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Justice Douglas' general notion of protected privacy was the genus of which
the particular guarantees in the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments
were species, the specification of constitutional concen1s in the first, third,
fourth, and fifth amendments suggests that "the people" had a limited and
specific d1:o:dication to the ideal of individual happiness. In pursuing the
coherent tmplications of the common value that might underlie the first,
third, fourth, and fifth amendments, without acknowledging that those
amendments reflect relatively specific choices, Justice Douglas left the
realm of constitutional analysis, seeking the values of "the people," and
entered the realm of philosophy, seeking to create a more perfect world in
his own image. He failed to recognize the limits placed on his role by the
value choices implicit in constitutional language.200

b. '17ie Constitutional Values of "the People" -Here and Now
This weakness in Justice Douglas' analysis of the intent of those who
the mandates of the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments
against the states does not end the matter. If one's goal is to identify the
constitutional values of "the people" today,2° 1 past constitutional choices
are signifi.::ant as evidence of contemporary constitutional concerns. 202 The
evidentiary significance of constitutional language, chosen by "the people"
of the past, may have its own limits. Even if "the people" of 1868 were
incorpora~ed

200. One might argue that the (substantive) due process clause is formally the source of
constitutional privacy, and that this clause is not specific at all. The language of"due process"
is broad and vague, one might argue, and invites courts to provide content. This argument for
a ~;eneral right of constitutional privacy is vulnerable on several grounds.
first, the argument is not relevant to Justice Douglas' derivation of constitutional privacy in
Grirwold, ~ince his rationale was predicated on the specific incorporation of the first, third,
fourth, and fifth amendments, and on the coherent implications of those amendments. Cf
supra note l!l8.
Second, if the argument does not envision incorporation of the firsr., third, fourth, and fifth
amendments, it leaves the due process clause with substantive content that is vague indeedto the point of indeterminacy.
Third, if the argument envisions incorporation of the first, third, fourth, and fifth
amendments-and more-one is left with a similar indeterminacy: What else? The ninth
amendment may be a response, but it is not an answer that mitigates the normative
incleterminac·y of the (substantive) due process clause. See sujrra note 198. Given earlier analysis
suggesting tbe limited circumstances under which political competitors would want to foresake
political power, see sujrra text accompanying notes 57-92, to posit that "the people" would
choose to grant courts such an indeterminate license is implausible.
TJltimately. the weakness of relying on the vague language of the clue process clause for
generating rr ore than procedural restrictions on state and local discretion rests in the weakness
of viewing the due process clause as the intended route of incorporating the Bill of Rights. If,
indeed, "the people" of 1868 did intend to incorporate the Bill of Rights to restrict state and
local discretion, as a matter of self-constraint, the most plausible route by which they would
ha\e express·~d thi~ incorporation is through the privileges and immunities clause. This clause,
by reference, is as specific as the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments. See, e.g., Duncan
v. Lou~iana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (Black, J., concurring) (clause at least should incorporate
protections enumerated in Bill of Rights); cf. J. ELv, sujrra note 148, at 28 (interpreting clause
as ''delegation to future constitutional decision-makers to protect certain rights that the
document neither lists, at least not exhausti,·ely, nor even in any specific way gives directions
for finding.").
201. See su1)ra text accompanying notes 95-109.
202. See su1)ra te:n accompanying notes 114-23.
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concerned only with particular aspects of individual happiness, perhaps
"the people" of 1987 would, if they thought about it, prefer some privacy
ideal of self-constraint beyond those contexts specified by the first, third,
fourth, and fifth amendments.203
How might one establish this proposition? As suggested in the
previous section, modem constitutional values can be inferred from the
relationships among three variables: the everyday political preferences of
past national majorities, past constitutional choices to constrain (and not to
constrain) local political preferences in the name of some constitutional
ideal, and the everyday political preferences of present national majorities. 204
Tum now to the first two variables, and consider the relationship
between the nation's ordinary political impulses and its constitutional ideals
of self-constraint at the time a constitutional provision was ratified. We have
assumed that "the people" of 1868 maintained a broad and general ideal of
"privacy"-or individual "happiness"-but that they had competing concerns they otherwise would seek to vindicate in everyday politics.205 Thus,
because they chose to protect the particular aspects of that ideal reflected in
the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments, we can surmise that they
were willing to endure some amount of everyday political pain in the
service of that ideal. One might represent the everyday political pain that
"the people" of 1868 chose to endure as follows: the total amount of
everyday political pain, Pt [1868], is equal to the sum of the everyday
203. This has been referred to as choosing the "level of generality" at which a constitutional
norm is perceived and defined. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 15-13, at 946
(1978). In speaking about a purported right of sexual privacy, Professor Tribe cautioned that
"arriving at a complete definition of protected human sexual activity at an appropriate level of
generality will [not necessarily] be an easy task.'' Id. Although he signals some sexual activities
that might or might not be protected, Professor Tribe does not provide criteria by which a
constitutional analyst can explain the choice to include one sexual activity in the realm of
constitutional protection while excluding another. Cf supra note 29.
Professor Tushnet also has noted that a question of constitutionality "frequently ... turns
completely on the level of generality at which some feature of the issue under analysis is
described. But the choice of that level must be made on some basis external to the analysis."
See Tushnet, supra note 102, at 791; see also Brest, supra note 59, at 222-24.
What does it mean to define a principle with an appropriate level of generality? He could
mean that the analyst who has defined the principle has properly determined that the value,
as defined, has been deemed by a constitutional majority to supersede the competing values
of ordinary democratic majorities. If so, the choice of a level of generality at which a
constitutional principle is described must account for the precise nature of conflict that
motivated a constitutional majority to circumscribe the discretion of ordinary democratic
majorities. Any choice to define a constitutional principle in a way that does not confront the
question of why "the people" would want to circumscribe the democratic discretion of "the
people," fails to adhere to a notion of popular determination.
When the Supreme Court deemed the equal protection clause to prohibit governmental
actions based not only on racism, but also on sexism, it shifted to a more general level than was
previously necessary for characterizing the clause's normative content. For an effort to justify
this move, and to distinguish this treatment of equal protection from the creation of
constitutional privacy from the general value purponedly underlying the first, third, fourth,
and fifth amendments, see infra text accompanying notes 335-390; note 374.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 162-66. For a clarification of this analysis, see its
application to equal protection in infra text accompanying notes 314-90.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 195-200.
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political pain that they chose to endure in the particular contexts covered by
the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments, {Pe 1 + Pe2 + Pc3 + Pe4}
[1868].2° 6 The measure of everyday political pain that the constitutional
majority was willing to endure for the sake of privacy consists of the extent
to which the Constitution, in disabling local discretion to victimize individual privacy interests, was to force a greater national commitment to the privacy
ideal than ordinary national majorities in Congress could be expected to choose. 207
Now turn to the third variable-ordinary political values today.
Suppose that everyday political values have developed-that local majorities are le~s likely today than in 1868 to violate the first, third, fourth, or
fifth amendments. 208 Indeed, suppose that everyday national majorities in
Congress are more likely than in 1868 to enact legislation protecting
individual speech interests, religion interests, or the interests of criminal
defendants from intrusion by local political choices. Given this new national
political context, the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments would
impose lm everyday political pain on "the people" of 1987 than they
imposed on "the people" of 1868. ({Pc 1 + Pc2 + Pc3 + Pe4} [1987] < {Pe 1
+ Pc2 + Pc3 + Pc4 } [1868]) Thus, the total amount of everyday political
pain that "the people" of 1987 would be forced to suffer from the

206. By fo1ming national norms through constitutional mandates rather than through
congressional legislation, the national majmity denies itself discretion to cut back on those
con'ltitutionally mandated national norms if it someday wants to. Sa supra note 81 and
accompanyin;~ text. By pursuing norms through constitutional mandates, the national
majority forces a commitment to certain values greater than ordinary congressional majorities might
choose ill ever)'day decisionmaldng. Thus, such constitutional mandates envision choices by
national majorities to suffer losses-endure pain-in the forums of e\'el]day politics. Each
mandate in each chosen constitutional context reflects such a choice of self-constraint-to
endure pain in the ordinary political proces5es for the sake of certain ideals.
The nomenclature in the text seekS to represent this idea. It assumes, as Justice Douglas
as~crted, that the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments were all intended to protect certain
clements of individual autonomy or happiness. It posits that each amendment reflected
particular ch•Jices of self-constraint in particular contexts, and that each choice of selfcomtraint reflected a choice to endure some losses-some pain-in ordinary politics. Thus,
think of Pc 1 as the pain "the people" of 1868 chose to endure in the contexts covered by the
first amendment, Pc2 as the pain they chose to endure in the contexts covered by the third
amendment, Pc3 as the pain they chose to endure in the contexts covered by the fourth
amendment, .md Pc4 as the pain they chose to endure in the contexts covered by the fifth
amendment.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 162-66. I am, for the moment, ignoring the peculiar
circumstances in which the fourteenth amendment was ratified. See supra text accompanying
notes 88-89; infra text accompanying notes 258-66.
208. A change in ordinary, everyday political preferences does not itself contradict the premise
of constitutional continuity. Recall that the latter notion is concerned with the relationship
between a desire for democratic discretion and a desire to restrain democratic discretion. See
supra note 164. When the motive to restrict democratic discretion is that of self-constraint, "the
people" resolve a dynamic tension between an ideal value and competing everyday preferences by choosing those ordinary preferences to forgo toward serving the ideal and those to
retain, despite: compromising the ideal. These competing everyday preferences thus limit the
extent to which "the people" choose to protect the ideal value, which, but for those competing
preferences, could have been vindicated to the full extent of its worth to "the people." Thus,
onl)' if there 1s some change in this relationship of tension between the ideal and ordinal}''
political preference~ is the premise of constitutional continuity contradicted. See infra note
209. For a consideration of the vulnerability of the Hamiltonian premise, see supra note 122.
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Constitution's original mandates related to individual happiness, Pt [1987},
would be less than the everyday political pain that "the people" of 1868
chose to endure for the sake of their happiness ideal, Pt [1868].
Assuming all this, one might make the following argument. The
notion of self-constraint suggests a competition within an individual's value
structure between an elusive ideal and pressing everyday concerns. Particular choices of self-constraint reflect a particular relationship or accommodation among those competing impulses, reflecting an equilibrium in
which the benefit to an ideal is worth the loss of competing everyday
preferences. The constitutional equation, which reflects the Hamiltonian
premise of constitutional continuity, suggests that this relationship of tension
between the constitutional ideal and competing everyday preferences
persists through time. 209 It suggests not only that "the people" of 1987, like
those of 1868, adhere to an ideal of individual "happiness," but also that
they are willing to endure as much everyday political pain for the sake of
that ideal as were "the people" of 1868.210 Thus, if "the people" today no
longer feel as much everyday political pain imposed by the first, third,
fourth, and fifth amendments as "the people" of 1868 chose to endure-if
{Pei + Pc2 + Pc3 + Pc4} [1987] is less than {Pei + Pc2 + Pc3 + Pc4}
[1868]-"the people" today must want some additional restriction on their
everyday political discretion, Pc5 , to maintain intact the level of their
commitment to their ideal of individual "happiness."
By interpreting the Constitution as prohibiting local choices that
intrude on some previously unspecified context related to individual
happiness-sexual activity, for example-the Court, acting as a coach, can
ensure that the everyday political pain that "the people" of 1987 suffer for
the sake of individual happiness equals the everyday political pain that "the
people" of 1868 chose to endure. Thus, if Pc5 represents "sexual activity,"
and if {Pei + Pc2 + Pc3 + Pc4 + Pc5 } [1987] is equal to {Pei + Pc2 + Pc3
+ Pc4 } [1868}, the Court could have a sound analytical basis for determining that the constitutional values of "the people" today extend to selfconstraint for the sake of individual happiness in the supplemental context
of sexual activity.211

209. See supra note 164. This is because the individual who has values of self-constraint views
them as ideals to be attained, but feels restricted in the extent to which those ideals might be
pursued because of competition from everyday desires. The notion of an ideal establishes the
preferred direction for normative movement. Thus, if the individual no longer holds those
everyday desires that once restricted the extent to which he could realize his ideal, he would
gladly make choices that make his everyday behavior more closely approximate his ideal. This
notion of an ideal as setting the preferred direction of normative movement resembles
Dworkin's notion of "integrity." See supra note 30. Dworkin, however, accounts only for the
ideal, and not for the everyday impulses that compete with the ideal. Id. The premise of
constitutional continuity, fo.cusing on the relationship between constitutional choices and
everyday political values, accounts for both. See supra text accompanying notes 161-66; infra
text accompanying notes 363-79.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 161-65.
211. See supra note 208. Of course, this raises significant difficulties in determining which
new particulars of a general ideal of individual happiness should be deemed protected by the
constitutional preferences of "the people." One must have some additional criteria since there
are so many sources of individual happiness logically begging to be protected. Yet, the contexts
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However sound this argument could be, 212 and although this hypothetical has suggested circumstances that could supersede the superficial
implications of constitutional language, 21 s it is probably not true that the
first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments intrude less on choices made by
ordinary democratic majorities today than in 1868. Indeed, those amendments, as interpreted by the courts today, may intrude on democratic
preferenc·es to a greater extent than the framers and ratifiiers intended.214
Thus, to establish a generic constitutional ideal of privacy, with
mandates going beyond the contexts specified in the first, third, fourth, and
fifth amendments, one must postulate that "the people" today are willing to
endure more pain of self-constraint in the service of individual happiness
than "the people" of 1868 chose to endure. There is, quite naturally, no
evidence for such a proposition. Values of self-constraint are by nature
vexing and elusive. Because values of self-constraint are by definition
unpopular in everyday politics, they will not be manifested in daily political
processes. Only when "the people" are thinking in constitutional terms,
making constitutional choices by "solemn and authoritative act,"2 15 and
therefore considering why, if at all, democratic discretion should be
circumscribed, is it likely that they will seriously consider values of selfconstraint. Thus, even if it is true that the first, third, fourth, and fifth
amendments were intended to serve the same ideal of individual happiness,
and even i.f"the people" of 1868 maintained this general value of individual
happiness as an ideal of self-constraint for which they were willing to
endure e"eryday political pain, there is no evidentiary basis for inferring
that "the people" today are willing to endure more democratic pain in the
service of that ideal than were "the people" of 1868, who purportedly
identified that ideal. There is no basis for rebutting the Hamiltonian
premise of constitutional continuity.
in which Justice Douglas posits that "the people" of 1868 chose to protect individual happiness
do not suggest an additional common characteristic. See supra note 197.
Compare this to the relatively easier resolution of an analogous question in the context of
equal protection. See infra text accompanying notes 235·441; cf. infra note 380.
212. See supra note 164.
,
213. A change in national political values requires a commensurate development of
constitution~) mandates of self-constraint in order to satisfy the Hamiltonian premise of
constitutiond continuity. See supra note 208; infra note 362.
214. Some have suggested, for example, that the first amendment's protection of speech was
directed primarily at sedition laws. See New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274
( 1964) (Sedition Act of 1798 first crystallized national awareness of central meaning of first
amendment); cf. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of tlzc First
Amendment", 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191.
A first amendment that prohibits only laws restricting criticism of governmental officials
wc•uld be far less intrusive on majoritarian preferences than is the amendment as interpreted
today. An antisedition law doctrine seeks only to preserve governmental accountability, and is
thus decidedly promajoritarian. The first amendment as it currently is interpreted restricts the
.di~cretion of majorities to silence minority viewpoints they find offensive. See, e.g., Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (offensive language); American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut,
598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984), 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affirmed, 106 S. Ct. 1172
(1 !l86) (mem.) (pornography). Professor Bollinger has made this point with notable clarity. See
L. BoLLINC.EF, supra note 56, at 50-51.
215. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see supra text
acrompanying notes 115-23.
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Constraint of Others: judicial Enforcement of a National Political
Consensus Against Dissenting Localities

If based on a theory that posits privacy as a general norm of
self-constraint derived from the logical implications of the first, third,
fourth, and fifth amendments, Griswold fails to satisfy a goal of identifying
the constitutional values of ''the people" today. Yet, the result in Griswold,
in which Connecticut's prohibition of the use of contraceptives by married
couples was invalidated, might have satisfied that interpretive goal on other
grounds. Rather-than postulate a privacy ideal of self-constraint, one might
postulate ordinary national political judgments about certain marital concerns, and a concomitant desire to impose those national values on
dissenting localities. In other words, one might turn to the other basic
motivation for constraining democratic discretion-constraint of others.
This was the essence ofJustice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold and
Justice White's majority opinion in Hardwick. In Justice Goldberg's view,
Connecticut's choice to prohibit the use of contraceptives by married
couples offended the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people."216 In Hardwick, Justice White found that Georgia's prohibition of
sodomy, at least as applied to homosexuals, 217 does not violate liberties that
are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."2 18
Both Goldberg and White looked toward the nation's relevant statutes
and practices, rather than the logical implications of constitutional values
limiting democratic discretion. In Griswold, Justice Goldberg noted that the
"traditional relation of the family [is] as old and as fundamental as our
entire civilization"219 and on that basis declared, "I cannot believe that [the
Constitution] offers these fundamental rights [of privacy in marriage] no
protection."220 In Hardwick, Justice White noted the "ancient roots" of
proscriptions against sodomy.2 21 "[U]ntil 1961, all 50 States outlawed
sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District of Columbia continue to
216. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). The word "conscience" relates
ambiguously to the distinction between values intended to constrain the political discretion of
only others, and values intended to constrain the political discretion of both others and self, as
well. Indeed, because the word evokes an attitude of self-constraint, one might infer that
Justice Goldberg's analysis was predicated on the implications of constitutionally mandated
restrictions on local discretion. Despite this import of "conscience," the thrust of Goldberg's
analysis concerned the traditions of the people as reflected in their daily practices. His analysis
concerned the centrality of marriage and family to Western civilization. Id. at 495-96
(Goldberg, J., concurring). The pursuit and protection of marriage and family hardly have
been vulnerable to the ordinary, everyday concerns of"the people;" rather, they have been the
focus of humanity's daily concerns. Thus, if any constraints were needed to protect these
values, those needing constraint are not the bulk of society, but isolated pockets of dissenting
minorities-one of which, apparently, was the state of Connecticut.
217. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2842, 2842 n.2 (1986) ("The only claim properly before
the Court . . . is Hardwick's challenge to the Georgia statute as applied to consensual
homosexual sodomy. We express no opinion on the constitutionality of the Georgia statute as
applied to other acts of sodomy.").
218. Id. at 2846.
219. Grisufold, 381 U.S. at 496 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
220. Id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
221. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
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provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private between
He concluded that, against this background of statutes
and practices, "[t]he claim that a right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' ... is, at best, facetious." 223
This rationale is implicitly predicated on a motive among "the people"
of constraining only others, rather than the compound motive of selfconstraint, and suggests that a court properly constricts local discretion only
to the extent that it accurately identifies a rough national consensus, and
only if it identifies a rough national consensus that a national majority,
through Congress,22 4 would want to impose on dissenting localities. 225 The
consentin1~ adults." 222

222. Id. at 2845.
223. Id. at 2846.
224. Cf. Wellington, Notes on Adjudication, supra note 14, at 222-29. In this article, Dean
Wellington distinguishes between "principles" and "policies," and the relative competence of
courts and legislatures to define each. A "principle" is a norm of conduct valued for itself. It
rC'flect~ some intrinsic notion of good or bad. A "policy" is a norm of conduct valued for its
instrumental role in promoting some goal. Id. at 222-25.
Policies, in Wellington's view, are not absolutes; they are evaluations of expedience and
convenience, and are properly compromised with competing concerns. Principles, on the
other hand, as moral judgments, should be treated as relatively immune to compromise.
Principles should be defined in terms of general application, and should not be undermined
by competing considerations. Given these characteristics distinguishing principles from
policies, Dean Wellington concludes that legislatures are better equipped to pursue policies,
and that courts are better situated to protect principles. Id. at 235-49.
All of thh assumes that "the people" do not want principles to be subject to ad hoc
compromise in the legislative process. This may or may not be true. Se.? supra note 30. I suggest
that people are perhaps more likely to want coherence with respect to policies than principles,
even if it me ms giving up more preferences, precisely because policie5 are instrumental and
principles are intrinsically valued ends. In a dispute between adherents of two competing
economic thc·ories, for example, people might deem it wise to choose one theory or the other,
instead of taking bits and pieces from each. There is something to be said for each coherent
theory, but no one has suggested a theory that corresponds to whatever ad hoc compromise
that would emerge if each combatant held his ground. Thus, perhaps to give his theory a
chance to work, Democrats voted to give President Reagan his entire economic package in
19:H. Despit·~ their doubts, many might have recognized that he could be right.
On the other hand, individuals are less likely to defer-more likely to be rigid-in their
principles, and therefore, compromise is more likely to characterize a corporate norm. If I
believe that Marijuana should be legal, while you believe that it should not be legal, neither of
us is likely to foresake our option of ad hoc compromise based on the possibility that the other
mi:~ht be right. I will want to gain as much liberty as I can with my political power, and you
will want to get as much criminal sanction as you can, given your political power. The Missouri
Compromise over slavery and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 tend to suppon this general
proposition.
The issue is of relatively limited significance if the question concerns issues about which
courts ~hould feel free to make common law. Id. at 249-64. Yet, when the question concerns
dimbli11g local or national majorities from achieving their preferences, rather than establishing
some starting-point subject to change by legislative choice, cf. G. CALABRESI, supra note 14, at
59-60, it becc·mes far more important to determine whether and how "the people" want courts
to develop tl-•e coherence of principle.
225. The judicial role in vindicating a postulated rough national consensus concerned only
with constraining the discretion of dissenting localities would be analogous to its role under the
dormant commerce clause, where a court'!· task is to evaluate the contemporary will of a
nallonal majority. When acting pursuant to the dormant commerce clause, a court's determination is subject to correction by congressional action, since a legislature, presumptively in this
system, best reflects prevailing political values. Similarly, when the desire to constrain
democratic discretion is concerned only with dissenting localities, and not with self-constraint
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search for such "traditions of the Nation" does not require identifying the
logical implications of certain constitutional values of self-constraint, but
involves feeling the present political pulse of the nation. Marital contraception is protected against local intrusions, while homosexual sodomy is not,
because marital contraception is treasured by a political majority of the
nation, while homosexual sodomy is not. 226 Thus, given the Goldberg and
White view of privacy, Mr. Hardwick can establish that Georgia lacks
discretion to prohibit homosexual sodomy only if he can establish that an
everyday national political majority wants to secure the individual's freedom to engage in such activities, despite the Georgia legislature's contrary
preferences.
Assume, however, that Mr. Hardwick does establish this national
political preference. Indeed, assume that Congress passes a statute protecting homosexual sodomy. Assume also that Justice Goldberg correctly
sensed a rough national consensus that marital privacy interests should be
protected from Connecticut's prohibition of contraceptives. What is the
significance of such national political preferences in determining the
constitutionality of Georgia's and Connecticut's idiosyncratic moral judgin service of some constitutional ideal, a court's task is to help an ordinary national majority
achieve its will. In this sense, the court acts as a quasi-legislature. The basis for restricting local
discretion is a hypothetical congressional statute. This judicially constructed statute must be
subject to congressional correction if the court erroneously identifies the nation's conventional
morality. See supra text accompanying note 156.
This nonconstitutional nature of restricting local discretion in the name of conventional
morality raises questions about whether a court should take the sort of activist stance that it has
assumed for the dormant commerce clause. Why should a court act in any particular contextfor example, that of a postulated rough national consensus about marital privacy-subject to
legislative correction? In the context of marital privacy, as opposed to the dormant commerce
clause, one might argue that a court should act because Congress lacks explicit constitutional
authority to legislate. Such an argument would be misplaced. Courts also lack explicit
constitutional authority to disable local discretion in the name of marital privacy or conventional morality. A court must postulate that "the people" wish to augment national legislative
discretion-congressional discretion-to reach issues of marital privacy, as a logical prerequisite to judicial invalidation of local discretion in the name of national conventional morality.
Thus, a more direct approach, and one no more intrusive on the constitutional value of
federalism, would have the Court declare simply that the Constitution is now interpreted as
granting Congress the discretion to legislate in the area of marital privacy. Such a notion of
augmented congressional authority should be a matter of considerable concern for constitutional analysts. See supra note 154; infra note 233.
Besides raising doubts about its wisdom, quasi-legislative judicial action implicates other
constitutional concerns, such as separated powers and delegation. See generally Schoenbrod,
supra note 74 (discussing legislative and judicial role in delegation doctrine).
226. There is evidence of an emerging consensus that sexual activity between consenting
adults, even of the same gender, should not be prohibited. Although all states criminalized
"sodomy," variously defined, until 1961,see Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2845 (1986),
twenty-six states have since removed criminal sanctions for such sexual activities. See Suroey on
the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. l\hAMI L. REV. 521,
524 (1986) (currently 24 states and District of Columbia criminally penalize homosexual
sodomy). Furthermore, of the twenty-four states that maintain such criminal statutes, only six
explicitly prohibit homosexual sodomy while permitting heterosexual sodomy. The remaining
eighteen states criminalize all sodomy. See id. at 524-25.
Whether this apparent trend also supports the antifederalism view that dissenting or lagging
populations should be prohibited from continuing to criminalize sodomy, however, is quite a
different question. See infra text accompanying notes 224-29.
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mcnts? 227
If there is a rough national consensus holding that homosexuals
should be free to engage in consensual sodomy, or that married couples
should be free to use contraceptives, a court following Goldberg's and
White's approach may properly impose the consensus against contrary local
judgments only if a national majority, through Congress, would want to
disable such local democratic discretion, 228 and only if •'the people" would
want to empower Congress with new constitutional authority to legislate
family morality.2 29 One must, in other words, postulate a contemporary
constitutional desire for national legislative power that the framers and
ratifiers chose not to delegate. Except by a pretextual use of the commerce

227. This assumes that Connecticut's electorate, whether on moral or other grounds,
believed in 1964 that married couples should not use contraceptives. Dean Wellington
quc·stions this assumption, in part because the statute was enacted in 1879, and in part because
the statute 5~ems so out of step with contemporary conventional morality. See Wellington,
Notrs 011 Adjiulication, supra note 14, at 291. He implies that the statute should be struck down
because it is unlikely to reflect the mores of contemporary Connecticut. See supra note 147; cf
w/11a note 152. If the Court were to strike down the statute under this rationale, it would not
be acting in a constitutional sense at all. Rather, the Court would be finding that the statute
probably no longer reflects the state's majoritarian preferences. Under this reasoning, the state
legislature should remain free to correct an erroneous judicial finding. This is a decidedly
promajoritarian rationale for judicial intervention. See generally G. C,\U,BRESI, supra note 14.
228. A national majority may hold values it does not want to impose on dissenters.
229. A national political majority might want to impose values on dissenting localities, but a
constitutional majority (i.e., "the people" when thinking in constitutional terms) might not
want to empower the political majority to do so. This is the essence of restrictions on
con1Tres·;ional authority rooted in the value of federalism. See supra note 813.
C7, Garcia ·;. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 495 U.S. 528, 550-52 (1985). This case
concerned th·~ challenge of a congressional statute on federalism grounds. In upholding the
~tatute,justice Blackmun, following Herbert Wechsler's lead, reasoned that the structure and
proces5cs of national politics sufficiently protect the constitutional value of federalism. Id.; see
also J. CHOPLR, sujJTa note 73, at 175-90 ("the federal judiciary should not decide constitutional
qu~·~tions respecting the ultimate power of the national government vis-a-vis the states");
Wechsler, Th, Political Safeguards of Federaliw: The Role of the States in the Composition and
Sdfftio11 of the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 543, 547 (1954) ("[T]o the extent that
federalist values have real significance they must give rise to local sensitivity to central
intc-rvention; to the extent that such a local sensitivity exists, it cannot fail to find reflection in
the Congress.").
This assertion would have startled the framers and ratifiers of 1787. who. precisely because
they viewed the national political process as inadequate to protect local concerns, created the
fed.:·ral government with limited and enumerated powers rather than with general powers.
The Wechsler-Garcia notion of federalism destroys any distinction between a national
majority's dC'iire to pursue policy and the limits of constitutionally delegated legislative
authority. Whether today's federalist values no longer have constitutional (as opposed to mere
political) significance to "the people" is the essential question that the Wechsler-Garcia theory
mu·;t confront. Cf. supra note 155; infra notes 232, 233.
Although this issue has been joined in the context of federal regulation of state employees
and state property, see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 836-37 (1976)
(owrruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985)), it is
implicit a5 well in Congress' discretion to regulate private persons and property pursuant to
the commerce• clause, cf. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114-15 (1941) (regulations of
interstate commerce that are not constitutionally prohibited, whatever their motive or purpose, arc
within plenary power of commerce clause); see mfra note 230.
0
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power, 230 or through suasion by use of the taxing and spending power,
Congress lacks constitutional authority to regulate family morality.2 31 Thus,
only if a court concludes that a constitutional majority of "the people,"
thinking with a constitutional frame of mind, would want to augment
national legislative power, despite not having resorted to the article V
amendment process, would it be proper to intrude on local discretion in the
name of the "traditions and collecti¥e nmsdence of our people." 232
Characterized in these terms, reliance on conventional morality for constricting local discretion, although it may vindicate the preferences of
everyday national majorities, is hardly constitutionally innocuous.

***
The foregoing analysis of the judicially developed right of privacy
suggests that if one pursues a goal of identifying the constitutional values of
"the people" today, Mr. Hardwick did not have a valid claim. Indeed, it
suggests that Mr. Griswold, and any married couple in Connecticut wanting
230. See infra text accompanying notes 153-56. Since United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941), the commerce clause has been interpreted as according Congress discretion to regulate
for any policy objectives, so long as the subjects of regulation have some vaguely defined
connection to "interstate commerce." "Whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of
commerce which do not infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power
conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause." Id. at 115 (emphasis added); cf. McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819). In McCulloch, Justice Marshall established
congressional purpose as the essential element for defining the limits of constitutionally
delegated legislative authority. "Should Congress . . . under the pretext of executing its
powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government, it would
become the painful duty of this tribunal ... to say that such an act was not the law of the land."
Id. at 423.
231. One might suggest that some issues of family morality, such as protection for
homosexuals, protection of a woman's choice regarding abortion, or even protection of a fetus
from abortion, could be packaged as matters for congressional concern under § 5 of the
fourteenth amendment. Cf J. CHOPER, supra note 73, at 216 (Court has broadly defined
Congress' discretion under § 5 of fourteenth amendment).
232. This observation applies with equal force to Dean Wellington's methodology of
judicially restricting local democratic choice in the name of "conventional morality." See
Wellington, Notes on Adjudication, supra note 14, at 265-311. It applies as well to Alexander
Bickel's observation that "even if the task of the Court were ... to follow the election returns,
surely the relevant returns would be those from the nation as a whole ...." A. BICKEL, supra
note 11, at 250; see also supra note 155.
It may be easier for a court to determine that "the people" of the nation today want
legislative discretion that "the people" yesterday wanted constitutionally to deny to national
majorities, than it is to conclude that "the people" today want constitutional mandates of
self.constraint that "the people" yesterday did not choose. This is so simply because of the
different relationship between constitutional values of self-constraint and values intended
simply to restrict the discretion of dissenting localities. There may be ample evidence that a
national majority wants to go beyond federalism limitations on national authority. Congress
might, as it often has, enact statutes that transgress existing limits on congressional power; it
might, as it often has, seek to pursue values by the carrot of federal funds rather than the stick
of regulation. This is to be contrasted with the slim chance that members of a national majority
will manifest, in everyday politics, a desire to restrict their own democratic discretion. See supra
text accompanying notes 211-14. Nevertheless, exclusive reliance on such ordinary political
pressure for augmented national legislative authority provides only an incomplete argument.One must determine, as well, that a constitutional majority of "the people," thinking in a
constitutional frame of mind, wish to augment national legislative power. See infra note 233.
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to use contraceptives, might not have had a valid constitutional claim.
Douglas' and Blackmun's pursuit of normative coherence toward a putative
constitutional ideal of individual happiness seems to violate the Hamiltonian premi:;e of constitutional continuity. There is no evidence that "the
people" of 1987 are willing to endure more political pain of self-constraint
in the name of individual happiness than were "the people" of 1868.
Similarly, the Goldberg and White rationale, which prohibits states from
reg·ulating marital concerns, while leaving them free to regulate homosexual sodomy, seems to violate the Hamiltonian premise as it relates to
constitutional federalism. Although one might speculate that "the people"
today no longer value constitutional federalism as did the framers and
ratifiers of 1787 or 1868-that "the people" today want Congress to have
constitutional authority to regulate just about anything that states can
regulate-one must make such an argument, while showing how the
Hamiltonian premise is either satisfied or not relevant, to justify Goldberg's
and White's approach.2 33 This neither Goldberg nor White has done.

233. This i;; essentially the argument Bruce Ackerman intends to make about the political
stmgglc ove1 the constitutionality of the New Deal. See Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1055.
Because the Supreme Court had repeatedly struck down elements of the New Deal as
unconstitutional, id., at 1053-54,
by 1936, a fundamental question of principle had been raised so decisively as to be
obvious even to private citizens whose principal concerns were far removed from the
daily str1.1ggJe5 of Washington, D.C. . . . Rather than acting under the explicit
procedures e5tablished by Article V, however, We the People of the United States
expressed its will through a higher lawmaking process that relied primarily upon the
structural interaction of articles I, II, and III of the Constitution.
Id. at 1054-5li. Ackerman suggests that because the terms of office are staggered among the
three branches of the national government, intense dialogue that yields a new consensus
among all three branches provides adequate evidence of a new constitutional order to
comtitutc constitutional amendrrumt. Id., at 1055-56. The overwhelming election in 1936 of
representatives, both legislative and executive, who supported a vigorous national response to
the Depression, followed by judicial acquiescence, completed the "structural amendment." Id. at
10[16-57.

Although provocative and ingenious, Ackerman's resort to activity in the forums of ordinary
national politics to signal constitutional ami'lldment undermines his earlier attention to the
dualism bet\\een constitutional values and ordinary political values-between highly selfcomcious constitutional choicemaking and ordinary legislative choicemaking focusing on the
expedience of the moment. See supra note 56. Resort to choices made in ordinary national
political forums as evidence that "the people" have chosen to abandon constitutional limits on
national discretion, is problematic. The sort of evidence on which Ackerman relies has
othenvise bec•n viewed as precisely the political excess-the "lower track" impulse-that the
"hi:::her track' principle, id. at l 040-43, of constitutional federalism was intended to constrain.
See s11/1ra note 229. Beyond this, even if one accepts the potential import of the 1936 elections
as a "structur.11 amendment," one is left with little evidence suggesting what new constitutional
principles "the people" were intending to frame. Thus, did the "structural amendment" of
19::06 endorst the proposition that Congress could intrude as deeply a> it deemed necessary
into tradition1I state affairs to serve the purpose of restoring national economic health, or did
it endor5e tht much broader proposition, that Congress can legislate for any purpose, to serve
an} policy-that the principle of limited powers was dead? Or did it endorse a principle
somewhere in between? See supra notes 230-32.
Perhaps more difficult to support than a national rejection of constitutional federalism
based on the 1936 elections is a national rejection of Lochnerian limits on state and national
legi~lative di~cretion. Ackerman's argument in suppon of recognizing "structural amendment" here ~sumes for the sake of argument that the Court's laissezfaire contractualism in Lochner
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Thus, whether predicated on a motive of self-constraint, or on a
motive of constraining only others, both notions of constitutional privacy
seem to exceed the implications of actual constitutional choices, and fail to
satisfy convincingly the goal of identifying the constitutional values of "the
people" today.2 34

B.

Equal Protection, Self-Constraint, and Homosexual People:
Coherence at the Painful Frontiers of Constitutional Intent
1.

The Issue

Donald F. Baker, a resident of Texas, is a homosexual person. Mr.
Baker's interests conflict with a policy choice made by a majority of the
Texas electorate. Under the Texas Penal Code, it is a misdemeanor for any
person to engage in "deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of
the same sex." 235 The Texas electorate has not proscribed "deviate sexual

did once reflect the constitutional intent of "the people." Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1056-57.
Thus, on the basis of national impulses to intrude upon the erstwhile constitutional ideals of
free contract-on the basis of impulses expressed in the forums of ordinary politicsAckerman would find that "the people" have made a "solemn and authoritative" judgment, see
supra text accompanying notes 115-19, to amend the Constitution by repealing a principle of
self-constraint.
One might speculate about the implications of this view of "structural amendment." Assume
that the Supreme Court had adopted Justice Harlan's dissenting view in Plessy. Also assume
the not implausible consequence that racial segregation became a focal issue in the national
campaign of 1896, and that those endorsing racial segregation had prevailed. Under such
circumstances, would the Court have been compelled by principle to reverse itself? If one
adopted the notion of"structural amendment," would one then be compelled to find that "the
people" had somehow amended the fourteenth amendment? Cf infra text accompanying notes
.
314-24, 390-441.
Although I endorse the notion that national political values are relevant for inferring
constitutional meaning, see supra text accompanying notes 162-66, 204-11; infra text accompanying notes 310-90, I see their value in the context of a premise of constitutional continuity.
If one blurs the distinction between national choices made in the congressional forum (which
typically are choices for congressional empowerment), and national choices made through
article V (which may be choices of self-constraint), as I fear Professor Ackerman's "structural
amendment" does, one has undermined an essential tool for constitutional analysis. As
Ackerman himself suggests, "Article V is the most fundamental text of our Constitution, since
it seeks to tell us the conditions under which all other constitutional texts and principles may
be legitimately transformed." Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1058.
Of course, my use of ordinary national political values toward interpreting contemporary
constitutional meaning is supportable only to the extent that the premise of constitutional
continuity has merit. See supra note 122; infra notes 318, 325, 370, 374, 376.
234. I have avoided the complication of attempting an explicit definition of" 'the people'
today" in this section. Rather, as one might have noted, this section has rested on two unstated
assumptions: first, that when "the people's" everyday political values are at issue, "'the people'
today" consist of the entire national electorate reflected in Congress; and second, that when
"the people's" constitutional values of self-constraint are at issue, " 'the people' today" consist
of the entire potential constitutional electorat~, empowered through article V. Cf supra note
207. This assumption is vulnerable. See supra note 94; infra text accompanying notes 248-56;
notes 306, 318, 325, 370, 376, 443, 456. No such assumption will be made in the next section.
235. TEX. PENAL ConE ANN.§ 21.06 (Vernon 1974).
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intercourse" 230 between individuals of different sexes. Although this issue
has been viewed as discrimination between homosexuals and heterosexuals,237 the issue can be conceptualized as one of sex discrimination. A man,
unlike a woman, is prohibited from performing certain sexual acts with a
man. A woman, unlike a man, is prohibited from performing certain sexual
acts with <i woman. Thus, people are being treated differently because of
sex.238
J\fr. Baker framed his constitutional claim as one arising under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, 239 which was ratified
in 1868. It seems quite clear that "the people" of 1868 disagreed among
themselves about what local democratic choices should be prohibited by the
fourteenth amendment. 24 0 It also seems clear that at least in part because of
this disagr-eement, the "original understanding" as to the immediate impact
of the amrndment-what would be prohibited, and what would be permitted-resembled a jumble of compromises, rather than a coherent philosophy of justice.241
236. The Texas legislature has defined "deviate sexual intercourse" as "any contact between
any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person." Id. § 21.01.
237. See Bakerv. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1143 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rtv'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th
Cit. 1985), cert. de11ied, 106 S. Ct. 3337, 3337-38 (1986) (holding that TEX. PENAL CooE ANN.§
21.06 (Vernon 1974) violates equal protection by discriminating between homosexuals and
hetero5cxuah; reversed by Fifth Circuit in one paragraph).
238. Some might counter that prejudice against homosexuals is different from ordinary
sexism. Many regard homosexuals as a species apart, so different that their violation of
traditional se..: role5 is viewed not as a man feeling or doing what a man should not, or a woman
feeling or doing what a woman should not, but as a person feeling or doing what a person
should not-a per',on malformed and in need of repair or destruction.
Although this may be a difference in.the intensity with which sexism is felt, and relevant for
some purpo~es, SI'<' illfra text accompanying notes 371-90, a difference in intensity is not
rekvant for determining whether the view logically falls within a definition of sexism. Sexism
is a perception that men because men, and women because women, have different moral statuses,
different ess<·ntial natures, and different proper roles. A value condemning sexism logically
extends to homophobia. See infra note 381.
239. Baher, 553 F. Supp. at 1125. Mr. Baker also argued that the statute violated his
comtitutional. right of privacy. For analysis of this claim, see supra text accompanying notes
16~1-234.

240. For the views of commentators, see generally R. BERGER, supa note 15; Bickel, The
Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1 ( 1955 ); Frank & Munro,
Tiu Original IJ11dmta11ding of "Equal Protection of the !Aws," 50 CoLUM. L. REv. 131 (1950). All
of these commentators agree that the framers and ratifiers understood that the equal
protection clause did not render many racially discriminatory laws unconstitutional. But see
Lo•,ing v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967). In Loving, Chief Justice Wan-en, after noting that
historical materials "at best, ... are inconclusive" for determining whether the equal protection
clause was intended to prohibit racial segregation in public education, id. at 9, declared that
"[t]he clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official
sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States." Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
241. See Frmk & Munro, supra note 240, at 133. Frank and Munro asserted:
The gen·~ralitics of the Fourteenth Amendment, as reported from Committee, were
voted upon by 218 Congressmen, were discussed in hundreds of speeches and
counties• editorials in the election of 1866, and were thereafter \'Oted upon by some
thousands of state legislators. Even if the times had been calm and conditions static,
the general phrases of the Amendment could not have meant even approximately the
same thing to all who voted upon them; and in fact, interpretations did diverge
widely.
Id.
01~~11al
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Thus, the equal protection clause, as originally understood, prohibited
only particular forms of discrimination against blacks. Blacks were to have,
at minimum, the same rights as whites in making and enforcing contracts,
suing, being parties, giving evidence, inheriting property, purchasing
property, selling property, and in being protected by the criminal laws of
the states.24 2 The notion that the equal protection clause would immediately invalidate state laws prohibiting miscegenation, denying blacks the
right to vote, or mandating racial segregation, was a hope for some, but a
nightmare for many.
Despite this original conception of laws prohibited by the equal
protection clause, modern Supreme Court doctrine suggests that any
governmental action undertaken because of racial prejudice-including
antimiscegenation statutes, racially discriminatory voting laws, and laws
requiring racial segregation-is constitutionally prohibited. 243 Furthermore, despite the absence of evidence that the framers and ratifiers of the
fourteenth amendment had any notion about challenging the deeply
entrenched sex roles that then pervaded the American populace, modern
Supreme Court doctrine suggests that the equal protection clause also
prohibits governmental actions predicated on gender prejudice. 244
242. According to Frank and Munro:
The equal protection clause was ... 9riginally understood to mean the following: all
men, without regard to race or color, should have the same rights to acquire real and
personal property and to enter into business enterprises; criminal and civil law, in
procedures or penalities, should make no distinctions whatsoever because of race or
color; there should be no segregation of individuals on the basis of color in the use of
utilities, such as transportation or hotels; with reservations, for here there is
substantial divergence, there should be no segregation in schools. It was generally
understood that Congress could legislate to secure these ends, without regard to
whether the particular objective was frustrated by state action or by state inaction. On
the other hand, the clause was meant to have no bearing on the right to vote; the
evidence of its contemplated effect on state anti-miscegenation laws is unclear; and it
was generally understood to have no bearing on segregation of a purely private sort
in situations fairly independent of the law, as in churches, cemeteries, or private
clubs.
Frank & Munro, supra note 240, at 167-68 (footnotes omitted); cf. R. BERGER, supra note 15, at
166-92 (equal protection of blacks was limited to rights enumerated in Civil Rights Act of
1866); M. KoNVITZ & T. LESKES, A CENTURY OF C1v1L RIGHTS 51 (1961) (fourteenth amendment
intended to eliminate constitutional objections to Civil Rights Act of 1866); Bickel, supra note
240, at 58 ("[S]ection 1 of the fourteenth amendment, like section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, carried out the relatively narrow objectives of the Moderates, and hence, as originally
understood, was meant to apply neither to jury service, nor suffrage, nor antimiscegenation
statutes, nor segregation.").
243. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) ("The Constitution cannot control
[private] prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of
the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 10 (1967) ("The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States."); see infra
note 434.
244. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). In Hogan, the plaintiff
challenged a policy of excluding males from a state school's nursing program as a violation of
equal protection. After noting that gender-based classifications are subject to so-called "middle
tier scrutiny," Justice O'Connor elaborated:
Although the test for determining the validity of a gender-based classification is
straightfonvard, it must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and
abilities of males and females. Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the
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Thus. the Supreme Court has augmented the mandates of the equal
protection clause beyond the "original understanding" of the framers and
ratifiers-blacks are protected from more forms of discrimination than
contemplated by "the people" of 1868, and blacks are not the only group
protected from discrimination motivated by prejudice.245 Mr. Baker relies
on this modern equal protection doctrine and seeks to pursue its putatively
coherent '"mplications even further. To establish Mr. Baker's claimindeed, to justify modern Supreme Court doctrine itself-one must confront the central question posed by this Article. Can one justify judicial
pursuit of constitutional coherence or, alternatively, a judicial goal of
enforcing the specific constitutional compromises struck by the framers and
ratifiers, consistent with a goal of identifying the constitutional values of
"the people" today?246
Following the Hamiltonian premise of constitutional continuity, past
constitutional choices provide evidence of present constitutional values.247
Thus, as a basis for ascertaining the implications of the equal protection
clause for the constitutional values of "the people" today, we turn again to
the past.

2.

The Choices of "the People" -There and Then
a.

z.

Conflict

Who Were "the People" of 1868?

There is an essential tension between the Civil War and a premise that
"the people have an original right to establish, for their future government,
such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own
happiness."2 48 "The people" of the South-at least the white majoritywanted to divorce themselves from a national community in which they
would be subject to the anti-slavery views and votes of the Northern
states. 24 ~' The North refused to allow these Southerners their desire for
self-determination and in this sense compromised, or at least begged the
statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions. Thus, if the statutory
objective is to exclude or 'protect' members of one gender because they are presumed
to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is
illegitimate.
Id. at 724-25.
2•15. Discrimination prohibited by the equal protection clause has been defined in terms of
prohibited lejislative purposes. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("The
central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the
prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.... [O]ur cases have not
embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects
a racially dbcriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact."); ,\l'e also J. ELY, supra note 148, at 136-48.
246. See suj.:ra text accompanying notes 103-07.
2•17. See supra text accompanying notes 114-23, 161-66.
2•18. See suj..·ra note 5.
249. In early 1861, for example, the citizens of Texas, acting by referendum, overwhelmingly ratified an ordinance of secession by a vote of 34,794 to 11,235. See Texas v. White, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 704 (1868).
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meaning of, a notion that "the people" have the right to establish principles
of government for their own happiness. For resolving the issue of secession,
"the people" were the military victors of the North.
Similarly, for ratification of the fourteenth amendment, "the people"
were those of the North. The principles of government established by the
fourteenth amendment made the Southern electorate decidedly unhappy.
It was, in part, against such principles that the South had rebelled with
military force. The Southern states did not ratify the amendment voluntarily, but were required to ratify the amendment as a condition for
readmission to the Union. 250 Indeed, their votes to ratify were secured not
by organic governments, but by state legislatures reconstructed pursuant to
Northern specifications.251
Thus, for constitutional analysts, the Civil War must be a complication.
While no one seriously questions the authoritative status of the fourteenth
amendment today, 252 some still entertain sufficient doubt to address the
issue. 253 More significantly, the amendment's military pedigree and its

250. See, e.g., M. KoNVITZ & T. LESKES, supra note 242, at 51-52 ("Before Reconstruction
governments took over the states of the South, the amendment was rejected in late 1866 and
early 1867 by all the Southern states but Tennessee.... Following these actions, Congress
passed the first Reconstruction Act on March 2, 1867. It made readmission of representatives
from the Southern states conditional ... on ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment by the
new state legislature."); Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1068-69. Recognizing this, what does it
mean to say that "the people" have a right to establish principles of government for their own
happiness? See infra note 443.
251. See, e.g., M. KoNVITZ & T. LESKES, supra note 242, at 52-53.
252. Cf Call, The Fourteenth Amendment and Its Skeptical Background, 13 BAYLOR L. REV. l, 14
(1961) (Southern ratification of fourteenth amendment achieved through "a war on the
Constitution itself, and upon all of the fundamental and essential principles on which the
entire fabric of American free institutions was based."); Suthon, The Dubious Origin of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 28 TuL. L. REv. 22, 44 (1953) ("Article Vofthe Constitution was violated
and flouted by the 1868 coerced ratifications of the Fourteenth Amendment ....").
253. Bruce Ackerman's effort to legitimate the fourteenth amendment by reference to his
notion of "structural amendment," see supra note 233, is, in my view, unsuccessful. Ackerman
recognizes that the exclusion of Southern representatives from the Thirty-ninth Congress (not
to mention that the Southern states were required to ratify the fourteenth amendment as a
condition for readmission to the Union) undermines the contention that the amendment was
ratified pursuant to valid article V procedures. See Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1066. Such
disenfranchisement of the South thus vitiates the legitimacy of the fourteenth amendment, if
satisfaction of article V is necessary for authoritative constitutional amendment.
But Ackerman points to the congressional elections of 1866 as validating the process leading
to ratification of the fourteenth amendment, othenvise problematic from the perspective of
article V.
It was the results of these elections that decisively shifted the balance of authority
between the President and Congress. Despite the unprecedented effort by President
Johnson to generate a new political party in support of conservative Unionist
principles, the Republicans emerged from the 1866 elections with an ovenvhelming
victory throughout the North.
Id. at 1068.
Despite Ackerman's assertion that the electorate blessed this "rump Congress" with a
"mandate" sufficient to substitute for regular article V procedures, id. at 1068-69, the fact
remains that the 1866 elections only confirmed the desire of the North to impose its will on the
South. The normal ratification procedures prescribed by article V were followed (if not the
procedures related to framing); article V's underlying premises related to democracy and
community were not. The fourteenth amendment was no less a spoil of war because the
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consequent tension with the vague notions of democracy and popular
dctermin::i.tion on which the American constitutional system othenvise is
predicated, present unique interpretive wrinkles.254
The following discussion will proceed from three premises: first, the
fourteenth amendment reflected the preferred constitutional values of the
Northern electorate;255 second, the Northern electorate required the
Southern ·electorate to ratify the fourteenth amendment as constructed and
understood by the North; and third, the Southern electorate, voluntarily or
not, did so. One is compelled from these premises to examine the
constitutional values of "the people" of the North in 1868. Only by
considering th~'ir constitutional choices can an analyst begin to infer the
related constitutional values of "the people" today.256

u.

Constraint of Self or Constraint of OtherJ?

Earlier analysis suggested that a choice by the national electorate to
limit local discretion by a constitutional mandate, rather than by simply
authorizing Congress to legislate, provides evidence that "the people"
maintain an ideal of self-constraint.257 We suggested that a national
majority would pursue a national policy against contrary local choices with
Northern electorate clearly wanted to disenfranchise the South than it would have been if the
Northern electorate's sentiments had not been so clear. Cf. infra note 443. Thus, the elections
of 1866 were constitutionally significant only if one accepts the proposition that the North had
the· right to impo5e its will on the South. But this proposition is the very essence of the
fourteenth amendment's questionable constitutional pedigree. See infra note 255.
Ackerman's treatment of the fourteenth amendment is to be contrasted with his other
example of ''>tructural amendment," purportedly exercised through the national elections of
19:16. AlthoHgh there the procedures of article V clearly were not followed, a premise of
popular dete,-mination in the context of the national electorate arguably was satisfied. See supra
note 233.
254. See infra notes 306 ("the people" of 1872), 318 ("the people" of 1896), 325 ("the people"
of 1954), 37(1 ("the people" of 1987), 376 (same).
255. Apart from the eleven Southern states (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiam1, Mis5issippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia), see
Fernandez, 1he Constitutionality of the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 378, 378 (1966),
there were t\\enty-~ix other states at the time the fourteenth amendment was ratified. Of those
twc·nty-'ib: states, nineteen ratified the amendment (Connecticut, New Hampshire, Vermont,
New York, Illinoi5, West Virginia, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, Missouri, Indiana, Minnesota,
Rhode Island, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Massachusetts, Nebrasb, and Iowa), three
rejected the 3mendment (Kentucky, Delaware, and Maryland), and three ratified the amendment, and then rescinded their ratifications (New Jersey, Oregon, and Ohio). See id. at 380; see
abo Note, The Fourteenth Amendment Was Adopted, 30 AM. L. REV. 894, 895 (1896). One
Southern state ratified the amendment before ratification was made a condition for readmission to the U .1ion (Tennessee). See Fernandez, supra, at 380. One non-Southern state took no
action (California). See J. ]AMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 112, 227,
277 (1984).
Thu~. dcprnding on how one treats the rescinded ratifications, the fourteenth amendment
wm. ratified by either twenty-two out of twenty-six non-Southern states (84.6%) or nineteen
out of twenty-six non-Southern states (73.1 %). Of course, once Reconstruction was well under
way, the am·mdment was ratified by eleven out of eleven Southern states (100%). For
comideration of the problems posed by rescinded ratification vote3, see Dellinger, The
Ltgitimacy of Comtitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REv. 386,
·119-27 (1983) (states should be deemed not to have right to rescind a vote to ratify).
256. See suj.•ra text accompanying notes 114-66.
257. See mj.<Ta text accompanying notes 65-90.
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a constitutional mandate, rather than congressional legislation, if it wanted
to ensure that some value will be respected to a greater extent than
Congress could be trusted to achieve. 258
Because there was such a severe cleavage between Northern and
Southern views on race, however, and because the Southern electorate
eventually had to be readmitted to Congress, one might suggest that
although the framers and (Northern) ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment were trying to ensure that certain values were protected to a greater
extent than Congress could be trusted to achieve, they did so only to prevent
their preferred notions of racial justice from congressional erosion once the
South was fully reintegrated as part of the national electorate.2 59 Such a
motive would have to be characterized not as self-constraint, but the
ultimate in constraining the political discretion of others-policymaking by
disenfranchising those dissenting localities whose political discretion the
electorate intends to bind.
·
It is undeniable that the fourteenth amendment was motivated at least
partially to thwart Southern participation in making the nation's racial
policies. Nevertheless, it is not necessarily true that this motive to constrain
the South-to constrain the discretion of dissenting localities-was the only
motive underlying the choice to pursue national racial policy by constitutional mandate, rather than by authorizing Congress to legislate. Indeed, in
the absence of unanimity, the ordinary political motive of constraining the
political discretion of others always supplements the constitutional motive
of constraining one's own political discretion.
Beyond the bare fact that the equal protection clause framed constitutionally mandated limits on local discretion, its broad language also
suggests that "the people" of the North acted not only with the desire to
constrain the South's political discretion, but also with an aspirational
motive to constrain their own political discretion. Those who framed and
ratified the amendment strongly disagreed among themselves about the
extent to which blacks should be accorded legal protection.260 In the face of
such disagreement, political combatants must compromise.261 In any given
political community, a legislative compromise reflects the best that each
member of the majority, given his limited political power, believed was
possible.262 Thus, to the extent that each individual seeks to ma.'Ximize his
interests, a political compromise about intensely controversial concerns
should be framed as precisely as possible.263 The Civil Rights Act of 1866,
enacted by Congress to protect the interests of blacks, reflects the kind of
detailed compromise that is likely to emerge from people, intensely
258. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
259. CJ. C. BLACK, supra note 56, at 131-32 ("The debates on the Fourteenth Amendment
... express the thought that the Amendment was being adopted, in part, because of a desire
to put its guarantees out of the reach of future Congresses.").
260. See iefra text accompanying notes 267-86.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 67-74.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
263. See id.
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disagreeing among themselves, who have no concerns of self-constraint. 264
If, however, members of a political majority are dissatisfied with their own
abilties to accommodate their internally conflicting concerns, and want to be
forced to mpect an ideal to a greater extent than they otherwise would in everyday
decisionmahing, like the client who hired a coach, they have reason to frame
their constitutional instructions more vaguely-more broadly-reflecting
their aspiration toward that ideal.265
Thus, because it is implausible that people, disagreeing intensely
among themselves about moral concerns, and acting only with the motive
of constraining others, would frame a political compromise in vague terms,
and because a choice to define constitutional instructions vaguely is more
consistent with an aspirational motive of self-constraint, this Article will
proceed from the premise that "the people" of the North who ratified the
fourteenth amendment acted with a motive of self-constraint, as well as the
more obvious motive to constrain the political discretion of the vigorously
dissenting South. This premise is far from incontrovertible, but its implications arc- worth pursuing, if only as an exercise in analysis. 266

264. See infra note 269. Vigorous political competition about matters of great controversy
makes peopk jealous of whatever they gain through political compromise. To fail to articulate
one's victorie; in precise terms is to risk losing them, if only by judicial interpretation. Thus,
even with respect to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, constructed with language far more precise
than that of the fourteenth amendment, some expressed fears that the courts would accord
blacks more rights than the polity would choose as appropriate. See infra notes 289, 291.
265. See infla note 333.
266. If one presumes that the fourteenth amendment was ratified simply with the motive of
protecting the North's everyday political preferences regarding race from erosion by Southern
participation in Congress (constraint of others), one might pursue an equally interesting and
challenging a!lalysis. Did "the people" of the North intend to authorize the Court to vindicate
their everyday political preferences regarding race at any given time, like a continuing "rump
Congre5s"? C,r. Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1066 (In framing the fourteenth amendment,
" 'Congress' excluded the Southern representatives from its ongoing delibertations. In so
acting, the rump 'Congress' was, of course, perfectly aware that it was taking an action that
rendered its omstitutional authority legally problematic .... "). If so, "the people" of the North
would have authorized the Court to ascertain the North's ordinary political concerns about race
at any given time, and to impose those views in the form of a constitutional mandate. Without
being able to exclude the Soutl1 from Congress, this would be the only way in which the
Northern electorate might establish continuing legislative authority for itself over issues of
racial di5crimination. Such a scheme would place the Court in a relationship with the Northern
elec1orate under the equal protection clause analogous to the relationship between the Court
and the national electorate under the dormant commerce clause. See supra notes 156, 225. But
because the Court's rulings under such a "dormant equal protection clause" must be insulated
from correction by a Congress that includes the South, as indeed such rulings would be if
i~sw::d in the form of a constitutional mandate, the Northern electorate would lack any means
to correctjudidal rulings when the Court has inaccurately divined their present political pulse.
In this sense, the analogy to the relationship between the Court and Congress under the
dormant commerce clause would be incomplete. See id.
Beyond this, or perhaps before this, the Court must determine principle.; for defining the
rele;ant electorate each generation. By what right does the North impose its will without
Southern participation? When new states are added to the nation, do they become part of the
authoritative North, whose everyday values on race count for defining the content of the
"dormant equal protection clause," or part of the defeated South, whose values on race do not
count? Is the Southern electorate ever to be reintegrated into the national electorate for .
purposes of defining the mandates of the "dormant equal protection clause"? For examination
of related issw~s in the context of an equal protection clause presumed to have been ratified
with the motive of self-constraint, see infra notes 306, 318, 325, 370.
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Racism and the Conflict Within Us

Before considering the manner in which the constitutional choices of
the North might be related through the Hamiltonian premise of constitutional continuity to the constitutional values of "the people" today, one
must probe the values motivating "the people" of the North toward an ideal
of self-constraint. What was the perceived moral evil of discrimination
against blacks?
Among the most radical abolitionists, it seems rather clear that the
motivating norm consisted of a prescriptive twist to the slogan "all men are
created equal." 267 It was immoral to view people as inferior-as less than
full human beings-because of their race. It was immoral to view people as
having restricted roles in society because of their race. In other words, the
radical abolitionists were radical anti-racists. For these radicals, it easily
followed that any action undertaken because of racism was immoral and
should be prohibited. Any discrimination based on normative judgments
about race violated the notion that race is irrelevant to human worth.268
Not everyone, of course, was a radical abolitionist. Others held less
absolute views about the evil oflaws and practices that discriminated against
blacks. Some believed that such discrimination was unacceptable only in
certain contexts-for example, those covered by the Civil Rights Act of
1866. In other contexts-voting, marriage, and other circumstances that
would involve social interaction between b,lack people and white peopleracial discrimination was quite acceptable and, indeed, desirable.269 Still

If the South ever were reintegrated as part of the "the people" whose everyday political
values regarding racial equality determine the content of the equal protection clause, the
analogy to the dormant commerce clause would be complete. After all, given our premise that
"the people" of the North acted only with the motive of constraining the political discretion of
the South, and not with the additional motive of self-constraint, they simply wanted ordinary
legislative discretion. If in interpreting the Northern electorate's values, a court determines
that the Southern electorate should be reintegrated for defining the meaning of the equal
protection clause, the original reason for denying legislative authority to the whole Congressfor creating an elitist "rump Congress" with special legislative prerogatives (albeit exercised by
the Court)-no longer would exist.Judicial finality here, like judical finality in the name of the
dormant commerce clause, would be perverse. See supra notes 156, 225.
267. See]. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAw 19 (1965) (originally published as THE ANTISLAVERY
ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT). TenBroek stated that "understanding of this subject
begins with the simple distinction between declarative and imperative sentences. 'All men are
created equal' is not a declarative sentence; it is an imperative. It is not a statement but an
exhortation. It is not an affirmation or description. It is a command. Whatever its form, its
function is directive. It says in substance, within certain limits and for certain purposes, that we
should treat men as if they were the same, although we know full well that they are not." Id.
(emphasis added). Of course, the question of what kinds of discrimination the equal protection
clause prohibits is a function of those "certain limits" and "certain purposes" for which people
were deemed to deserve equal treatment.
268. This view was expressed by Charles Sumner, a central participant in the struggle to
draft the fourteenth amendment. See Frank & Munro, supra note 240, at 137 ("This principle
of equality of rights;o Sumner declared, was the real meaning of the Massachusetts Constitutional provision which gave equal rights to every human being. No distinctions whatsoever
could validly be made because of race, and hence separate schools were illegal.").
269. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 reflected a prevailing view that while blacks should enjoy
"civil equality," they should not be granted either "political" or "social equality". Raoul Berger
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others had no qualms about racism. The races simply were, by nature and
God's will, on different tracks. Any conjunction of the tracks would derail
the white race from its destiny. Any effort to join the tracks was a sinful
sabotage of God's plan. There could be no compromise.210
Among these three camps, the most interesting and analytically
significant is the second. This camp's position reflects the most obvious
internal conflict. Its members' choices in rationalizing and accommodating
their internally competing values are essential to the original meaning of
the fourteenth amendment. It was because those of the second camp,
rather than the radicals, were predominant that "the people" originally
understood the equal protection clause as not immediately prohibiting all
racial discrimination, but as prohibiting racial discrimination only in limited
contexts.271 Similarly, it was because those of the second camp, rather than
the radical racists, were predominant that the fourteenth amendment was
ratified at all.
One must, therefore, consider how these people perceived their
internally conflicting preferences. What value did they hold as an ideal? To
what extent did they want their Constitution, through the courts, to force
them to approach the coherent implications of that ideal at the expense of
other conflicting concerns?
One might infer values that motivated this middle group by considering why people might have viewed the thirteenth amendment as inadequate to vindicate the warranted rights of blacks. There was far less
relays the following explanation of the Bill's terms "civil rights and immunities," as explained
by House Chairman James Wilson:
What do these terms mean? Do they mean that in all things, civil, social, political, all
citizens, without distinction of race or color, shall be equal? By no means can they be
so construed ... Nor do they mean that all citizens shall sit on juries, or that their
children shall attend the same schools. These are not civil rights and immunities.
Well, what is the meaning? What are civil rights? I understand civil rights to be simply
the absolute rights of individuals, such as "The right of personal security, the right of
personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property."
R. BERGER, supra note 15, at 27(quoting remarks of House Chairman Wilson, CONG. GLOBE,
3~1th Cong., lst Sess. 1117 (1866)). For further discussion of the distinction between "social''
and "civil ec:uality," and its implications, see infra text accompanying notes 275-86.
270. Senat0r Saulsbury of Delaware, reacting to a proposal that would have prohibited
segregated transportation in the District of Columbia, declared that such a measure would be
"a war against nature and nature's God." Frank & Munro, supra note 240, at 151. Similar
ambivalence about the limits of acceptable and appropriate racial equality was expressed by
Andrew Ro1rers, a member of the House of Representatives, in debates over the fourteenth
amendment:
Sir, I want it distinctly understood that the American people believe that this
Government was made for white men and white women. They do not believe, nor can
you make them believe-the edict of God Almighty is stamped ;;gainst it-that there
i5 social equality between the black race and the white.
I have no fault to find with the colored race .... I wish them well, and if I were in
a State where they exist in large numbers I would vote to give them every right
enjoyed by the white people except the right of a negro man to marry a white woman
and the right to vote.
0
Bickel, supra note 240, at 49.
271. "The plain fact, as Senator Fessenden, the respected chairman of the Joint Committee
said, was tlmt 'we cannot put into the Constitution, owing to existing prejudices and existing
imtitutions, an entire exclusion of all class distinctions.' " R. BERGER, supra note 15, at 164.
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controversy about the thirteenth amendment than the fourteenth among
"the people" of the North-far more consensus that something about slavery
was morally evil. The terms of the thirteenth amendment suggest that
slavery was viewed as a moral evil not merely because it deprives people of
liberty. Slavery and "involuntary servitude" were prohibited, "except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted."27 2
Thus, whatever deprivation of liberty is inherent in slavery was viewed as
morally acceptable when imposed as criminal punishment.
Some people might have viewed slavery based on race, as opposed to
slavery as punishment for a crime, as morally evil, because one has no
choice about being black, whereas one does have a choice about whether to
obey a criminal statute. 273 This notion, however, could not have motivated
those in the middle group. Because those in the middle group wanted the
fourteenth amendment to prohibit some laws discriminating against blackslaws that blacks had the choice to obey or disobey-they must have had
some notion that racial discrimination is morally wrong. They must have
believed that for some purposes it is wrong to treat people differently because
of value judgments about race. Thus, members of this middle group might
well have had a partial commitment to the abolitionist notion of intrinsic
racial equality-that it is wrong to treat people as possessing different moral
worth as a function of race.
By positing a normative motivation for the equal protection clause,
one can consider why people adhering to that norm might want to limit its
application. Once a person accepts that it is wrong to treat people
differently in one context because of moral judgments about race, he or she
begs the question of why that norm should not apply to all contexts. What
makes the context of interracial marriage different from the contexts of
contractual relations or property ownership, such that racial discrimination
is acceptable in the first context, but unacceptable in the latter two?
There are three related answers. First, one might acknowledge competing values, and declare that in different circumstances, different values
have different weight. A person might have an intellectual notion that race
should be irrelevant in evaluating the worth of another human being, yet
continue to feel the emotion of racism. That racist emotion may be more or
less important in different contexts. For a significant number of people,
racism in the "social" realm was more significant than racism in the "civil"
realm. 274 Discrimination that perpetuated physical separation-such as
segregation and antimiscegenation statutes-served the overpowering
emotion of racism. Discrimination in other contexts, such as making
contracts, owning property, and imposing criminal penalties, may have
b~en less emotionally significant. The intellectual ideal of racial irrelevance
272. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (emphasis added).
273. One might take another view. Slavery-imprisonment and hard labor for being blackalso may be conceived as the criminalization of doing an)'thing while being black. Indeed, some
of the black codes enacted by Southern states after the Civil War suggest such a view. See M.
KoNVITZ & T. LESKES, supra note 242, at 14 (1865 Mississippi vagrancy law applicable to
"Negroes" over eighteen years old, not lawfully employed or "found assembling themselves
together").
274. Cf infra text accompanying notes 277-81.
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was relatively more important in these latter contexts, and therefore could
prevail.27c We will call people who thought this way the "Balancers."2 76
Second, one could deny that one's value scheme is composed of
competing values, and thereby define away any concern with logical
incoherence. Such an obfuscatory approach for coping with internal
conflict was reflected in the othenvise incomprehensible distinction between "chi! equality," which many viewed as morally mandated, and "social
equality," which many viewed as a matter of individual taste, at best, and
morally reprehensible at worst. Although not contemporaneous with
debate among· the framers and ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment,
Justice Brown's opinion in Pless;• v. Ferguson 277 presents a revealing application of this purported distinction toward justifying the constitutional
permissibility of racial segregation.27s Justice Brown stated that:
[t]he object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of
thing:> it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions
based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from
political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms
unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring,
their ;eparation in places where they are liable to be brought into
contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other,
and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within
the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their
police· power.279
Note that, on the one hand, Justice Brown articulates the coherent
275. Although today it might seem odd co postulate that the same individual holding an
intellectual ideal of racial equality-even in limited circumstances-might simultaneously
harbor an intense emotion of racism, this general phenomenon of individuals with inconsistent values i!. common. Consider, for example, the phenomenon of religious guilt. Religious
beliefs often define activities or attitudes that are somehow "bad." Nevertheless, those very
act 1vitie5 or beliefs that religion brands as bad often bring a great deal of immediate satisfaction
and happiness. For six days during the week, many might engage in those activities, or think
tho5e thoughts, that on the seventh day, they solemnly remind themselves are "bad." Indeed,
even while sitting in their house of worship on the seventh day, solemnly reaffirming their
belief in the religious strictures, their eyes might wander to the attractive person in the next
row, and they might have lustful thoughts, violating those religious mandates that they
simultaneou•,ly reaffirm.
276. On Oct. 16, 1854, while campaigning against Stephen Douglas, Abraham Lincoln
spoke the Balancers' ideology as he juxtaposed an ideal ofjustice against the feelings of racism.
Considering available options once the slaves were freed, Lincoln said:
What ncoxt? Free diem, and make them politically and socially, our equals? My own
feelings will not admit of this; and if mine would, we well know that those of the great
mass of white people will not. Whether this feeling accords with justice and wund judgment,
is not the sole questw11, if indeed, it is any part of it. A universal feeling, whether well or
ill-founded, can not be safelr disregarded. We can not, then, make them equals. It
does seem to me that systems of gradual emancipation might be adopted ....
II THE Cowcrm WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 256 (R.P. Basler ed. 1953) (emphasis added).
277. 163 lf.S. 537 (1896).
278. Lincoln aho manifested this malady at times. See 2 CONG. REc. 376 (1874) (quoting
Lincoln that the "negro" is entitled to the natural rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happines5 as found in the Declaration of Independence but not necessarily political and social
equalitr): infra note 284.
279. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544 (emphasis added).
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implications of the view that it is wrong to regard people as inferior because
they are black. This notion, applied to one context, logi,cally extends to all
contexts. Along the lines of this general principle, Justice Brown acknowledges that laws denying "the absolute equality of the two races before the
law," or implying the inferiority of either, would violate the amendment. 280
Implicitly, any law based on the view that blacks are of a different intrinsic
moral worth compromises the underlying norm of racial equality~
On the other hand, Justice Brown suggests that the amendment
"could not have been intended" to require "social equality." He recognizes
that whites still had an intense aversion to associating with blacks-that this
interaction would be "unsatisfactory," perhaps to both blacks and whites,
but certainly to whites. The essential premise of Justice Brown's conclusion
that the doctrine of separate but equal does not offend the fourteenth
amendment's underlying principle of "the absolute equality of the two races
before the law" 281 rests on the view, incredible today, that intentional
segregation does not imply black inferiority.
Thus, rather than clearly acknowledge that the emotional flare of
racism felt in the social context competed with the absolute ideal of racial
equality acknowledged in the civil context, Justice Brown denied any
conflict. He might not have perceived that he was carving an exception to
the norm of racial equality.282 Similarly, some framers and ratifiers in the
middle group who adhered to the distinction between "civil equality" and
"social equality" might not have perceived that they were carving an
exception to an ideal of racial equality.2 83 We will call these people the
"Perception-Impaired Absolutists."284

280. Id. (emphasis added).
281. Id. at 544.
282. It is also possible that justice Brown disingenuously tried to hide that he was carving an
exception to the general principle of "absolute equality of the two races before the law."
283. The purpose of examining Justice Brown's reasoning, which acknowledges a general
principle of racial equality, while accepting laws that treat people differently because of race,
is to illustrate the different manner in which intrapersonal normative conflict might be
acknowledged, perceived, and evaluated. Understanding how individuals might have perceived and evaluated their competing ideals of racial equality, on the one hand, and the
pressing emotions of racism, on the other, is essential for evaluating whether, and the extent
to which, they would have authorized courts to pursue the coherent implications of one value,
at the expense of the other, in the name of the Constitution. See infra text accompanying notes
287-300.
284.Justice Brown's opinion also reflects an element of balancing. His observation that, "in
the nature of things," the fourteenth amendment "could not have been intended" to enforce
social equality "or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either," Plessy,
163 U.S. at 544, suggests a recognition that legally enforced social inequality is, in fact,
inequality before the law-but is an inequality that the framers and ratifiers wanted to retain
because mandated equality would have been intolerably painful for them. This attitude of
balancing (and its implicit recognition that legally enforced social inequality is inequality
before the law) occurs in the midst of a predominantly Perception-Impaired Absolutist
position, see supra text accompanying notes 277-81, suggesting that my distinction between
Balancers and Perception-Impaired Absolutists does not necessarily mean that individuals
were exclusively one or the other.
Indeed, it was quite possible-perhaps probable-that people who were so troubled and
confused by racism, yet so drawn to it, could manifest both attitudes at once. One might call
such people "Perception-Impaired Balancers." These people might deny that a certain
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There is a third way of thinking which denies that conflicting values
are the basis for carving exceptions to a norm of intrinsic racial equality.
Those who believed that God mandated racial segregation, but not slavery
or di&criminatory criminal penalties, had no further need to justify qualifications to the principle that race should be irrelevant in evaluating human
worth or mission. 285 God made all the necessarv determinations, which
were not to be altered by mere human beings . .Apparently, in this view,
God's law looks more like an intricate legal code than a corpus of
intrinsically compelling principle.286 We will call these people the "Theists."

b.

Coherence-To What Extent?

Constitutional mandates pursued with the motive of self-constraint
suggest that "the people" want courts, like a coach, to help them vindicate
some preferred yet vulnerable constitutional ideal. Assuming that "the
people" of 1868 acted with the motive of self-constraint in adopting the
equal protection clause, 287 one must determine the extent to which they
wanted courts to pursue their preferred ideal of intrinsic racial equality. Did
"the people" of 1868 want courts eventually to impose the principle that all
governmental actions undertaken because of racial prejudice are unconstitutional? Did ''the people" of 1868 want courts eventually to impose the
principle that governmental actions undertaken because of gender prejudice
are unconstitutional?
In addressing these questions, consider the implications of each
normative matrix that might account for an individual's desire to favor a
limited ideal of racial equality. The Balancer acknowledges both an ideal of
prJ.ctio~ viok tes their value of racial equality, and decide, once convinced that the practice does
violate that value, to compromise the equality ideal in favor of their racist emotions.
Abraham Lincoln, for example, in a speech in 1857, referred to the statement in the
Dcdarntion of Independence that "all men are created equal," and speculated that:
the authors of that notable instrument intended to inclupe all men, but they did not
intend to declare all men equal in all respects. . . . They defined with tolerable
distinctness, in what respects they did consider all men created equal-equal in
"certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happine5s."
II THE CaLLtCTED WORKS OF AnRAHA~I LINCOLN 405-06 (R.P. Basler ed. 1953). Approximately
thirty seconds before uttering this notion that distinguished between social and civil equality,
Lincoln, perhaps like anti-Communists today, bragged that he was no less racist than Stephen
Douglas. "There i5 a natural disgust in the minds of nearly all white people, to the idea of an
indiscriminate amalgamation of the white and black races; and Judge Douglas evidently is
ba•;ing his chief hope, upon the chances of being able to appropriate the benefit of this disgust
to him~elf." Id. at 405.
Similarly, Senator William Fessenden, who apparently favored antimiscegenation statutes
on social grounds, denied that the statutes discriminated against blacks at all, since "Negroes
could not marry whites and whites could not marry Negroes." Bickel, supra note 240, at 16.
This argument persisted until the Supreme Court struck down antimiscegenation statutes in
1967. SL'<' Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967); cf infra note 377.
285. See subra note 270.
286. There· is a fourth possibility, relevant more for judicial decisionmaking than for people
en;:;aged in Folitical competition. One could acknowledge that the principle of racial equality
should apply in all contexts, but misapply the principle-disingenuously-in certain contexts.
See su/1ra note 282.
287. See su,IJra text accompanying notes 257-66.
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intrinsic racial equality and conflicting racist concerns that have their own
allure. To what extent would this individual, adhering to the the notion of
intrinsic racial equality as an ideal, authorize a court to pursue its progressive coherence against his competing racist concerns?
One cannot answer this question without additional information about
the Balancer's value scheme. For example, a person desiring something
sweet might be asked to choose between an apple and a piece of candy.
Both are logically and indistinguishably related to the articulated criterion
of "something sweet." One can distinguish between the apple and the piece
of candy only on the basis of additional criteria-for example, something
very sweet, or something wholesome and sweet.
The need for additional information about the value scheme of the
Balancers who supported the fourteenth amendment might be satisfied by
referring to constitutional language-the manner in which they chose to
express their constitutional ideals of self-constraint.2 88 "The people" of
1868 did not express their dedication to an ideal of intrinsic racial equality
by framing the specific terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as a
constitutional mandate. 289 Rather, their constitutional choices were expressed in the broadest possible terms. 290 Even the credulous should doubt
that Balancers who did have cherished competing values that they wanted
forever to protect even against their ideal of intrinsic racial equality would
fail to express those treasured reservations in plain terms. 291 Thus, assum-

288. Cf supra note 59.
289. The issue addressed in the text is analogous to the earlier comparison of an employer
who viewed physical well-being as a static concern for which he was willing to forgo certain
specific pleasures, and an employer who viewed physical well-being as a developmental
concern for which he was willing to expend a constant amount of effort. See supra text
accompanying notes 58-61, 257-66 & note 59.
290. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 23, at 133-37 (framers did not articulate particular
"conceptions" of equal protection, but appealed to general "concept" of equal protection); J.
ELY, supra note 148, at 30 ("We know from its history that [the equal protection clause] was
meant particularly to combat inequality toward blacks. We also know, however-and would
rightly presume it even if we didn't-that the decision to use general language, not tied to race,
was a conscious one.''); Bickel, supra note 240, at 63 (framers chose "language capable of
growth");ef. supra note 59.
291. Indeed, even with respect to the relatively precise Civil Rights Act of 1866, some
expressed concerns about the possibility for a broad judicial construction. For example,
Anthony Thornton, a Democrat from Illinois, cautioned:
[W]ith the loose and liberal mode of construction adopted in this age, who can tell
what rights may not be conferred by virtue of the terms as used in this bill? Where is
it to end? Who can tell how it may be defined, how it may be construed? Why not,
then, if it is not intended to confer the right of suffrage upon this class, accept a
proviso that no such design is entertained?
Bickel, supra note 240, at 19. The significance of this fear regardingjudicial interpretation of
a statute must have been exacerbated with respect to the equal protection clause. Unacceptable
interpretations of statutes can be legislatively corrected, cf. supra note 266; unacceptable
interpretations of constitutional provisions cannot. See also Dworkin, supra note 24, at 494 ("It
is highly implausible that people who believe their own opinions about what counts as equality
or justice should be followed ... -would use only the general language of equality and justice
in framing their commands.'').
This argument obviously applies only to constitutional provisions that are articulated with
apparently open-ended language. There are, of course, provisions somewhat more specific
than the equal protection clause, see supra text accompanying notes 190-215 (discussion of
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ing that "the people" of 1868 acted with a motive of self-constraint, the
language with which the Balancers chose to express their constitutional
ideal of intrinsic racial equality suggests no exceptions that the judiciarytheir coach-would be required to respect in (someday) developing the
coherent implications of their constitutional ideaJ.292
Consider the implications of the value scheme held by a PerceptionImpaired Absolutist who acted with a motive of self-constraint. This
person, like Justice Brown in Plessy v. Ferguson, acknowledges that the
constitutional ideal, without exception, should prevail over any conflicting
majoritarian choice.2 93 Yet, the Perception-Impaired Absolutist might
honestly believe that segregation and antimiscegenation statutes do not
violate the ideal of intrinsic racial equality. Thus, for the PerceptionImpaired Absolutist, the question is not whether the ideal of intrinsic racial
inequality should prevail against any competing value; it should. Rather,
the issue :oncerns who should determine whether a particular democratic
preference conflicts with the constitutional ideal.
The postulated motive of self-constraint suggests that those
Perception-Impaired Absolutists supporting the equal protection clause did
not trust themselves to determine whether some everyday desire or
perception violated their moral ideal-that they recognized the power of
their racism to distort perception. Thus, because these people apparently
envisioned an absolute ideal of intrinsic racial equality, 294 and because they
apparently recognized the pernicious influence of racial prejudice on their
everyday perceptions, it would make sense for them to authorize judges to
determine whether particular democratic preferences violate their constitutional ideal.2 95 This would make sense, at least, for one who accepts the
Hamiltonian justification of judical review-that judges, better than the
electorate and its representatives, can dispassionately discern and apply
0

pril•acy as derived from first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments), and provisions that are
apparently clear and precise-e.g., that the President shall be at least thirty-five years old. For
sor.1e implications of these precise provisions, giving analytical perspective about the vague
provisions, see Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indetenninate Tex!: A Preliminary Defense
of 1111 Impcrfed Muddle, 94 YALE LJ. 821, 853-72 (1985) (arguing that Constitution's more
determinate provisions should be used to justify process of interpreting Constitution's less
determinate provi~ions).
292. This analysis may respond to Ronald Dworkin's question about whether the framers'
"concepts" or their "conceptions"-or both-should count when interpreting constitutional
meaning. See Dworkin, supra note 24, ac 490.
This anal}sis suggests that both must count, because by acting with the motive of
self-constraint, "the people" who framed and ratified the equal protection clause manifested
a desir" to count both "concepts" and "conceptions." Their "conceptions" should govern
immediate cc,nstitutional meaning, because tlley had a limited commitment to the "concept,"
but their gen·~ral "concept" suggests the ideal to which they apparently aspired, as tile pain of
forgoing· the exceptions was reduced to tolerable levels. See infra text accompanying notes
29!1-390.
293. The language of the amendment-its failure to specify exceptions-supports Justice
Brown·~ artirnlation of the "absolute equality of tile two races before die law" as the applicable
comtitutional ideal. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896); supra text accompanying
notes 257-66; notes 59, 290.
294. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.
295. The Perception-Impaired Balancer would resolve conflicts between his or her ideal of
raCJal equality and his or her emotion of racism-once conflicts are acknowledged-as would
a Balancer. S.·e supra note 284; infra note 299.
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"the people's" chosen constitutional values. 296 Assuming this normative
matrix, Justice Brown's error was not one of legal principle, but one of
failing to transcend the prejudices and perceptions of his mind and his
era.297
Finally, consider the implications of the value scheme held by a Theist.
This person believes that God made the races equal for some purposes, but
not for others. A person whose values are rooted in God's will is not likely
to believe that God's meaning should be changed by judicial development.
Exceptions to a principle of intrinsic racial equality are God's exceptions,
and hence inviolable. Thus, a person with this normative matrix would
probably want to specify the circumstances in which racial discrimination
should be prohibited and those circumstances in which it should be
permitted. Such a person would have sought to frame the fourteenth
amendment with the specificity of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The general
terms of the fourteenth amendment suggest that this normative matrix did
not motivate a substantial portion of "the people" in 1868. From the
language of the amendment, one might conclude that the votes of the
Theists were not necessary for ratification. 298
Thus, despite their intrapersonal conflicts, the radical antiracists, the
Balancers, and the Perception-Impaired Absolutists apparently envisioned
a fully realized ideal of intrinsic racial equality tainted by no exceptions.
Despite the racist impulses compelling the original understanding that the
fourteenth amendment, as of 1868, would prohibit only certain forms of
racial discrimination, all relevant points of view apparently converge on the
proposition that the amendment should, ultimately, prohibit all racial
discrimination that denies intrinsic racial equality.
A question remains: When was that uncompromised ideal to be
realized?

c.

Coherence-When?

The fourteenth amendment does not provide any explicit guidance on
the issue of when racial discrimination denying intrinsic racial equality
should be prohibited in contexts beyond those recognized in the original

296. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
297. It was inexcusable that Justice Brown failed to recognize the logical conflict between the
ideal of intrinsic racial equality and legally imposed racial segregation. Although a person's
analytical capacity may be limited by the perspective of the era, some people in the
mid-nineteenth century were able to discern the logical conflict between laws requiring
segregation and the ideal of intrinsic racial equality. The radical abolitionists had long
advocated this position. A judge could fail to perceive the logical relationship for only two
reasons. First, the judge's analytical capacity may have been clouded by his own prejudices.
Alternatively, the judge might hawe perceived the logical relationship, yet dishonestly failed to
acknowledge it. One cannot do much about such gross depanures from the ideal judicial role,
whether intentional or unintentional, except to identify and criticize them. Cf infra notes
377-78, 390-441.
298. This conclusion applies to the Northern electorate of 1868. The Southern electorate
may well have consisted ovenvhelmingly of racist Theists. See supra text accompanying notes
248-56.
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understanding. One might, however, generate relevant criteria by further
analyzing "the people's" ambivalent feelings about the equality ideal. The
radical antiracists had no qualms about immediately prohibiting all laws
based on racial prejudice. Similarly, the Perception-Impaired Absolutists
had no qualms about immediately realizing their ideal of intrinsic racial
equality. 299
Thus, accepting all premises established or assumed so far, 300 the
Balancen. must have been responsible for any choice to delay fully realizing
the constitutional ideal of self-constraint. The Balancers were apparently
unwilling to forgo all laws based on racism because in certain contexts
racism was just too important. There was apparently a certain amount of
pain in ordinary politics that the Balancers were willing to endure in the
name of •ntrinsic racial equality, and an amount beyond which they were
not willing to go. Despite this reservation, they seemed to manifest a desire
to realiz<: the full implications of their constitutional ideal someday by
adopting the general language of the equal protection clause. Thus, to the
extent that the meaning of the fourteenth amendment in 1868 was a
function of the Northern Balancers' constitutional ideals and racist reservations, the question of proper timing must have been a function of
circumstances that would change the internally competitive balance between
their con:;titutional ideal of intrinsic racial equality301 and their everyday
emotions of racism.
We know, for example, that "the people" of 1868-the Balancers, at
least-did not want laws mandating racial segregation to be immediately
invalidated by the equal protection clause. 302 But consider the following
scenario: A case is brought in 1872 challenging the constitutionality of
racial segregation. Assume that by 1872, fewer Northern states and local
majoritie~ than in 1868 had impulses to pass racist laws in those contexts
that the equal protection clause originally was intended to affect. Under
these circumstances, the clause would have become less significant for
constraining ordinary democratic discretion than it originally was in 1868.
299. See s1•/>ra notes 293-97. Any reluctance to authorize courts to enforce their determinations that a democratic choice violates the constitutional ideal of intrinsic racial equality would
reflect the Balancers' ideology, rather than that of the Perception-Impaired Absolutist.
Although there might have been Perception-Impaired Balancers-people who denied the
existence of conflict, and if convinced that conflict existed, would have chosen racism rather
than racial (quality-they are properly categorized as Balancers for purposes of this analysis.
Sa supra note 284.
300. Specifically: that constitutionally mandated restrictions on local discretion can serve a
motive of self-constraint among "the people" of the nation, see mpra text accompanying notes
67 -90; that ~' motive of self-constraint among "the people" of the nation suggests the desire to
favor some\ alue to a greater extent than "the people" could achieve in ordinary congressional
politic~, ste supra text accompanying notes 91-92; that "the people" of the North who framed
and ratified the fourteenth amendment acted with a motive of self-constraint (as well as the
more obvious motive of constraining the racist South), see supra text accompanying notes
257-66; tha1 the dominant ideal underlying the equal protection clause was a notion of
intrinsic rac,al equality-that people should be viewed as morally indistinguishable despite
differences in race, see supra text accompanying notes 267-86; and that "the people"
authorized the courts, ultimately, to pursue that ideal without exceptions, see mpra text
accompanying notes 287-98.
:101. See si.pra text accompanying notes 273-84, 287-92.
302. See s11pra text accompanying notes 241-44.
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The Balancers less frequently would have been denied their preferred
racist policy choices, because they had fewer racist policy choices that they
wished to vindicate. Under these circumstances, therefore, if a court
interpreted the fourteenth amendment as having the same meaning as it
had in 1868, the amendment would have imposed less ordinary, everyday
political pain on "the people" of 1872 than they originally chose to endure
for the sake of intrinsic racial equality.
Thus, if one accepts that "the people" whose values count for defining
the fourteenth amendment's original meaning were "the people" of the
North, 303 and that "the people" of 1868 expressed an aspiration to achieve
an ideal of intrinsic racial equality tainted by no exceptions,3°4 and if one
then applies the Hamiltonian premise of constitutional continuity,305 one
might conclude that a court should compensate for "the people's" changed
everyday political values-their less intense racism-by prohibiting racist
choices in some additional context(s). Only in this way can "the people's"
original constitutional commitment to an ideal of intrinsic racial equality be
maintained intact and undiluted.
This analysis can be expressed in terms of the "constitutional equation" as applied to the hypothetical circumstances of 1872:
[ord. nt'l prefs. : const'l choices](l868) II [ord. nt'l prefs. : const'l values](l872)306

303. See supra text accompanying notes 248-56.
304. More precisely, "the people" of the North expressed this ideal, see supra text accompanying notes 287-97, and the Southern white majority, voluntarily or not, ratified the Northern
ideal as the price for readmission to the Union, see supra text accompanying notes 248-56.
305. Cf supra note 209. The premise of constitutional continuity is far less problematic when
applied to a person, or a group of people, who actually made particular constitutional choices,
than it is when applied across the generations. The premise becomes ever weaker as more time
passes, and "the people" live in an environment increasingly detached from that in which the
original constitutional choices were made. For considerations in support of the premise of
constitutional continuity, see supra text accompanying notes 114-23. For considerations
questioning the usefulness of the premise, see infra text accompanying notes 306, 318, 325,
370.
306. It might be more accurate to describe the constitutional equation in terms of the
constitutional choices and the ordinary political values of the North:
[ord. pol. prefs.: const'I choices](North 1868) II [ord. pol. prefs.: const'I values] (North 1872)
In plain language:
The relationship between the ordinary, everyday political preferences and the values
underlying choices of constitutional self-constraint among "the people" of the North
in 1868 reflects the relationship between the ordinary, everyday political preferences
and the values underlying constitutional mandates of self-constraint desired by "the
people" of the North in 1872.
Note that because "the people" whose values were relevant in creating the fourteenth
amendment were the Northern electorate, this "constitutional equation" differs from that
based on the nation's constitutional values and the nation's ordinary political preferences
discussed earlier. Cf supra note 164. One can, however, express the same idea with the "true"
national constitutional equation, simply by recognizing the severe dichotomy between Northern and Southern values in 1868. One can presume that the South in 1868, voluntarily or not,
recognized the constitutional ideals as framed and understood by the North, see supra text
accompanying notes 255-56, and toward determining "the people's" contemporary constitutional values, one'can evaluate the development of each region's ordinary political concerns
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The analysis requires quantification of the total amount of everyday
political pain "the people" -the Balancers-originally chose to endure, (Pt
[1868]). Pt [1868] can be broken down and expressed as the sum of
everyday political pain that "the people" of 1868 chose to suffer by being
denied the discretion to pursue their racist impulses in those particular
contexts originally subsumed under the equal protection clause. (Pt [1868] =
Pc 1 + Pc2 + ... + Pen [1868)). 307 The analysis also requires quantification
of the everyday political pain "the people" actually suffered in 1872 in those
contexts originally addressed by the amendment, (Pt [1872] = {Pc 1 + Pc2 +
... + Pc11 } [1872]); the extent to which the every•day political pain they
actually suffered in 1872 is less than the amount of everyday political pain
they chose to suffer in 1868, (Pt [1868] - Pt [1872]); and the amount of
everyday political pain they would have suffered from being constitutionally
disabled from pursuing racist impulses in a new context, (Pcn+l [1872])for example, racial segregation. If Pcn+l [1872] is equal to Pt [1868] minus
Pt [1872]-or, to put it another way, if{Pc1 + Pc2 + ... + Pen} [1868] is
equal to {Pc1 + Pc2 + ... + Pen + Pcn+1} [1872]-the Court would then
have a basis consistent with the premise of constitutional continuity to
inti:~rpret the amendment as now prohibiting racist policies in that new
context of racial segregation.
It is, of course, far easier to suggest the need to quantify these variables
than actually to quantify them. At minimum, one must meaningfully
quantify how much everyday political pain "the people" of 1868 chose to
endure, Pt [1868]. Despite the premise that their original understanding
viewed the immediate impact of the fourteenth amendment as roughly
similar to that of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, it is a difference in coverage
between the two provisions-a degree of somewhat greater immediate
coverage by the fourteenth amendment-that could suggest the amount of
pain in ordinary politics that "the people" of 1868 were willing to endure
for their ideal of self-constraint. 308 We simply do not know what their
through time, and the relationship between those ordinary political concerns and the constitutional judgments each region made in 1868.
By assumin.; that the relevant electorate in 1872 remains only "the prnple" of the North, I
am "fudging· the difficult question of whether (and when) the values of the Southern
electorate become relevant for interpreting the fourteenth amendment's meaning. Because
1872 is i.o clo•;e to 1868, the continued exclusion of the South seems, at least in a visceral or
intmtive sen5(, little more problematic than its original exclusion from meaningful participation in creatir,g the fourteenth amendment. Nevertheless, this question of reintegrating the
South exbts for 1872, as it does for 1896, 1954, and 1987. For a consideration of this question
in these latter three contexts, see infra notes 318, 325, 370.
307. There seems to be a scholarly consensus that among those contexts originally intended
to be covered by the equal protection clause were the right to make and enforce contracts (for
the ~ake of illustration, one might call this Pc1 ); the right to sue (call this Pc2 ); and the rights
to purchase, iell, and inherit property (call these Pc;, Pc4 , and Pc5 ). There may have been
mot.:'.. &t' sujJTa note 242. The precise extent of the amendment's intended immediate reach,
{Pc 1 + ... + Pen}, is not known. See infra note 309. It is rather clear, however, that the context
of r.i.cial segregation was not originally covered by the fourteenth amendment's mandates. See
sujm1 text accompanying note 242. Thus call racial segregation Pen+!·
308. Cf. infra note 309. If one could know precisely what contexts the equal protection clause
was originally understood as reaching, cf. infra text accompanying note 309, one might devise
some rough measure for the evetyday political pain "the people" of 1868 chose to suffer by
identifying how many Northern jurisdictions then favored racist policies in those contexts, and
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chosen measure of self-constraint was. 309
However difficult these questions might be to answer with respect to
"the people" of 1868 and 1872, on~ confronts additional complications as
the electorate of 1868 dies away and, pursuant to the premise of constitutional continuity, becomes an evidentiary proxy for "the people" of 1896,
1954, and 1987.

3.

The Becoming of Constitutional Meaning

The following sections will apply the foregoing analysis to several
significant constitutional conflicts-Plessy v. Ferguson, 310 Brown v. Board of

how many jurisdictions, although then lacking such policies, wavered in their views and might
have chosen to vindicate their racist impulses in those contexts in the foreseeable future.
Similarly, an analyst in 1872 could have roughly quantified the amount of ordinary political
pain that "the people" of 1872 would have suffered from being constitutionally denied the
discretion to pursue racist impulses in the context of segregation by determining how many
jurisdictions then segregated on the basis of race, and how many, although then lacking such
a policy, wavered in their views and might have chosen to vindicate their racist impulses by
mandating racial segregation in the foreseeable future.
309. See supra note 242. If, however, "the people" of 1868 intended the equal protection
clause to prohibit discrimination in only those contexts reached by the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
there would be a stronger basis for finding that they acted only with the motive of constraining
the discretion of the recalcitrant South, and without the additional aspirational motive of
self-constraint. Assuming this original meaning for the equal protection clause, the Northern
electorate would have chosen a constitutional mandate that corresponded precisely with the
manner in which they had recently resolved their competing concerns in ordinary congressional politics. For a skeletal analysis of how the equal protection clause might be interpreted
if one assumes that "the people" of the North acted only with the motive of constraining
others, see supra note 266.
But even 1f the intended reach of the fourteenth amendment's immediately applicable
mandates corresponded precisely with the Civil Rights Act of 1866, "the people" of 1868 might
have acted with the· motive of self-constraint if they envisioned wavering from their present
commitment to an ideal of racial equality, and if they wanted to prevent themselves from doing
so. See supra text accompanying notes 67-90. If so, "the people" might have intended the equal
protection clause to act as a sort of one-way rachet, incorporating each move (if any) in "the
people's" ordinary political values toward the constitutional ideal, see infra note 323, but never
going beyond the level of commitment that "the people" would choose in ordinary legislative
politics. The effect of this postulated constitutional intent would resemble that from a
postulated constitutional intent in which "the people" of the North pursued the fourteenth
amendment with the motive of constraining only the recalcitrant South (rather than with the
motive of self-constraint as well). See supra note 266.
One will recall our earlier analysis that if "the people" of the North wished to insulate their
"enlightened" racial views from erosion once the Southern electorate were readmitted to
Congress, they might have sought to authorize the courts to vindicate their ordinary legislative
values with respect to race, analogous to the relationship between the Court and Congress
today under the dormant commerce clause. There would be, however, one significant
difference between the posited situation in which "the people" of the North acted with the
motive of constraining themselves from wavering away from their ordinary legislative commitment to racial equality on 1868, and that in which they wanted only to constrain the Soutl1
from forcing a retreat from whatever commitment to racial equality the Northern electorate
favored: while the one-way rachet effect of a judicially construed equal protection clause is
exactly what those concerned with self-constraint would want, it would be an unfortunate, but
necessary, inconvenience for those concerned only with constraining the everyday political
discretion of the South. See id.
310. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Education ,3 11 lvlississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 31 2 and, finally, Baker
v. Wade.:m Each of these cases presented a claim that the Court should
declare unconstitutional local policies that were permissible according to
the original understanding of 1868. Thus, each posed the interpretive
problem of determining whether "the people" want a particular exercise of
democratic discretion to be invalidated toward serving the coherent implications
of the equal protection clause's ideal of self-constraint and, if so, whether "the
people" want to be denied the discretion to pursue their competing
everyday political impulses today.
In each of these constitutional conflicts, the courts have faced a
national political context somehow different from that in which constitutional choices-evidence of "the people's" values of self-constraint-were
made in 1868. To what extent can a court determine whether the
constitutional values of "the people" today require invalidating a policy that
"the people" of 1868 apparently wanted to reserve as a matter for ordinary
local discrt:tion?

a.

i.

Reeling in the Rope of Reserved Racism

Racial Seg;regation and "the People" of 1896

Plessy v. Ferguson 314 involved a challenge to a Louisiana statute that
required "·equal but separate" railway coaches for white and "colored"
passengers. 31 :; The fourteenth amendment was understood by "the people"
of 1868 as not prohibiting racial segregation. 316 Despite this, racial segregation conflicted with their apparent constitutional ideal of ultimately
prohibiting all policies undertaken because of racial prejudice. 317 Thus, this
case presented the question of timing. On what basis could a court have
determined that toward serving their constitutional ideal of intrinsic racial
equality, "the people" today-in 1896-wish to endure the political pain of
self-constr~.int in this context, previously reserved by "the people" of 1868
for ordinary local discretion?3I8

311. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
312. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
313. 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 198.5), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 3337-3N (1986).
314. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
315. The sUtute provided the following: "[A]ll railway companies carrying passengers in
their coaches in thb State, shall provide equal but separate accommodations for the white, and
colored races, by providing two or more pa~senger coaches for each passenger train, or by
dividing the passenger coaches by a partition so as to secure separate accommodations." Id. at
540 (quoting :\ct of July IO, 1890, § I, 1890 La. Acts 152, 153 (repealed 1972)).
316. Srt' wpra text accompanying notes 240-44, 302-09.
:H7. Ser supra text accompanying notes 287-98.
318. Who are "the people" of 1896 with respect to the values underlying the equal
protection clause? This question, if it had been asked by a court in 1896, might have
undermined Me authority of the amendment altogether. The Southem electorate in 1868 did
not \'Oluntaril:r embrace an ideal of intrinsic racial equality, and probably would not have done
so in 1896. Se.• supra text accompanying notes 248-56.
Yct, if a court had applied the premise of constitutional continuity to this issue, cf. supra note
122; mfra nott:s 325, 376, it might have concluded that "the people" of the North in 1896, like
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those in 1868, would have chosen to exclude the Southern electorate from "the people" whose
values were relevant for defining the fourteenth amendment's meaning in 1896. Because
including the South as part of the relevant electorate in 1896 would have raised doubts about
the contemporary validity of the fourteenth amendment, and because "the people" (of the
North) in 1868 apparently decided that their concerns for racial equality were more important
than their competing concerns for democracy and community reflected in article V, it would
have followed from the premise of constitutional continuity that the non-Southern electorate
in 1896 would make a similar judgment. Thus, "the people" of the North might have
concluded that the South must remain excluded in 1896 if the constitutional ideal of intrinsic
racial equality were to remain intact.
Thus, a court in 1896 might have determined that as in 1868, the North and the South still
disagreed about whether the fourteenth amendment should be law. But to have questioned
the amendment's continuing authority based on the proposition that "the people" of tlze nation
today-1896-would not ratify the fourteenth amendment through regular article V processes
essentially would have been to reconsider issues otherwise decided by the Civil War. No
amount of philosophy could have resolved these issues to the satisfication of either side. Either
the South had the "right" to secede and, if not that, to block ratification of the fourteenth
amendment, or the North had the "right" to force the South to remain part of the Union and
to force the South to accept Northern views of racial morality. Cf infra note 443.
This problem, central for interpreting the fourteenth amendment's meaning to "the people"
of 1896, was tlze matter of dispute that in 1868 could not be resolved by established political
processes. "The people" of the North won this dispute. One struggles to identify a basis since
1868 from which the constitutional analyst in 1896 could have determined that the Southern
majority had developed some right independent of Nortlzern sufferance to be included among "the
people" whose values counted for interpreting the contemporary meaning of the fourteenth
amendment. Cf infra notes 325 (same question in 1954), 370 (same question in 1987).
One might characterize this proposition in a startling way: "the people" in 1896 who had the
right to establish principles of government for their own happiness, relevant to tlze values
underlying tlze fourteenth amendment, did not include the Southern electorate-at least in the view
of"the people" of the North. Cf infra notes 325, 370. The South in 1896, as in 1868, remained
bound by the values underlying the Northern electorate's choices to constrain itself and tlze
South-values presumably still held, pursuant to the premise of constitutional continuity, by
the North's progeny. See supra text accompanying notes 257-66. For some difficulties with the
premise of constitutional continuity in this context, see infra notes 325, 370, 376.
This analysis defines "the people" as a function of power and inheritance. Cf infra note 443.
It in no way develops criteria beyond these for a judge concerned with justif,·ing his or her
working definition of "the people.'' See infra text accompanying notes 455-59. Despite this,
however, the analysis at least suggests that a conflict might have remained between the
Southern electorate and the non-Southern electorate with respect to the fourteenth amendment. It suggests a method for ascertaining the constitutional values of each electorate. And
it suggests the need to choose between the two electorates for defining "the people" relevant
to the fourteenth amendment.
That "the people" of 1896, as those of 1868, might not have included the South is
troublesome. But this concern is separate from the problem that courts might have failed to
serve their employer's values-assuming that their employer was "the people" who militarily
took the right to assert their values, that is, the Northern electorate and their progeny. Cf infra
note 443. Courts might have pursued the coherent implications of constitutional ideals further
and faster than even "the people" of the North-and their progeny-would have wanted; on
the other hand, courts might not have pushed "the people's" ideals of self-constraint far
enough or fast enough. The first potential error would have been doubly significant, for the
courts would have been distorting the values of both the South, which was being carried along
grudgingly in any case, and the North, whose limited ideals of self-constraint the courts had
been charged to serve. The second potential error would have been more significant from the
perspective of the North and its progeny than that of the South. Any failure to push the
North's ideals of self-constraint far enough, or fast enough, only could have been welcome
relief to the South and its progeny, which probably preferred not to be pushed at all. For further
problems in identifying the progeny of 1868's Northern electorate, see infra notes 325, 370,
376.
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This Article has posited that the development of ordinary, everyday
political values is the source for the development of constitutional coherence, so that "the people" maintain their level of commitment to their ideal
of self-constraint, yet are not forced to exceed their level of commitment. 319
Thus, if a court could have established that "the people" of 1896 felt less
everyday political pain from the fourteenth amendment's original mandates than "the people" of 1868 chose to endure (that is, {Pe 1 + Pe2 +
... + Pc,.} [1896] was less than {Pei + Pe2 + ... + Pen} [1868)), and that
the everyday political pain that "the people" of 1896 would have felt from
having been denied the discretion to segregate, plus the amount of
everyday political pain "the people" of 1896 did endure in those contexts
originally covered by the equal protection clause, was equal to the amount
of pain "the people" of 1868 chose to endure toward serving their ideal of
intrinsic racial equality (that is, Pen+I [1896) plus {Pc1 + Pe2 + ... + Pen}
[1896] was equal to {Pe 1 + Pc2 + ... +Pen} [1868)), there would have been
a justification for a finding that today-1896-is the proper time to
interpret the equal protection clause as prohibiting racist policies in the new
context of racial segregation.320
To have established this proposition, however, would have required
quantification of variables that could not have been precisely quantified. 321
Without such quantification, this question of timing could not have been
precisely answered for Plessy-or, indeed for any particular case.
It wculd, however, be remarkable to speculate that ordinary political
values among "the people" -even among non-Southerners 322 -had
changed so much between 1868 and 1896 that the pain engendered by a
constitutionally mandated prohibition of racial segregation-apparently
unbearable to the framers and ratifiers in 1868-could have diminished to
Given the extent to which notions of democracy and community would have been
compromised by the proposition that the Southern electorate in 1896, as in 1868, were
exdudcd from "the people" whose values counted in interpreting the fourteenth amendment's
meaning, some might suggest that any further distortion by judicial error-judicial tyranny
with respect to the constitutional values of the non-Southern electorate-would have been
trhial by cor,1parhon. This may be true. Nevertheless, that the values of the defeated South
were not to have been vindicated is not to say that the values of the victo1ious North should
not ha\e been vindicated as accurately as possible. The Court is "the people's" servant, at least
so far as "the people" are concerned, cf. supra text accompanying notes 61-64, 91-92. Once the
Court determines, or is told, which people it is to serve, its interpretive task is no less real or
meaningful simply because "the people" -its employers-have chosen to impose their will on
another population for the sake of their notions of justice.
Whether a judge should follow his employer's directives, and how a judge should define "the
people," are que&tions of an entirely different nature. See infra text accompanying notes
455-59.
::119. See su1)ra te:n accompanying notes 164, 306.
::120. Even if a court could have determined that these conditions were satisfied in 1896, and
that the premise of constitutional continuity therefore suggested that "the people" required a
prohibition of raci~t policies in the new context of segregation to serve their ideal of intrinsic
racial equalitv, it still would have had to determine whether the imposition of this applicable
comtitutional principle could be accommodated in particular localities, or whether the imposition of mandatory remedies in certain vigorously dissenting localities should wait, because of
the potential for civil strife-even as a function of "the people's" values. See infra notes 323,
·tofi.
321. See suj•ra text accompanying notes 306-09.
322. See suj•ra note 318.
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the point of acceptability in 1896. Little had occurred between 1868 and
1896 to mitigate the racism endemic even among "the people" of the
North. On this basis, one might postulate that the lure of racist segregation
had roughly the same political status in 1896 as it did in 1868323 and, in turn,
323. One cannot pass without noting the potential significance of the Civil Rights Act of
1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875), which frovided as follows:
[A]ll persons within the jurisdiction o the United States shall be entitled to the full
and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of
inns, public conveyances on land and water, theatres, and other places of public
amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and
applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous
condition of servitude.
Id . .if this statute had been understood to prohibit racial segregation in transportation facilities,
then the analysis presented in this Article would suggest that Plessy was, in fact, wrongly
decided. Assuming that ratifying constitutional restrictions on local discretion reflects a desire
to favor a value to a greater extent than would national political majorities, a national political
majority's desire to prohibit racial segregation would suggest that to maintain the tension of
self-constraint, the Constitution itself must prohibit at least state laws requiring segregation in
transportation facilities.
There is some question, however, whether the statute was concerned with racial segregation
per se. The bill was introduced by Senator Charles Sumner-the radical antiracist. It is rather
clear from legislative debate that Sumner wanted to prohibit all manifestations of racism,
including racial segregation. "I will say that when this bill shall become a law, as I hope it will
very soon, I know nothing further to be done in the way oflegislation for the security of equal
rights in this Republic." CONG. GLOBE, 4lst. Cong., 2d Sess. 3434 (1870).
There was, however, debate about whether segregation denies "equality of right." Senator
Edmunds of Vermont, referring to segregated schools, said that there is no "equality of right
when you declare that you will put the black sheep in one place and the white sheep in
another." CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3190 (1872). Senator Ferry of Connecticut
responded with the theory that separate but equal facilities do provide "equality of right." Id.
"The Senator from Vermont insists that it is a denial of equality of right to have different
rooms for the education of the races. I assert that it is not a denial of equality of right." Id.
The distinction between "civil" and "social" equality was pressed more strenuously as the bill
progressed toward passage. Representative Buckner of Missouri charged that "[i]t is not civil
rights but social rights that it seeks to enforce and protect. It is not equality before the law, but
equality in society, that Massachusetts hankers after with such avidity." 2 CONG. REC. 428
(1874). Other supporters of the bill denied that the law related to "social equality."
Representative Rainey, a black Republican from South Carolina, assured moderates that "the
negro is not asking social equality.'' Id. at 344 (1873). Representative Walls stated:
That social equality will follow the concession of equal public rights is about as likely
as that danger will come to the Republic because of a general amnesty. None present
this unreasonable and unnatural argument but those whose political life depends
upon the existence of a baseless prejudice wholly unworthy a civilized country and
disgraceful to the American people.
Id. at 416 (1874). Finally, Representative Butler of Massachusetts, Sumner's ally, said:
Social equality is not effected or affected by law. It can come only from the
voluntary will of each person. Each man can in spite of the law, and does in spite of
the law, choose his own associates.
But it is said we put them into the cars. That men are put into the cars and the
women that are put into the cars I trust are not my associates. There are many white
men and white women whom I should prefer not to associate with who have a right
to ride in the cars. That is not a question of society at all; it is a question of a common
right in a public conveyance.
3 CONG. REC. 940 (1875).
There is a fundamental ambiguity in the message of those who denied the relevance of
"social equality." It was never entirely clear whether Butler, and other supporters of the
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conclude that 1896 was probably not the right time to deem racial segregation in public transportation prohibited by "the people's" constitutional
preferences of self-constraint. 3 2 4

n.

Racial Segregation and "the People" of 1954

Consl'der the interpretive question posed by Brown in 1954. Is it
constitutionally permissible for local majorities to vindicate their racist
preferences in the context of segregation? Superficially, this might appear
identical to the question of timing presented by Plessy in 1896. One might
suggest, however, that everyday political perceptions of racism had
changed by 1954, that racism and segregation were viewed as morally
unacceptable by a greater portion of ''the people" than in 1896.325 Indeed,

statute, were denying that associating in the same car, or school room, implicates "social
equality," or whether they were denying that the Jaw would require integrated facilities, rather
than equal-and permissibly separate-facilities for blacks. Butler's quoted statement is
especially arr.biguous in its reference to men and women. Since it was not uncommon at this
time to find ;eparate railway cars for men and women, see infra note 339, Butler might have
been understood as arguing that providing equal but separate cars or segregated sections
within cars '\Ould not implicate "social equality," but would satisfy statutory requirements.
This ambi~;uity is exacerbated because the debate took place while the following amendment
wa~ pending
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to require hotelkecpers to put whites and blacks into the same rooms, or beds or feed them at the
same table, nor to require that whites and blacks shall be put into the same rooms or
classes at school, or the same boxes or seats at theatres, or the same berths on
steambo its or other vessels, or the same lots in cemeteries.
2 CONG. REc. 405 (1874). It is unclear whether this amendment failed because people viewed
it as an unnecessarily explicit racist blot that did not change the meaning of the statute, or
whether the majority of Congress simply rejected the policy of mandated equal, but
permis'.ibly :;eparate, facilities. See M. Ko:wrrz & T. LESKES, supra note 242, at 90-101
(expressing view that Civil Rights Act of 1875 was intended and understood to prohibit racial
segregation, as well as denial of accommodations based on race).
Furthermore, even if a national majority did prefer to mandate racial integration, one
cannot know whether the difficulties in enforcing this policy against a recalcitrant South would
ha•.e been viC'wed as worth the benefits. If the Supreme Court had allowed the Civil Rights Act
of 1875 to itand intact, see The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18 (1883), the ensuing
experience of enforcing the statute would have suggested the extent to which the national
majority was committed to prohibiting racial segregation. For the distinction between factors
relevant in interpreting "the people's" constitutional values applicable throughout the nation,
and factors r~levant in determining whether those values should be imposed in volatile local
remedial contexts, see infra note 406.
:124. After the Court decided the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). several states enacted
statutes "which practically copied the Civil Rights Bill of 1875." G. STEPHENSON, RACE
D1mNCTIONS IN A\IERICAN LAw 121 (1910). These included Connecticut (1884), Iowa (1884),
New Jersey (1884), Ohio (1884), Colorado (1885), Illinois (1885), Indiana (1885), Massachusetts (1885), Michigan (1885), Minnesota (1885), Nebraska (1885), Rhode Island (1885),
Pennsylvania (1887), Washington (1890), Wisconsin (1895), and California (1897). Id. These
ob~.ervations would or would not have favored Mr. Plessy, depending on one's resolution of
the questions raised and discussed with respect to the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1875
it5c·lf, supra note 323.
325. To ex1mine the constitutional values of"the people" of 1954, one must again confront
the- fundamentally troublesome question plaguing the fourteenth amendment since its
inception: who arc "the people" whose constitutional values are relevant for generating the
equal protection clause's meaning? See supra note 318; infra notes 370, 374; cf. infra note 376.
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Previous analysis has suggested that unless conflicts otherwise resolved by the Civil War are
to be re-solved in court, any decision to include Southern values into the constitutional
equation must be a function of the values of the non-Southern electorate. See id. One might
therefore conclude that for purposes of analyzing the fourteenth amendment's meaning as of
1954-the extent to which "the people's" ideals of self-constraint had to be realized in 1954"the people" of 1954 stiH excluded the Southern electorate. Southern majorities were still
intensely racist; there was no evidence, such as voluntary votes to ratify the fourteenth
amendment, that the Southern electorate endorsed the fourteenth amendment's ideals. Thus,
to have included the Southern electorate of 1954 as part of "the people" whose values count
for interpreting the amendment's contemporary meaning still would have raised doubts as to
whether the fourteenth amendment should have had any legal force at all. Cf supra note 318.
Furthermore, to have included the values of Southern majorities in determining "the people's"
ordinary political values-to have determined whether the ordinary, everyday political pain
"the people" would feel today, in 1954, from being denied the discretion to segregate exceeded
the amount of political pain "the people" of 1868 chose to endure-would have been to place
a significant drag on the rate at which "the people" could have achieved the ideals apparently
articulated in the fourteenth amendment. To have added Southern values regarding racial
segregation would have required accommodating a racism of greater intensity than that
prevalent in the North. Again, however, this method for defining "the people" of 1954 rests
primarily on the results of power-the Civil War-and a concept of inherited rights. See supra
note 318. The validity of these criteria for defining "the people" is an issue open for dispute.
See infra text accompanying notes 455-59.
Thus, for an analyst in 1954, as for one in 1896, the Hamiltonian premise of constitutional
continuity might have suggested that because "the people" of the North in 1868 chose to
exclude Southern participation in articulating the Constitution's racial ideals-toward preventing Southern participation from excessively diluting the North's ideals of self-constraint,
see supra text accompanying notes 257-66, and despite compromising the values of democracy
and community-so the non-Southern electorate in 1954 would make a similar decision to
maintain their commitment to the racial ideal intact, despite continuing to compromise the
values of democracy and community. Accepting this, a decision to accommodate Southern
values would have been a function of practical concerns among the non-Southern electorate
to avoid civil strife. Cf supra notes 320, 323; infra note 406.
I have thus far referred rather glibly to the "Southern electorate" and the "non-Southern
electorate," and assumed from the Hamiltonian premise of constitutional continuity that the
constitutional values of each in 1954 were fairly represented by the choices made in 1868.
Although the Southern electorate might have been defined by those residing in the same
eleven states from 1868 through 1954, see supra note 255, the premise of constitutional
continuity applied in this regional fashion assumes that any movement of people into the
Southern states from the non-Southern states, carrying their non-Southern values with them,
was insignificant. Furthermore, the premise of constitutional continuity assumes that any
categorical additions to the electorate-such as blacks and women-did not have a significant
impact on the continuity of constitutional values from 1868 to 1954. See supra note 122.
These problems are compounded when the premise of constitutional continuity is applied
to the non-Southern electorate, the definition of which after 1868 becomes progressively more
complicated as each new state is added to the Union. The analyst in 1954 would have had to
consider whether the thirteen state electorates added to the Union since 1868 should be
included among "the people" whose values count for inferring the contemporary meaning of
the fourteenth amendment. One would have had to determine whether these new state
electorates more reflected the values of the Southern electorate or the non-Southern
electorate. This might have been done by examining patterns of migration and legislation.
Although facing problems similar to those confronting the analyst in Brown's era who might
have tried to identify the non-Southern electorate of 1954, the analyst today might be better
able to identify the non-Southern electorate of 1987. Today, the analyst might examine the
response of these thirteen new states to the Equal Rights Amendment, which may be a
normative analogue of the fourteenth amendment. See infra text accompanying notes 361-79.
Such an examination suggests that the thirteen states added to the Union since 1868 are far
more dedicated to constitutional ideals of intrinsic human equality, see infra note 373, than are
the Southern states, and somewhat less dedicated to such·ideals of self-constraint than are the
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one might suggest that "the people" were less likely in 1954 than in 1896 to
pursue racist impulses in those contexts originally covered by the equal
protection clause, and that Justice Warren in Brown therefore had a
slronger basis than did Justice Brown in Pless;• to determine that "the
people" '>Vere ready to endure this new source of ordinary political pain
toward serving their constitutional ideal of intrinsic racial equality.326

original Northern states of 1868. Nine of the thirteen states admitted after 1868 voted to ratify
the Equal Rights Amendment (69.2%). In contrast, of the Northern and Southern states
eKisting in 1868, only two of the Southern states (18.2%), but a resounding twenty-three of the
twenty-six Northern states (88.5%) voted to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment. See infra note
376.
Thus, the premise of constitutional continuity is vulnerable because the flow of history, at
lmst ~uperlicially, seems to change as much as it preserves. It must be applied with some
~cmitivity to change-especially to changes in the electorate's composition. In short, the
Hamiltonian premise is just that-a premise, a point of departure. To depart from the premise
b not to refute it, but to refine it. See supra note 122; infra notes 370, 374; cf. infra note 376.
326. There is evidence of voluntary political action at both the local and national levels to
combat raci,m. In 1935, the Congress of Industrial Organizations <CIO) established a
Committee to Abolish Racial Discrimination. See UNITED STATES Co~u.nss10N ON C1v1L RIGHTS,
FltEEDOM TO THE FREE: A CENTl'RY OF EMANCIPATION ll2 (1963) [hereinafter FREEDOM TO THE
F1tEE]. Gras'.> root~ organizations were formed in the late 1930s to challenge racial segregation
in the South. Set' id. at 113. During the course of World War II, racial discrimination in the
army was aoated, but by no means eliminated. See 1d. at ll 4-17. In 1948, President Truman
announced a policy prohibiting segregation in the military. See id. at 127. In 1950, the
President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces
concluded that "a policy of equality of treatment and opportunity will make for a better Army,
Navy, and Air Force. It is right and just." See id. at 126. After earlier efforts to prohibit racial
discrimination by government contractors during World War II, President Truman issued
E:,ecutivc Order l 0,308, articulating such a policy and creating the Committee on Government
Contr.Kt Compliance. See id. at 128.
Pre~ident Truman felt sufficient political pressure to create the President's Committee on
Civil Rightt., which in 1947 recommended a range of federal statutory and administrative
provi~ions "to safeguard the civil rights of the people." See id. at 118-19; s9e also M. KONVITZ &
T. LE~KE~. supra note 242, at 70-72. Ironically, the Committee recommended "enactment by
the state~ of laws guaranteeing equal access to places of public accommodation, broadly
defined, for persons of all races, colors, creeds, and national origins." FREEom1 TO THE FREE,
supra, at 182. But for the Court's invalidation of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, such legislation
might have been unnecessary. See supra note 323. Although eighteen states had enacted such
legislation after the federal Act was invalidated in 1883, only Oregon, in 1953, had since
enacted such legblation before the Brown decision. See M. KON\'ITZ & T. LESKES, supra note 242,
at 157. Th·~ Committee al5o recommended desegregating the District of Columbia, as l
"5ymbol to l)Ur own citizens and to the people of all countries [of] our great tradition of civil
liberty." FRfEDOM ro THE FREE, supra, at 122-23; see abo M. KoNVITZ &T. LESKES,supra note 242,
at 157. In 1953, President Eisenhower declared his commitment to a desegregated District.
honically, rnrly federal efforts to desegregate the District relied on an ordinance enacted in
1873. Sn• Ft\EEDO'.! TO THE FREE, supra, at 123.
One wonders whether the national political view of racism had truly changed since 1896 or
whether tlw nation had simply recaptured the lost spirit of 1875, perhaps thwarted by the
Supreme Court with the Civil Rights Cases. Whatever progress against racism there was before
1054 occun-ed primarily after 1940. It intensified dramatically after Brown, culminating in
l!l64 with sweeping federal civil rights legislation.
Thi5 po~itive response to Brown suggests that 1954 was not too early to impose the pain of
sdf-constraint from a constitutional mandate prohibiting racial segregation-a mandate that
"the people" of 1868 apparentl) were unwilling to endure. Whether 1954 might have been
fifty-eight y.~ars too late-whether the nation would have responded to the Court's coach-like
lead after l '396, as it did after 1954-is, again, a question answerable only with guesses and
speculation. See mfra text accompanying notes 331-34. Indeed, one wonders whether the
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To say that it was more plausible in 1954 than in 1896 to believe that
"the people's" constitutional values extended toward prohibiting racial
segregation,327 however, is not to establish that "the people's" constitutional
values in 1954 were properly interpreted as prohibiting racism in this new
legal context. The latter proposition can be "established" only by determining that "the people" of 1954 suffered less everyday political pain from the
fourteenth amendment's origi,nial mandates than "the people" of 1868 chose
to suffer, and that by having been forced to suffer everyday political pain
in the new context of racial segregation, "the people" of 1954 would have
suffered the same amount of everyday political pain that "the people" of
1868 chose to endure for their constitutional ideal of self-constraint.328 But
because this analysis requires reference to unquantifiable historical and
contemporary variables, a court in 1954, as in 1896 and 1872, could not
have been confident whether it properly has determined that today is, or is
not, the proper time to push constitutional mandates a new step further
toward "the people's" untainted constitutional ideal.329

***
Even accepting its premises, one might find the foregoing analysis
troublesome for at least two reasons. First, the analysis suggests that if
ordinary, everyday political values do not change from those which
prevailed when "the people" made their constitutional choices of selfconstraint, there is no basis for a court to impose additional constitutional
mandates against "the people's" contrary exercise of democratic discretion.
Unless people feel less need to vindicate their racist impulses through law,
unless everyday political majorities are less likely to want to vindicate racist impulses
through law, there is no basis for determining that "the people" today are
willing to endure constitutional constraints on their democratic discretion
that "the people" of 1868 chose not to endure.3 30 In short, evolution of "the
Court in 1954 was truly leading, as a coach should, or was instead following the nation's then
inexorable repudiation of racism.
For more on the proper relationship between the coach-like court and the national
electorate, given a constitutional ideal of self-constraint, see infra text accompanying notes
391-441.
327. The issues posed by Brown and Plessy were different in a manner that cuts the other
way. At least to the Congress of 1875, racial segregation in education was more desirable than
racial segregation in transportation facilites. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 prohibited
discrimination in the latter context, but not in the former. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3, 9 (1883). Earlier drafts of the bill also would have applied to discrimination in education.
These provisions were dropped before the bill was passed. See Avins, The Civil Rights Act of
1875: Some Reflected Light on the Fourteenth Amendment and Public Accommodations, 66 COLUM. L.
REv. 872, 876-77 (1966) (unsuccessful bill provided for equal enjoyment of schools and public
institutions).
328. Thus, if{Pc1 + Pc2 + ... + Pcn}{1868] was equal to {Pei + Pc2 + ... + Pen + Pcn+1}
[1954], then there would have been a basis for determining that 1954 is the proper time for
interpreting the equal protection clause as prohibiting laws enacted because of racism in the
previously uncovered context of racial segregation. Cf supra text accompanying notes 314-20
(same analysis applied to 1896), 302-09 (same analysis applied to 1872).
329. See supra text accompanying notes 308-09, 321.
330. One must distinguish the concepts of ordinary political pain the framers and ratifiers
"chose not to endure" and ordinary political pain the framers and ratifiers "did not choose to
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people's" everyday political values toward the constitutional mandates established by the original understanding is a prerequisite for the development
of new constitutional mandates that go beyond the original understanding
by more effectively vindicating the ideals underlying "the people's" desire
for self-constraint.
Seceond, it is hardly comforting that a court can determine only on the
basis of probabilties and rough evaluations-othenvise known as
guesses 331 -whether the ordinary political values of "the people" have
changed sufficiently to warrant the determination that racist policies,
previously reserved by "the people" as constitutionally permissible, should
today be struck down to vindicate the ideals of the contemporary constitutional electorate. This is especially troublesome when a court must decide
such momentous questions as those presented by Plessy and Brown. 3 32
We might temper any sense of despair with the following two
observations. :j33 First, although the answers might be essentially intuitive

endure." See supra note 59; iefra note 362. The first suggests a real choice, a self-conscious
weighing of values. The second may suggest no choice at all, but absence of deliberation, either
became an issue did not exist at the time (discrimination against blacks on golf courses, see
wpra note 131) or because the issue was not seriously confronted (discrimination based on
nltional origin, see infra note 340).
To make a determination contrary to what the framers and ratifier3 chose not to endur.q
requires some indication that "the people's" values have changed. One might posit that either
"the people's" constitutional values have changed, such that they are willing to endure more
e•Jeryday pain toward sen•ing some ideal, or that their everyday values have changed, such that
the line between constitutional mandates and aspirations must be shifted in order to maintain
intact the o ·iginal commitment to the constitutional ideal. Cf supra text accompanying notes
203-15 (analysis applied to constitutional privacy). The former course contradicts the premise
of comtitutional continuity; the latter course helps to satisfy the premise of constitutional
continuity.
To make some determination about an issue that the framers and ratifiers did not consider
r<"quires th2t one place the issue in the context of what is known about their values from the
choices the) did make. For example, would a prohibition of discrimination based on national
origin have presented a significant amount of ordinary political pain, such that "the people,"
already choosing to endure so much ordinary political pain in the context of racial
dhcrimination, would have chosen not to endure so much more? Would "the people," had
they thought about it, have chosen to prohibit discrimination based on race and national origin
in particular contexts, or to take the progressive step-at-a-time approach with respect to
discrimination ba~ed on national origin as with racial discrimination in those racial contexts
or1gi11al(v chose11 not to be covered by the amendment? Cf iefra text accompanying notes 339-79
(equal prottction and sexism). Perhaps one cannot confidently answer these questions, but by
recognizing their relevance, one at least has criteria for addressing the interpretive problems
posed by issues "the people" did not consider. See infra note 362; cf. Brest, SJ.ipra note 59, at 211
(when lawmaker\ intent is indeterminate, ''the judge's decision must be rooted elsewhere").
331. Cf C:. BL~CK, supra note 56, at 140 ("[e]very great constitutional decision is debatable"), 192 ("[c]onstitutional questions that reach the courts are rarely if ever free from
doubt").
332. The foregoing analysis has not attempted to account for the relative prevalence of
radical anticacists, Perception-Impaired Absolutists, and Balancers. Given the premise of
popular det·~rmination, the extent to which a court should delay the coherent development of
intrinsic racial equality is related to the proportion of Balancers among the framers and
ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment. Only the Balancers would have sought to delay
realization of intrinsic racial equality. See supra text accompanying notes 299-300. This bit of
information is also probably unknowable.
333. The ,5sue might be illuminated by returning to the analogous situation involving Coach
and her ambitious boss. The boss has given Coach ambiguous instructions-"Help me develop
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and speculative, one at least has identified questions that might enrich
analysis. Second, by recognizing the analytical significance of factors related
to the issue of timing-for example, a development of "the people's"
ordinary political values-one might develop new approaches that simultaneously mitigate the potential costs of judicial error and more effectively
serve "the people's" ideals of self-constraint, by making it more likely that
"the people's" everyday political values do, in fact, prowess towar<l their
constitutional ideals. 3 34

b.

Sexism and the Constitutional Values of "the People" -Here and Now

Since 1954, the Supreme Court has determined that any law based on
racial or ethnic prejudice is constitutionally prohibited,335 whether or not
prohibited according to "the people's" original understanding of the
fourteenth amendment. Beyond this, the Court has held that the Constitution prohibits laws enacted because of sexism.336 This doctrinal move-

my physical fitness." This developmental ideal of self.constraint is contrasted with a static ideal
of self-constraint, in which the employer might authorize the coach simply to prevent him
from eating ice cream. See supra notes 289, 308, 309. Coach knows neither how far nor how
quickly to push her boss. To bring this situation closer to that of constitutional analysis, Coach
is unable to ask her boss for additional instructions. Under these circumstances, how will
Coach determine how far and how quickly to push her boss?
Coach has three available resources: the original instructions, any additional knowledge
about the boss' values (such as conversations before the boss' articulation of instructions), and
the boss' current reactions to the coach's particular mandates. If, for example, Coach is fired
in response to an especially stringent order, she should infer either that: she pushed further
or faster than was justified, given the boss' intended original instructions; the boss was not
sincerely dedicated to the original instructions; or contrary to a premise of normative
continuity, the boss' desire for self-constraint has changed. If the boss complains bitterly about
Coach's chosen physical regimen, she might have pushed too hard. If the boss does not
complain at all, it is quite possible that Coach is not pushing hard enough. Thus, even if Coach
is not fired, she cannot be sure that she is doing her job properly. See supra notes 124-25 and
accompanying text.
The uncertainties confronting the coach are even greater for a court placed in a similar role.
The Court has never been fired, although one might interpret failed congressional efforts to
curtail federal court jurisdiction and Franklin Roosevelt's failed Court-packing plan as
attempts to do just that. In order to determine whether it is correctly pursuing "the people's"
values of self-constraint, the Court is left with evaluating the extent of resistance, acquiescence,
and acceptance that a decision might generate. Where constraint is necessary, its imposition is
painful. One would expect that people suffering pain in the everyday political process would
manifest that pain with political dissent and resistance, even when the Court is properly
enforcing "the people's" own constitutional ideals of self-constraint. One must emphasize that
the issue concerns when constitutional principle should be articulated by a court as enforceable
against contrary democratic choices. The relevant quantum of dissatisfaction and resistance is
that felt by the entire electorate of "the people" in ordinary politics, and the point of reference
is the unknowable quantum of pain that "the people" of 1868 chose to endure. Intense pockets
of local resistance to a principle more acceptable by the rest of the population might be
determinative for remedial questions, but they are not relevant for the declaration of generally
applicable constitutional principle. See infra note 406.
334. See infra text accompanying notes 391-441.
335. See supra note 243.
336. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). Hogan involved a
challenge to the admissions policy of a state nursing school. In holding that the policy of
excluding men was gender discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause, Justice
O'Connor, for the majority, emphasized that governmental purposes or policies reflecting
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sexism, 340 one is left without direct evidence that "the people" today adhere
to such a constitutional ideal.341
This is where the analysis of interpretivists such as Raoul Berger,
Henry Monaghan, and Justice Rehnquist ends. But having suggested a goal
of identifying the constitutional values of "the people" today, 342 and that
past constitutional choices are direct evidence of present constitutional
values based on a premise of constitutional continuity,343 one can view the
interpretivist approach from a fresh perspective.
One might begin by considering what an interpretation of equal
protection that prohibits all-and only-governmental actions based on
racial or ethnic prejudice344 would imply about contemporary constitutional
340. Indeed, even the issue of discrimination based on national origin was not central in
debates about the equal protection clause. Discrimination against racial groups other than
blacks was not an issue of particular concern. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in a case that
recognized special equal protection concern for traits other than race or ethnicity,justified the
application of the equal protection clause to races other than blacks, and to traits other than
race (national origin) on the basis of logic. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 780 (1977).
He stated:
The essential problem of the Equal Protection Clause is ... determining where the
courts are to look for guidance in defining "equal" as that word is used in the
Fourteenth Amendment. Since the Amendment grew out of the Civil War and the
freeing of the slaves, the core prohibition was early held to be aimed at the protection
of blacks. If race was an invalid sorting tool where blacks were concerned, it followed
logically that it should not be valid where other races were concerned either. A logical,
though not inexorable, next step, was the extension of the protection to prohibit
'
classifications based on national origin.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Justice Rehnquist here acknowledges that the logical
extension of some norm may be, but is not necessarily, appropriate for analyzing who is covered
by the equal protection clause and for determining the extent of that protection.
Justice Rehnquist's analysis is incomplete on two grounds. First, he employs the method of
logic without any normative predicate. Justice Rehnquist never identifies what value is being
logically extended from race to national origin. To say that race is logically like national origin,
one must identify the purposes of comparison. Race may well be logically equivalent to
national origin when considered in the context of a value that rejects normative judgments
about people based on characteristics of birth or chance. Race, however, is not the logical
equivalent of national origin when considered in the context of a Hitlerian norm advocating
that people of one biological stock join together to form a great new nation.
Second, Justice Rehnquist never presents an analysis for determining when the logical
implications of a value are properly pursued, and when they are not. Such is a task undertaken
by this Article.
341. Concluding that "the people" of 1868 intended eventually to reach sexism, as well as
racism, based simply on the general language of the fourteenth amendment, elevates form
over substance. Cf supra text accompanying notes 257-66. This conclusion also substitutes
word games for analysis of human motivation, which should be at the center of constitutional

an;~:~~nsideration of the interpretive possibilities that would be posed if"the people" of 1868
had specified race, see infra note 362.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 95-109.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 114-23.
344. I recognize, of course, that even apart from gender discrimination, the equal protection
clause has been interpreted as prohibiting more than all laws enacted because of racial and
ethnic prejudice. Those other contexts, such as "substantive equal protection" for speech
interests, see, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) ("[U]nder the Equal Protection
Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a
forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less
favored or more controversial views."), involve values unrelated to the racial judgments that
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values. 34 :; As earlier suggested, 346 one has three categories of evidence that
can be quite helpful for inferring present constitutional values, given the
premise of constitutional continuity: 347 first, the constitutional choices of
the past; second, the context of everyday political values in which those
choices were made; and third, the context of everyday political values
today. Our examination of the first two categories has suggested that
although "the people" of the North in 1868 were clearly concerned about
constraining the political discretion of the racist South, they apparently
acted with a motive of self-constraint as well, expressing an aspiration to
reach toward an untainted ideal of intrinsic racial equality, despite their
own intense racism. 348 Thus, "the people" of the North understood the
fourteenth amendment as originally prohibiting racial discrimination in
particular contexts, yet expressed that understanding with broad and
general language. 349 One can now turn to the third variable-the context of
ordinary political values today.
The evolution of local, state, and national legislation-reflecting
everyday political values-suggests that there has been a radical change in
the political status of racism since 1954. Most of contemporary society
agree, even in the forums of rough and dirty everyday politics, that law
should not reflect racist attitudes. 350 National majorities, through Congress.
have enacted federal legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in many
contexts.3 51 Most states and localities do not need constitutional constrainu.
lwve been a focus of this Article. Indeed, one might suggest that "substantive equal protection"
is not a fum tion of the equal protection clause itself, but instead a function of values derived
from other specific constitutional contexts-for example, as in Mosley, the first amendment. See
zd.
"Rationality review" under the equal protection clause-a doctrine holding that laws must
have a rational relationship to permissible ends-also reaches well beyond the contexts of
racial and ethnic prejudice, but is profitably understood not as a true constitutional doctrine
at all, but a promajoritarian doctrine that encourages legislatures either to define their
oqjectives honestly, or to pursue their honestly defined objectives more efficiently. See, e.g.,
Linde, Due l'roces1 of LaUomaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197, 216 (1976) (responsible lawmaking may
be premise of rationality review). In any event, my reference to an interpretation of the equal
protection clause as prohibiting all-and only-laws enacted because of racial and ethnic
prejudice should be viewed in the context of those values underlying the racial judgments
mJde by "th·~ people" of 1868. Sfe supra text accompanying notes 248-309. Cf supra note 340.
345. For Co)nsiderations relevant for identifying "the people" of 1987 whose values count for
inferring the fourteenth amendment's contemporary meaning, see infra note 370.
346. See rnj1ra text accompanying notes 9.5-166.
347. &,, rn/1ra text accompanying notes 162-66.
3·18 . .'fre ,,11pra text accompanying notes 2.57-66.
:149. See supra text accompanying notes 260-66.
'150. Thus, the question of timing posed by Brown, if presented today, would be easier to
answer than it wa~ in 1954. The political context has changed, such that the vast bulk of the
nation would feel little or no pain of self-constraint by being denied the political discretion to
pursue racism through law. Indeed, delaying the Brown decision until I 987 would more likely
have been a woeful failure to vindicate "the people's" ideals of self-constraint than an excessive
in1rmion on discretion that they wanted to retain. One might suggest, however, that Brown
itsdf played a crucial role in fostering the near universal, contemporary political view that
racism is an unacceptable predicate for laws. For further discussion about the relationship
between judicial decrees and the evolution of public values, see infra text accompanying notes
391-441.
351. In 1957, Congress enacted The Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat.
634 (Hl57) (.:odified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975-197.Je (1982,l), which established the
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on their democratic discretion so far as racism is concerned, because most
state and local political majorities today apparently are comprised of people
who would not likely seek to vindicate racist impulses through law. 352
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. See id. at § lOI(a). The Act also created the Civil Rights
Division in the Department of Justice. See id. at § 111 ~ see also SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE SENATE Cm!M. ON THE JUDICIARY, 98TH CONG., 2o SESs., FEDERAL CIVIL
RIGHTS LAWS: A SOURCEBOOK 14 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
In 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241
(1964). Title II prohibited discrimination based on "race, color, religion, or national origin" in
various places of public accommodation. Id. at tit. 2, 78 Stat. at 243 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1982)). Title III authorized the Attorney General to institute legal
proceedings when people were denied the equal use of any public facility on the basis of race,
religion or national origin. Id. at tit. 3, 78 Stat at 246 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000b to 2000b-6 (1982)). Title IV prohibited discrimination based on "race, color, religion, or
national origin" in all public schools, and schools supported with government funds. Id. at tit.
4, 78 Stat at 244 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c to 2000c-9 (1982)) Title VI
prohibited discrimination based on "race, color, or national origin" in "any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." Id. at tit. 6, 78 Stat. at 252 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-5 (1982)) Thus, with Titles II, III, IV, and VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the ordinary political values of the nation had turned against racial segregationwhich, of course, was a significant realm of racism that the framers and ratifiers of 1868
apparently wanted to reserve from the fourteenth amendment's mandates. See supra text
accompanying notes 239-44. Title VII prohibited employment discrimination based on "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. at tit. 7, 78 Stat. at 255 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)).
In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-1 IO, 79 Stat. 437,
which prohibited discrimination based on "race or color," Id. at § 2, 79 Stat. at 437 (codified
as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-l (1982)), and, as amended in 1975, discrimination
based on language, in the context of voting, see Act of August 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, §
203, 89 Stat 400, 401 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f) (1982)). Thus, another significant area
that "the people" of 1868 wanted to reserve for ordinary local discretion was addressed by the
everyday political values of a national congressional majority.
In 1968, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 28 and 42 U.S.C.), which prohibited
discrimination based on "race, color, religion, or national origin" in the sale, lease, or financing
ofresidential property. See id. at§§ 801-819, 82 Stat. at 83 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3606). In 1974 the statute was amended to prohibit discrimination based on sex as
well. See Act of August 22, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 729 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
3604-3603).
Let me emphasize that reference to this record of national legislation is not meant to deny
that racism continues to infect a substantial portion of the American population. See, e.g.,
McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1781 (1987) (statistical evidence of racism in imposing
death penality insufficient basis for invalidating sentence imposed in particular case). The
significant point, however, is that it no longer infects a majority of the electorate to such an
extent that the electorate wants to vindicate racist impulses through law. To the contrary, the
ordinary political values of national majorities seek to thwart racism, not to vindicate it.
352. Quite the contrary, most states have enacted their own statutes prohibiting racist
discrimination in many private contexts. All fifty states, for example, have enacted legislation
prohibiting racial discrimination in employment. See SouRCEBOOK, supra note 351, at 139-42.
Thirty states "have been determined by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
to have fair housing laws that provide rights and remedies 'substantially equivalent' to those
provided by title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 [42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619]." Id. at 142-43.
The difference in the extent of consensus between the contexts of employment and housing
may reflect remnants of the distinction between "civil" and "social equality." See supra text
accompanying notes 276-84. Regardless of this apparent difference, it is clear that a national
majority views racial discrimination in the contexts of employment and housing as immoral, or
at least undesirable, and that the members of that national majority have expressed their views
both together in Congress, see supra note 351, and separately in their respective states. For
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Becavse racism is so unpopular today in ordinary politics, because so
many states and localities are unlikely today to enact statutes because of
racism, and because Congress has prohibited racial discrimination in contexts that g;o well beyond those covered by the equal protection clause, one
might condude that an interpretation of the equal protection clause as
prohibitinH all-and only 353-laws enacted because of racial and ethnic
prejudice would invalidate little, or nothing, that Congress would not
choose to prohibit, and therefore would impose little or no everyday political
pain on "the people" today. If this is true, an interpretation of the equal
protection clause as prohibiting all-and only 354 -laws enacted because of
racial and ethnic prejudice would coincide more with a desire among "the
people" to impose their everyday political values on dissenting localitie:;:iG:;_localities in which racism is still a majoritarian impulse-than with
a constitutional desire among "the people" for self-constraint. 356
What follows from this is significant. The meaning of equal protection
as defined by Berger, Monaghan, and Rehnquist is implicitly predicated on
a matrix of putative contemporary constitutional values that is radically
different from the constitutional intent apparently manifested by "the
people" of 1868. From a painful and active provision for self-constraint, the
fourteenth amendment in 1987, as interpreted by the "interpretivists," has
become a comfortable and passive affirmation of ordinary political values
prevailing i:hroughout the nation-values that could today be as effectively
vindicated through authorizing Congress to legislate.357 Thus, these
"interpretivists," in the name of preserving the constitutional values of "the
people" and adhering to the meaning of past choices, may have reconstructed
society's fundamental constitutional motivation. According to the implications of "interpretivist" judgment, constitutionally rooted moral growth has
stopped because the motivational foundation of constitutional norms has
changed-from self-constraint to simply constraining the offensive political
discretion of others.358
This potentially significant discontinuity between the value choices
made by "the people" of 1868 and the constitutional values of the modern
era implicit in "interpretivist" judgments suggests that Berger, Monaghan,
~om~ pcr5pcctive on the manner in which state laws regarding race have evolved from
victimization to protection during the mid-twentieth century, see, e.g., M. KoNVITZ & T.
Lt.~ta.s, supra note 242, at 155-272 (1961) (evolution of state laws prohibiting racial discrimination during the mid-twentieth century); c. MAGNCM, THE LEGAL STATCS OF THE NEGRO (1940):
STA rF.s' LAws oN RAc.E AND COLOR (P. Murray ed. 1950); THE FIFTY STATES REPORT, Srn~nTTED TO
THE CmtMISSICN ON CIVIL RIGHTS 8) THE STATE ADVISORY Co~!MITTEES (1961).
353. Cf. supra note 344.

354./d.
355. Cf. supra note 266.
356. Cf. mpra text accompanying notes 149-56, 216-32, 266.
357. Sre sujira text accompanying notes 67-90, 153-56; notes 154, 156; cf. supra note 266.
358. Of course, if passage of the fourteenth amendment were not motivated by a desire for
\clf-comtraint, cf. ,,upra text accompanying notes 257-266, the answers provided by the
Berger-~lonaghan-Rehnquist approach would be more supportable. These analysts, however,
might be uncomfortable inferring from the motive of constraining others that the Court, in
enforcing the equal protection clause, is-or ~hould be-serving as Congress' quasi-legislative
from. Scr supm notes 156, 166, 266.
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and Rehnquist may have failed their premises.359 These "interpretivists"
may have failed by confusing continuity of form with continuity of
substance-by confusing continuity of language and a continuity of values,
which language helps to express. One denies meaningful continuity-a
continuity of constitutional values-by "interpretation" that changes the
basic motivation of "the people" from the aspirational self-sacrifice of
self-constraint to the inert self-satisfaction of national legislative discretion. s6o
Yet, one poses a difficult problem by positing that the fundamental
motive of self-constraint has not changed, and by recognizing that an equal
protection clause interpreted as prohibiting only laws based on racism
cannot reflect a motive of self-constraint among "the people" today. The
Hamiltonian premise of constitutional continuity suggests that some value
should be deemed to maintain the constitutional tension of
self-constraint. 3 61 Should that value be a constitutional concern for laws
based on sexism?362

359. "[T]he principal anti-activist argument is that the Constitution confers no judicial
power to revise it." Berger, supra note 5, at 31.
360. See supra note 208. One might conceive of the basic motivation in 1868-an ideal of
self-constraint-as represented by a rubber band, tensely pulling against tempting but
disfavored contrary political impulses. Once the goal of moral development has been reached,
in the sense that today "the people," by and large, are far less racist than in 1868, the rubber
band relaxes. The tension is gone. If the court does not stretch the rubber band again, exerting
an additional source of tension against everyday political preferences, the court must posit that
the fundamental constitutional intent of "the people" has drastically changed, thereby
contravening the premise of constitutional continuity.
·
361. See supra note 209. After all, if "the people" of 1868 did choose to endure everyday
political pain toward serving a constitutional ideal, Pt (1868), and if "the people" of 1987 feel
no ordinary political pain from the equal protection clause interpreted as prohibiting all-and
only-laws enacted because of racism, {Pc1 + ... + Pcn+I + ... + Pcallracism}. the premise
of constitutional continuity is not satisfied unless the clause is interpreted as reflecting a more
fundamental value, directly underlying the constitutional ideal as originally conceived, see infra
text accompanying notes 362-68, capable of generating new contexts, logically related to the
original contexts, in which the denial of ordinary democratic discretion will engender a pain
of self-constraint equal to that which "the people" of 1868 chose to endure, Pt (1868). CJ. infra
note 374.
One might, however, question the premise of constitutional continuity applied to circumstances so far removed from those in which the constitutional choices of 1868 were made. CJ.
supra notes 122, 325; infra notes 370, 374, 376.
362. Commentators have erected a distinction between the framers' intent not to prohibit
something, and the absence of an intent to prohibit something-the first reflecting a choice
with force, to the extent that any constitutional choice has force, and the latter reflecting either
the choice to leave the matter to other decisionmakers (most likely legislators), or the absence
of consideration, hence the absence of choice altogether. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 24, at
485-87; Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 Omo ST. L.J. 261,
299-300 (1981). Implicit in such discussions is the view that if the framers and ratifiers
intended not to prohibit something, such a choice presumably would be binding on judicial
interpretation today. See Perry, supra at 419. CJ. supra notes 59, 330.
The analysis presented by this Article suggests tfiat the framers' and ratifiers' choice not to
prohibit something does not necessarily foreclose a subsequent interpretation holding that
"something" to be constitutionally prohibited. The issue depends on a determination of why a
given subject was left for democratic discretion. If, to use Perry's example, "the people"
intended the Constitution to require that blacks and whites be provided with equal schools, but
also decided to leave segregated schools as a matter for local discretion because "the people"
were willing to endure only a certain amount of the ordinary political pain, their choice to
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To consider this question, one must return to the structure of
values that past constitutional choices imply and that the
Hamiltonian premise makes relevant to modern political combat. A motive
of self-constraint implies a desire to pursue the coherent implications of
some ideal to a greater extent than "the people" would choose in everyday
congressional politics. 363 It implies a competition between the quick and
intense gi:atification of ordinary politics and a fragile aspiration to attain
constitutional ideals through choices of self-constraint.
Thus, we saw earlier that the value scheme among those who supported the fourteenth amendment probably reflected competition between
an ideal of intrinsic racial equality and the alluring emotion of racism. 3 6 4
We also saw that the central issue of debate in 1868-how much discrimination the Constitution would prohibit-was a function of the relative
weights that people we called Balancers placed on these competing
concerns.t 65 In determining which of these competing values was to prevail
in particular contexts, "the people" of 1868 struck a balance between their
constitutional ideal of self-constraint and their intense emotions of racism.
The change in political values between 1868 and 1987, the substantial
mitigation of intense racism in "the people's" everyday politics, requires
maintaining this balance of self-constraint if the Hamiltonian premise of
constitututional continuity is to be satisfied.366 To recreate this balance, one
must com.ider both competing sides-that which motivates the constitutional ideal, and that which motivates the political reservations.
Pursuing sexism through the law has potential constitutional significance if sexism is logically related to "the people's" value that deems racism
morally unacceptable. 367 If one believes that characteristics of birth should
not be the basis for prescriptive judgments about people, and that it is
tlwrefore wrong to discriminate against black people based on a judgment
that blackness establishes something prescriptively distinct about people,
then one should recognize that discriminating against people based on a
view that gender establishes something prescriptively distinct about people
is similarly problematic. Indeed, if one considers only the constitutional
value that people should not be treated differently based on moral
competin1~

exi:mpt segregated schools from the constitutional mandate would become an open question
if, and when, "the people" no longer felt ordinary political pain from being constitutionally
required to provide blacks with equal schools-if, in other words, it would be unthinkable in
ordinary poJ,tics to deny blacks equal-yet separate-schools. See Perry, su,ln"a at 419.
This sort c.f inquiry, questioning even affirmative choices to exempt certain activities from
constitutional prohibition, is inevitable once one accepts that the goal of constitutional analysis
must be to identify the constitutional preferences of "the people" today, that constitutional
re~trictions C•n local discretion reflect a motive of self-constraint, and that past choices are
analytically 5ignficant as evidence of present values of self-constraint. Thus, even if "the
people" of I.S68 had specified that the equal protection clause was intended not to prohibit
la\'Js based on sexism, it would not necessarily contravene their wishes, or in Perry's words, it
would not necessarily be "contraconstitutional," id., to prohibit laws enacted because of sexism,
giv·~n the changed national political climate.
:163. See .1u,ln"a text accompanying notes 163-66, 257-66.
!164. See su,IJra text accompanying notes 267-98.
!165. See su,11ra text accompanying notes 287-300.
!166. See su,IJra note 209.
367. See su,IJra text accompanying notes 267-86.
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judgments about characteristics of birth, then racism and sexism-notions
that some people, because black (or women), are unfit to do certain things
that other people, because white (or men), are fit to do-are indistinguishable, just as candy and apples are indistinguishable with respect to the value
of "something sweet."368 Thus, with respect to the constitutional side of the
balance, racism and sexism are logical equivalents.
Establishing a logical relationship is the first necessary analytical step.
Examining only the constitutional ideal, however, is not enough. This
Article has stressed that judicial pursuit of normative coherence potentially
thwarts the political compromises that othenvise would be made at the
constitutional level. Thus, although both racism and sexism are manifestations of the same evil-assigning moral status to individuals based on
characteristics of birth-it is not necessarily true that because "the people"
of 1868 chose to forgo the emotion of racism motivated by an ideal of
intrinsic human equality, 3 6 9 "the people" of 1987 would choose to forgo the
emotion of sexism for the sake of that same ideal.370 One must, therefore,
368. See supra text accompanying notes 287-88.
369. See infra note 373.
370. One again must confront the difficult question of identifying "the people" today whose
values are relevant for inferring the meaning of the equal protection clause. Previous analysis
suggested that because the non-Southern electorate of 1868 apparently determined that
notions of democracy and community could be compromised for their ideals of racial equality,
see supra text accompanying notes 248-56, one might infer from the premise of constitutional
continuity that if the Southern electorate continued to threaten "the people's" ideals of
equality, "the people" of 1896 and 1954, as those of 1868, would have continued to believe,
perhaps reluctantly, that the recalcitrant Southern majority still should not have been allowed
to shape the nation's constitutional ideals relevant to the fourteenth amendment. See supra
notes 318, 325. For consideration of difficulties in identifying the non-Southern electorate of
1954, and analogously, of 1987, see supra note 325.
If, however, tlie severe cleavage between Northern and Southern values relating to human
equality has healed by 1987, there would be no reason for the non-Southern electorate to
determine today that the Southern electorate should remain excluded from "the people"
whose values count for defining the fourteenth amendment's contemporary meaning. Some
might suggest that at least with respect to everyday political values regarding racism, the South
is approaching parity with the rest of the nation. Cf supra note 352. Nevertheless, even if this
accurately characterizes the Southern electorate's ordinary, everyday political values regarding
racism, there is no evidence that the Southern electorate holds ideals of intrinsic human
equality, see infra note 373, with a motive ofself-constraint, simply because the Southern electorate
did not voluntarily ratify the fourteenth amendment. See supra text accompanying notes
248-256.
Indeed, the Southern electorate's pattern of rejecting the Equal Rights Amendment was
virtually identical to its pattern of rejecting the fourteenth amendment before the Southern
governments were reconstructed. While only one of eleven Southern states (9.1 %) ratified the
fourteenth amendment before radical reconstruction (Tennessee), only two of eleven Southern states (18.2%) ratified the Equal Rights Amendment (Tennessee and Texas). See infra note
376. In contrast, while twenty-two of the twenty-si.x non-Southern states voted to ratify the
fourteenth amendment (84.6%), thirty-two of the thirty-nine non-Southern states-including
those admitted after 1868-voted to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment (82.0%). Thus, the
cleavage today between the Southern states and the rest of the nation about ideals of gender
equality is severe-18.2% of the South supporting such values of self-constraint versus 82% of
the remaining states-although the cleavage is somewhat less severe than it was in 1868 over
the issue of racial equality-9.1 % of Southern states supporting such values versus 84.6% of
the remaining states. See supra note 255.
Whether the cleavage remaining today between the South and the rest of the nation is
sufficiently severe to induce the non-Southern electorate, see supra note 325, to continue the
Southern electorate's exclusion from "the people" relevant to the fourteenth amendment
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turn to the side of political reservation in the constitutional equation371 the comp•eting values that limit the extent to which "the people" are willing
to endure· the everyday political pain of self-constraint for the sake of an
elusive ideal. 372
If sexist laws are to be deemed constitutionally insignificant today,
gfrJen the premise of constitutional continuity, it must be because the emotion of
sexism-unlike racism in 1868-outweighs the constitutional ideal, either
because sexism is more important to "the people" of 1987 than racism was
to "the people" of 1868, or because the ideal of intrinsic human equality373
is less important to "the people" of 1987 than it was to "the people" of 1868.
One can plausibly suggest that "the people" of 1987 do not value their
emotions of sexism more than "the people" of 1868 valued their emotions
of racism. The idea that women should not emerge from the home into the
world at large-or that men should not pass them in the other directionis widely held and emotionally rooted. But this idea is rarely held with the
violent intensity that marked pervasive notions of proper social distinction~
among the races in the mid-nineteenth century. Thus, assuming that "the
people" of 181)8 expressed a constitutional ideal ultimately prohibiting all
governmental actions based on racism, that sexism today is generally felt
with no more intensity than that underlying racism in 1868, and that racism
and sexism are logically equivalent with respect to the relevant ideal of
self-constraint, one might conclude, applying the Hamiltonian premise of
constitutional continuity, that "the people" of 1987 adhere to an ideal of
intrinsic sexual equality, ultimately prohibiting all governmental actions
based on :)exism.374
cannot be answered. One knows only that the degree of cleavage in 1868, apparently
somewhat gieater than the degree of cleavage today, was important enough to the victorious
Northern electorate to compromise notions of democracy and community. Ironically, and
re\'ealingly, this analysis suggests the principle that the South can regain its status among "the
people" for ,Jurposes of equal protection-at least so far as the non-Southern constitutional
electorate h concerned-only when its contribution to public values makes little difference. Cf
i11j1a note 376.
:~71. The' constitutional equation," again, is the following:
[ord. nt'l pref5. : const'I choices](past) II [ord. nt'I prefs. : const'I choices](pres.)
St'c supra noH~ 164. In view of the peculiar circumstances in which the fourteenth amendment
was ratified, we have modified the constitutional equation as reflecting the tension between the
constitutional ideals and the ordinary political values of "the people" of the non-Southern
electorate. S1e supra note 306.
!172. This task has been neglected by such philosophy-oriented analysts as Ronald Dworkin
and David Richards.
!173. The phrase "instrimic human equality" is used simply as a label for the notion that it
h wrong to treat people as po5sessing different moral worth or different social roles based on
prescriptive judgments about characteristics of birth. See supra text accompanying notes
36i-372.
:174. The shift to a deeper level of values-intrinsic huma11 equality a» the norm motivating
"the people's" concern for intrinsic racial equality in 1868-adds a new layer of vulnerability
to the premi~e of wnstitutional continuity. Cf supra notes 122, 325, 373. There may have been
something ~i:ecial about the context in which racism was evaluated in 1868. The black victims
of racism in the mid-nineteenth century suffered a degree of deprivation since unmatched by
other racial or ethnic groups, and by those victimized by sexism. One might suggest, therefore,
that both the conscquence5 of their racism, and the intrinsic immorality of their racism, were
elements of the normative calculus among "the people" of 1868.
Thi5 may be true, cf. mfra note 380, ana one's view of whether "the people" of 1868 were
concerned al: out the intrinsic immorality of racism alone, or in conjunction with its particu
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The narrow failure of the Equal Rights Amendment, however, raises
questions about the manner in which "the people" of 1987 adhere to their
competing concerns for intrinsic human equality and their emotion of
sexism-indeed, whether a concern for intrinsic human equality is less
important to "the people" of 1987 tharl it was to "the people" of 1868. Some
might argue that "the people" of 1987, because they did not ratify the Equal
Rights Amem!ment, hold no ideal of self-constraint with respect to sexism.
This argument is vulnerable. Although it is true that the requirements of
article V were not satisfied during the attempt to ratify the ERA-thirty-five
rather than the required thirty-eight states voted to ratify-the fact that
thirty-five states did vote to ratify375 hardly suggests that "the people" are
uncommitted to a constitutional ideal of intrinsic sexual equality. Indeed,
given the fourteenth amendment's own problematic relationship to article
V, the "failure" to satisfy article Vin ratifying the Equal Rights Amendment
has even less potential to rebut the Hamiltonian premise of constitutional
continuity with respect to the contemporary meaning of the equal protection
clause. 376
larly atrocious effects, might shape one's evaluation of the contemporary constitutional
significance of sexism. It is important to note, however, that this variation in the analysis uses
the premise of constitutional continuity. It simply characterizes the constitutional values and
choices of 1868 somewhat differently from that suggested in the text.
Nevertheless, the premise of constitutional continuity is vulnerable because values do
change. Everyday poltical values clearly have changed since 1868. Cf supra note 122. There is
no reason that constitutional values cannot change as well. Indeed, the article V amendment
process presupposes that constitutional values can change through time. Cf supra text
accompanying notes 103-07. Despite the manifest imperfection of the Hamiltonian premise,
one is left with other options that may be more imperfect-strict (or closed) interpretivism and
a concomitant Jeffersonian rejection of self-constraint, see supra text accompanying notes
129-39; unguided lax (or open) interpretivism, see supra text accompanying notes 140-44; or
Bruce Ackerman's "structural amendment," see supra note 233. Excessive constitutional politics
vitiates the psychology of special choicemaking otherwise implicit in constitutional judgments;
sparsely sporadic constitutional politics strains the courts' interpretive capabilities as the
premise of constitutional continuity is stretched tenuously thin through time. At issue is how
one can best approach an impossible ideal_:the identification and protection of "the people's"
fragile values of sc;lf-constraint. See supra note 122.
For significant evidence supporting the premise of constitutional continuity, see infra note
376.
375. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 668 (11th ed. 1985) (Congress extended
ratification period and unsuccessfully attempted to reintroduce ERA); Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 393 ( 1983)
(discussing extension of ratification period and state attempts at revision of prior approval).
One must, indeed, consider the manner in which the formal requirements of anicle V
should govern the meaning of a failed amendment process. This requires addressing questions
considered supra text accompanying notes 95-166, such as whether identifying past or present
constitutional values is the theoretically precise goal of constitutional analysis; why one
examines past constitutional choices; and whether "the people" today want the article V
requirements to be viewed as rigidly precluding consideration of any constitutional politics
unless the process of ratification is pursued toward a positive conclusion. See supra note 233.
In any event, anicle Vis a rule of recognition, and as such, is not selfjustifying. See Ackerman,
supra note 33, at 1057-70 (as Constitutional Convention of 1787 revised preexisting formal
procedures, future Conventions might modify article V formalities); Dworkin, supra note 24,
at 496 (stressing importance of general constitutional intent over specific intent of framers).
376. It is important to emphasize that the question concerns how the failed Equal Rights
Amendment should affect interpretation of the equal protection clause. Two aspects of this
question must b~ considered: first, the relationship between the Southern electorate and the
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It may be more plausible to suggest that the failure of the Equal Rights
Amendment was a consequence of the relatively limited extent to which
modern Balancers are willing to endure the pain of self-constraint for
intrinsic ~;exual equality.377 Sexism, in some contexts, may simply be too

non-Southern electorate in 1987; and second, the premise of constitutional continuity a~
applied to the constitutional choices of 1868.
One will recall that the eleven Southern states, with the possible exception of Tennessee, did
not voluntarily ratify the fourteenth amendment. Rather, the Northern electorate reconstructed the Southern states' governments, and instructed them to ratify the amendment as a
condition for readmission to the Union. See rupra text accompanying 250-254. Thus, assuming
that Tenne~.see did voluntarily ratify the fourteenth amendment, one of eleven Southern
states chose to ratify (9%). Apart from recissions, twenty-two of the twenty-si.\': non-Southern
states voted to ratify the fourteenth amendment (84.6%). See supra note 255.
This pattern among the thirty-seven states that considered the fourteenth amendment is
remarkably similar to the decisions these same states made about the Equal Rights Amendment. Among the eleven Southern states, onl)' two-Tennessee (again) and Texas-voted to
ratify the Equal Rights Amendment (18%). See THE CoNSTITL"TION OF THE UNITED STATES or
A~IERICA, A~'ALYSI~ AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1972); 1980
Supplement, S. Doc. No. 64, 96th Cong. 2d. Sess. SI (1980). Among the twenty-Si.\':
non-Southern states from 1868, twent)'·three voted to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment
(88.5%), one more than the 1mmber of states tluit voted to rati.f)' the fourteenth amendment in 1868. Id.
Three non-Southern states that voted to ratify the fourteenth amendment (Illinois, Nevada,
and Missouri), see supra note 255, did not vote to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment, id., and
three non-Southern states that rejected the fourteenth amendment (Kentucky, Delaware, and
Maryland) voted to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment, id. California, which took no action
on the fourteenth amendment, voted to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment, id.
Of the th•rteen states admitted after the ratification of the fourteenth amendment, nine
(Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Washington) voted to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment (69.2%), and four (Arizona,
O!Jahoma, Utah, and Wyoming) did not vote to ratify the Amendment (30.8%). Id. Thus, the
Equal Rights Amendment was ratified by thirty-two of the thirty-nine non-Southern states
(82.05{ ), and by only two of the eleven Southern states (18.2%).
These fac1s suggest several intriguing points for analysis. First, one can confidently infer a
present cleavage about issues of gender equality between those thirty-seven states that fought
the Civil War and struggled over the fourteenth amendment. Second, the cleavage today
among thes<· state5 is nearly identical to their cleavage over racial equality in 1868. Third, if it
is true that the equal protection clause and the Equal Rights Amendment have been motivated
by the same fundamental value of "intrinsic human equality," see supra note 373, one might
infer from Me first two points strong evidence that the premise of constitutional continuity,
despite its vulnerabilities, 5ee supra notes 122, 374, may be confirmed.
Even accepting this evidence as support for the Hamiltonian premise, one still must identify
"the people' of 1987 whose values count for inferring the fourteenth amendment's contemporary meaning. See supra note 370; cf. supra notes 306, 318, 325.
377. Ther·~ was a fear, for example, that the proposed amendment would prohibit "separate
but equal" i:ublic bathrooms. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 375, at 669 n.15. Ruth Ginsberg's
re»ponse to 1:his argument is similar to arguments made in 1868, opposing the application of
the equal protection clause to racial segregation. See supra note 284. "Separate places to
&;robe, sleep, perform personal bodily functions are permitted, in some situations required,
by regard for individual privacy. Individual privacy, a right of constitutional dimension, is
appropriately harmonized with the equality principle." G. GUNTHER, supra note 375, at 669
n.15 (quoting Ginsburg, The Fear of the Equal Rights Amendment, The Washington Post, Apr. 7,
1975, at A21, col. l); see also Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment:
.11 Comtitutw.zal Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE LJ. 871, 900-02 (1971) (right to
privacy would ensure "seearate but equal" bathrooms after passage of ERA).
Of course, this "privacy' label was a mask for sexism. The issue was not privacy, in the sense
that individuals need insulation from other individuals. The issue was that people feel
dif,comfort in associating with people of the other sex under circumstances in which they feel
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important to too many people to forgo at this time.3 78 Thus, like their racist
counterparts of 1868, who wanted to retain the discretion to pursue their
racism in social contexts despite their intellectual ideal of intrinsic racial
equality, "the people" of 1987 also seem to be committed to competing
concerns-the ideal of intrinsic sexual equality and the insistent emotion of
sexism. Thus, rather than rebut the Hamiltonian premise of constitutional
continuity, this nation's struggle with the Equal Rights Amendment can
serve as confirmation.379
If the Court has properly extended the meaning of equal protection to
embrace the ideal of ultimately prohibiting all governmental actions based
on sexism, 380 one is still left with the vexing problem of timing. When should
perfectly comfortable in associating with people of their own sex. In the context of racial
segregation, people had similar "privacy" concerns-a feeling of discomfort in associating with
people of another race under circumstances in which they felt perfectly comfortable in
associating with people of their own race. Indeed, the "privacy" argument presented by such
liberal advocates as Thomas Emerson is remarkably reminiscent of the erstwhile distinction
between "civil" and "social equality" with respect to racial segregation. Id. at 902-03. See infra
note 381. The unisex public bathroom issue is, therefore, one example of the normative
symmetry of the equality versus racism issues of 1868 and the equality versus sexism issues of
1987.
378. Public bathrooms were apparently one context, see supra note 377, and the army
another, see Brown, supra note 377, at 967-80. Sexual orientation may have been yet another.
Thomas Emerson, for example, was emphatic that " 'in view of the legislative history, the
courts are not going to say that the ERA requires homosexual marriages. If you can be sure
of one thing in the law, I would be sure of that.'" R. LEE, A LAWYER LooKS AT THE EQUAL
RIGHTS AMENDMENT 65 (1980) (citing Professor Emerson's testimony at Senate Hearings, Equal
Rights Extension: Hearings on SJ. Res. 134 before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 114-41 (1978)).
379. See supra note 376. This conclusion is particularly compelling if one considers the
judicial context in which the political battle over the Equal Rights Amendment was fought.
The Supreme Court, after deciding Frontiero in 1973, had been moving toward a Constitution
concerned with governmental sexism. It was widely perceived that the ERA, proposed by
Congress in 1972, would accelerate the normative movement that the Court had set in motion.
Indeed, the failure to ratify might suggest that "the people" were vaguely satisfied with the
Court's development of the relationship between the equal protection clause and gender
discrimination. Cf Van Alstyne, Interpreting THIS Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributions of
Special Theories ofJudicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 209, 212 (1983) ("My own sense of the
ill-fated Equal Rights Amendment ... is that it became a casualty to the apprehensions of
persons who frankly feared not what it said, but how it might be judicially construed.").
Whether people viewed the Amendment as superfluous, or feared too many consequences too
quickly, neither point of view necessarily rejects the ideal of intrinsic gender equality.
380. One might ask why the rela."ation of self-constraint, implicit in the remission of
national racism, should be invigorated by an anti-sexism principle, rather than, for example,
a principle restricting democratic discretion to enact laws that have a discriminatory impact on
blacks. Cf Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1976) (involving employment
examination disproportionately disqualifying black candidates). For an analysis that seeks the
constitutional values of "the people" today, and that accepts the premise of constitutional
continuity, the answer depends on identifying the values of self-constraint that motivated "the
people" of 1868.
If one posits that the value motivating "the people" of 1868 concerned the evil of moral
judgments based on race, and if limits on the extent to which "the people" were willing to
vindicate that ideal concerned the emotional pull of racism, then one has no basis for
determining the extent to which, if at all, laws with a discriminatory impact on blacks might
compromise J'the people's" constitutional ideals. Even if it is the result of past racism,
discriminatory impact is not racism itself. Thus, a decision to disfavor laws having a
discriminatory impact on blacks must involve a normative determination beyond the evil of
racist judgments. See Chang, The Bus Stops Here: Defining the Constitutional Right of Equal
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the influence of sexism in particular public contexts be deemed constitutionally impermissible?
Thh question brings us back to the plight of Mr. Baker. Indeed, Mr.
Baker's case is essentially Mr. Plessy's case. This is so for several reasons.
First, in both cases, the challenged governmental policy lies in the path of
a constitutional norm of self-constraint, apparently-or presumablyvalued by "the people." Assuming that "the people" wanted someday to
attain an untainted ideal of intrinsic racial equality, Mr. Plessy's case
challenged a local majority's preference that violated the ultimate constitutional ideals of "the people." Similarly, if one accepts the suggestion that
"the people" today want someday to attain an untainted ideal of intrinsic
gender equality, then Mr. Baker's case also challenges a local majority's
preference that violates the ultimate constitutional ideals of "the people."381
Erlucatwnal Opportunity and an Appropriate Remedial Process, 63 B.U.L. REV. l, 7-12 (1983). If,
therefore, "the people" of 1868 were motivated by a notion that racism itself is morally evil,
ouc has no basb consistent with the premise of constitutional continuity from which to
conclude that "the people" of 1987 adhere to an additional norm of self-constraint regarding
the evil of nonradst laws having a discriminatory impact on blacks. In contrast, still assuming
that the motivating norm in 1868 concerned the evil of making moral judgments about people
on the ba5i; of race-becaU5e such characteristics of birth should be deemed irrelevant to
moral statm.-an<l assuming that the competing norm of political reservation was the emotion
of racism, the logical relationship between the antiracism and antisexism principles, as well as
the parallel relationships between these two principles and the competing emotions of racism
and scxi~m. respectively, enable~ the analyH to develop an antisexism constitutional principle
ton•ard satisfdng the Hamiltonian premise of constitutional continuity.
If, howev.~r. one posits that the motivating norm in 1868 was not the e\•il of racism, but the
evil of its £/j-cts on its victims, cf. supra note 374, and concludes that "the people" on this basis
S<•ught to constrain themselves from discriminating in certain areas, such as contract law and
property law, then laws having a discriminatory impact on blacks are logically related to that
motivating norm. If the countervailing value limiting the application of the constitutional ideal
to particular contexts in 1868 was the emotion of racism, then the diminution of racism might
suggef.t that "the people" need new avenues of self-constraint.
Here again, however, the premise of constitutional continuity has complex implications. Cf
s11/Jra note 374. Although racism has abated, and "the people," therefore, feel little or no pain
of ~elf-comtraint from an antiracism constitutional principle, the status of blacks is far better
in 1987 than it was in 1868. Thus, not only has the pull against the constitutional ideal abated,
th~ pull of the constitutional ideal may have abated as well.
Second, e1·en if the pull of the constitutional ideal has not abated, additional values pulling
a~;ainst the constitutional ideal are entirely different from the emotion of racism-for
e"ample, the ~ocial costs and inconveniences that would be engendered by a principle
rc~tricting discretion to enact laws with a di:;criminatory impact on blacks. As the Court stated
in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976):
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent
compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than
another would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps
invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing
statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to
the more affluent white.
Id. at 248 (footnote omitted). Because this competing value in 1987 has a different relationship
to the assumed constitutional ideal than did the competing value of racism in 1868, one cannot
jmtify developing· constitutional meaning as a function of the Hamiltonian premise of
constitution.ll continuity.
381. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is discrimination based on sex. See supra text
accompanying notes 236-38. See also R. LEE, supra note 378, at 64 ("Homosexual conduct laws
im·olve the dearest possible kind of classification based on sex. Those laws permit Bob to
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Second, Mr. Baker's claim seems to implicate precisely the sort of
emotionally wrenching reservations about the ideal of self-constraint that
Mr. Plessy's case presented nearly a century ago. Some, suffering from
sexism's version of perception-impairment, might deny that laws discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation are laws discriminating because of
sexism. 382 Even for those who acknowledge that the ideal of intrinsic
gender equality is contradicted by discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, modern Balancers might feel the emotion of homophobia so
intensely that they are willing to compromise their intellectual ideal in favor
of their emotional compulsion.
Because Baker's case and Plessy's case present similar constitutional
conflicts for their respective eras, one would expect that they present
similar problems in determining whether today is, as a function of "the
people's" constitutional preferences, the right time to take a step further
toward "the people's" constitutional ideal by recognizing a new and
controversial constitutional prohibition. Previous analysis has suggested
that constitutional mandates can properly be extended into new contexts
only to maintain the amount of everyday political pain that "the people" of
the past, as evidentiary proxy for "the people" today, chose toward serving
their constitutional ideal of self-constraint. 383 Thus, only if "the people's"
everyday political values change, only if existing constitutional mandates
become less relevant for overturning local democratic choices, could there
be a basis for determining that the Constitution's mandates reach into new
contexts, further vindicating the coherent implications of "the people's"
ideals of self-constraint.384
Unfortunately, as previously suggested, an analyst cannot determine
in any meaningful way how much pain of self-constraint "the people" of
1868 chose to endure at any given time and, implicitly, from the premise of
constitutional continuity, how much everyday political pain "the people" of
1987 would choose to endure. 385 Thus, even accepting the Article's
characterization of "the people's" constitutional intent in 1868, and even
assuming that "the people" of 1987 adhere to the matrix of conflicting
concerns about gender with the same respective intensity as "the people" of
1868 adhered to the matrix of conflicting concerns about race, one cannot
confidently determine whether "the people's" constitutional values of
self-constraint today would, for the sake of intrinsic gender equality, authomarry Carol and Ted to marry Alice. But they prohibit Bob from doing what Alice may do,
namely, marry Ted. Why? Solely because of his sex."). Denial of this point would suggest a
Perception-Impaired Absolutist, or a Perception-Impaired Balancer, with respect to the
repudiation of sexism. See infra note 382.
382. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 377, at 962 ("[A] legislature intent
on retaining criminal penalties for sodomous or adulterous conduct could easily bring the laws
into line with the Equal Rights Amendment by extending them to apply equally to men and
women."). This argument is remarkably reminiscent of Virginia's contention that its
antimiscegenation statute did not discriminate on the basis of race because it punished the
white member and the black member of the offensive couple equally. See Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967).
383. See supra text accompanying notes 301-09, 319·24, 325-29.
384. See supra text accompanying notes 330-31.
385. See supra text accompanying notes 299-309.
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rize a coach-like court to revoke local democratic discretion to vindicate the
popular ~motion of homophobia. 386
To the extent that an answer is demanded, the recent failure of the
Equal Rights Amendment suggests that Mr. Baker may have little better
claim to victory in 1987 than did Mr. Plessy in 1896.38i But to the extent
that the question of timing is a matter of rough guess work, 388 there is
significant room for doubt about any answer. Given this doubt, this
potential for judicial error, this potential for ')udicial tyranny," 389 Mr.
Baker-and all of us-would do well to look even more closely at two old
constitutional questions. Was Plessy v. Ferguson wrongly decided? And if so.
what was Plessy v. Ferguson's error?39o

4.

To Recognize, Yet Challenge, the Expedience in Principle:
Rediscovering Marbury's Path Not Taken

Alexander Bickel was deeply concerned with what he termed the
problem of "ripeness" in constitutional decisionmaking. By "ripeness," he
meant a prospect for adequate popular acquiescence following a court's
decision to enforce unpopular constitutional principle. If a judicial decision, mandated by principle, would engender significant resistance and
raise que5tions about judicial authority to make binding constitutional
decisions, Bickel advocated what he termed the "passive virtues." Rather
than exprnd judicial credibility by remaining true to principle, and rather
than undermine principle by upholding a challenged public decision that,
according to principle, should be struck down, Bickel counseled the use of
devices by which the Court could avoid stirring excessive political unrest,
and also avoid explicitly endorsing a violation of principle.39 1
This notion of "ripeness" might seem to parallel the issue of timing
considered in the two previous sections. Assuming that a constitutional
provision reflects a motive of self-constraint, that "the people" want courts
to help them pursue the coherent implications of some ideal against
contrary democratic discretion, and that a case presents an issue lying
386. See mpra text accompanying notes 331-34.
:l87. Inde<•d, Mr. Baker might have a weaker claim, for there is no modem day equivalent
of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 with respect to discrimination based on sexual orientation. See
suf1ra note 323.
:188. See supra text accompanying notes 299-334.
389. See s11pra text accompanying notes 100-1 I.
;190. A. BICKEL, supra note I I, at I 97 (emphasis added).
'391. See generally A. BICKEL, supra note I I. Bickel was led to this inquiry, one would suspect,
largely becailse Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was decided during his
formative years. For scholars of that generation, there was a need to confront Plessy v.
Ferguson; th<-re was a felt obligation to justify Brown's departure from Plessy by some theory of
principled constitutional analysis; and after that, there was a need to determine whether, and
if •.o, why, implementation of the Brown principle should accommodate inevitable popular
re!;i5tancc. Thus, the troublesome analytical questions of Bickel's era: Was Plessy correctly
decided, in the sense that the public in 1896 would not have accepted (or endorsed?) a judicial
ruling ba~ed on the Harlan dissent? Was BroWll correctly decided, in the sense that the public
in 1954 wa5 1hen ready to accept (or endorse?) that application of the constitutional principle?
Should the Court have decided the constitutionality of antimiscegenation statutes before
1967?
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directly in the path of coherence along which courts have been authorized
to go, is now the proper time to impose the principle's next coherent
development against democratic discretion?
Despite the apparent similarity, there are significant differences
between Bickel's notion of "ripeness" and the question of timing that
plagues a court in determining whether it has been authorized to develop
the coherent implications of constitutional values. The question of timing,
generated by the analysis in the previous sections, does not assume the
present existence of principle. Indeed, the issue concerns whether the
principle, relevant for overturning the challenged exercise of democratic discretion,
can now properly be declared. This issue is interpretive and theoretical. It
is a question of defining constitutionally mandated principle and a function
of certain premises about the constitutional intent of "the people." Bickel's
notion of "ripeness," however, is one of practicality and power. Principles
exist-derived and defined somehow-but may be so politically vulnerable
as to warrant an invisible retreat in the face of political challenge. 392
In Bickel's view, the applicable constitutional principle at the time
Plessy was decided would have held that "race is a proscribed ground of
legislative classification."393 Bickel believed that Plessy, as well as cases
upholding racial segregation in other contexts, "was no more defensible on
principle then than it is now." 394 Any assertion that this principle could
have exceptions-that "race is a proscribed ground of legislative classification, except that it may be used sometimes"395 -was not, in his view, a
matter of principle, but "a device of expediency ."396 Immediately preceding
that passage, however, Bickel notes that a principle may be defined in a way
that reflects some degree of "flexibility." He said:
A true principle may carry within itself its own flexibility, butand this is the important thing-flexibility on its own terms. For
example, one may lay it down that in all criminal proceedings the
accused must have the assistance of counsel in order to ensure the
protection of his rights. Or one may say, as the Court has in fact
said, that the assistance of counsel is constitutionally required in
all cases, except in relatively simple ones in the state courts, where
the accused seems to have been able to cope for himself, so that his
rights were in fact adequately protected. This is not a mere device
of expediency; it is a principle with flexibility built in, within its
392. Despite these differences, Bickel's suggestion that a court can do more than explicitly
uphold or explicitly strike down a challenged exercise of democratic discretion, even in the
face of clearly applicable principle, see infra note 417, may suggest approaches for coping with
the vexing question, "when?", posed by the absence of clearly applicable principle. When the
issue concerns doubt about when the coherent implications of some constitutional ideal of
self-constraint should be imposed on contrary democratic discretion, there may be options
other than explicitly upholding or explicitly invalidating the challenged majoritarian choice.
Indeed, there may be an appropriate option other than Bickel's preferred strategy of quiet
retreat and polite avoidance. See infra text accompanying notes 416-25.
393. A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 59.
394. Id. at 71.
395. Id. at 59.
396.Id.
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own terms. 397
Thus, Bickel seems to view principle as a matter of internal consistency .398 The qualified right to counsel reflects a flexible principle because
all components of the right seem to be a function of its purpose-to ensure
that the accused receive "effective" representation. On the other hand, a
qualified right against being victimized by a choice based on race is not a
matter of principle, because the exceptions-at least those Bickel contemplates with respect to Plessy-seem to violate its underlying rationale. The
racial segregation challenged by PleSS)' was a function of racism. Racism
contradicts the principle, and, therefore, any accommodation to racism
must be a function of expediency.
Although Bickel lamented that principle was compromised by Plessy
and other cases of the era, Plessy's error, for him, was not the failure to
strike down legally mandated racial segregation, for such an action would
have stirred a popular backlash that the Court might not have survived.
Rather, the error was in affirmative!)' and explicitly upholding legally mandated
racial segn::!gation. 399

397. Id. at .38-59.
398. According to Professor Kronman:
Principles may, of course, be complex-they may have exceptions, provisos, and
qualifications, and be subject to higher-order norms for the resolution of conflicts
between competing principles. But according to Bickel, every complexity in a
principle must itself be principled, that is to say, it must have been introduced for a
moral reason 5imilar to that which led to the adoption of the principle itself in the first
place, and not simply because popular opinion requires it. Thus, it is never principled
either to limit or extend a constitutional norm merely to reflect existing majoritarian
views, e\en if the limitation or extension is cast in general terms that give it a
principled appearance.
Kronman, Akxandcr Bicktl's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. I567, I583 (1985) (footnote
ommedJ.
Thi5 Article's analysis, undertaken from "the people's" perspective, departs from this view
by •:mphasizing the proper source for principles, and seeks to define principle in a manner
comistmt with source as well as with content. Thus, given a premise that principle must emerge
from "the pec•ple," compromise and incoherence may be perfectly principled in the definition
of principle, while an unauthorized pursuit of consistency may be judicial excess. See infra text
accompanyin1t notes 404-I6. According to Bickel:
By principle is meant general propositions, as Holmes called them, deeming their
formation the chief end of man, though he felt obliged at the same time to spray them
with his customary skeptical acid; organizing ideas of universal validity in the given
universe of a culture and place, ideas that are often grounded in ethical and moral
prer,uppcsitions. Principle, ethics, morality-these are evocative, not definitional,
terms; they are attempts to locate meaning, not to enclose it.
A. B1cK1.L, supra note I I, at I99. Bickel's "principle" thus foreshadows Dworkin's "integrity."
See 111pra note 30. Yet, only by considering whence principle comes can one determine what
principle may contain, for the difficult truth is that there are few "ideas of universal validity."
Cf. infra note 456. Whatever such ideas there may be are not the subjects of constitutional
adjudication, which, after all, is a function of deep normative conflict. See .-upra note I.
:399. See A. BICKEL, supra note 1 I, at 7I ("The Supreme Court made the grave error of
lending its affirmative sanction to the practice of segregation in the nineteenth century, and
doing so on p1inciple, across the board. This was the error, not failure at the early date to strike
down segregation as unconstitutional.").
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Bickel's argument for passive avoidance is predicated on a premise
that judicial reasons and rulings become part of political debate. 40 For
Bickel, the real error of Plessy was in sanctifying legally mandated racial
segregation with robes of constitutional legitimacy. "Plessy v. Ferguson's
Error"401 was tragic because it fortified those forces of racist resistance, and
thereby delayed the development of social circumstances in which considerations of expedience would not mandate a retreat from principle. The
Court could have avoided "Plessy v. Ferguson's Error" by not deciding the
case-by employing one of Bickel's devices of passive avoidance.402
The argument that the Plessy Court could not have successfully
enforced an invalidation of official racial segregation is convincing. The
argument that such statutes violated constitutional principle, and that the
Court should not have explicitly upheld them, needs further consideration.
Indeed, as suggested by this Article, Bickel's criterion of internal consistency-or logical coherence-is problematic for defining applicable principle in the context of analyzing constitutional mandates. By questioning the
premise that courts should pursue normative coherence in interpreting
constitutional mandates, we have concluded that values which Bickel
termed considerations of "expedience" are, in fact, fundamental components for defining legally applicable principle.
In 1868, the fourteenth amendment, according to the understanding
and the corporate wishes of "the people," and as Bickel himself acknowledged,403 did not prohibit laws requiring segregation. Segregation was too
important to too many people in 1868, even though it did compromise the
ideal of intrinsic racial equality.404 Given an interpretive goal of identifying

°

400. As Bickel put it, "the Court, when it legitimates a measure, does insert itself with
significant consequences into the decisional process as carried on by other institutions. This is
a necessary consequence of the Court's power to define and apply society's basic principles."
Id. at 70. Furthermore, "[t]he Court's prestige, the spell it casts as a symbol, enable it to
entrench and solidify measures that may have been tentative in the conception, or that are on
the verge of abandonment in the execution." Id. at 129; cf. Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the
"Passive Virtues" -A Comment on Principle and Expediency in judicial Review, 64 C0Ln1. L. REV. l,
8-9 (1964). Professor Gunther questions the extent to which subtle aspects of Supreme Court
opinions shape public opinion. "[T]here is something to the legitimation notion, just not that
much; there is some difference in political impact between sustaining a statute on the
constitutional merits and staying the Court's hand, just not that much." Id.
401. A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 197.
402. Id. at 69. Plessy probably could not have involved only a short-term postponement,
unlike Bickel's other exam pies ofjudicial passivity in the s.ervice of political colloquy. See id. at
111-98.
403. See Bickel, supra note 240, at 58.
404. In seeing constitutionally applicable principle as prohibiting racial segregation in 1896,
Bickel apparently left the realm of legal analyst and entered the domain of moral philosopher.
Cf supra note 30. The philosopher's principle and the constitutional analyst's principle are
functions of different criteria. The former is concerned primarily with content, while the latter
must be concerned primarily with source. Cf supra note 398. Given the manner of compromise
by which individuals make internal choices and groups make corporate choices, competing
values must be accommodated, to the extent that they are valued by "the people," if the task
of the Court is to effectuate the constitutional values of the people.
It is particularly interesting that Bickel would present this view, given his careful and
sensitive evaluation of the original understanding about racial segregation. See generally Bickel,
supra note 240. He noted that deviation from that original understanding about the
permissibility of legally mandated segregation must, somehow, be a function of "the trend in
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and effectuating the corporate will of "the people," the applicable principle in
1868-and 1896-may well have contained the segregation exception.405
Under such circumstances, the segregation exception would indeed have
been a matter of expediency-not in the sense of concessions to limited
power, but in the sense of normative compromise chosen by "the people" as
they defined their preferred principle.406
public opimon." Id. at 63-64. He concluded that the decision in Brown was properly "based on
the moral and material state of the nation in 1954, not 1866." Id. at 65. This suggests that, at
ltast in 1955, Bickel regarded comt1tutio11ally applicable principle in 1868 as permitting legally
mandated iacial segregation. One doubts whether he believed that the "material and moral
state of the nation" had so changed by 1896 to warrant the view of principle he suggested in
The Least Dangerous Branch. Cf supra note 323.
405. Cf su/1ra note 323. Herbert Wechsler admonished that judicial decisions "be genuinely
principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis
and reasom quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved." Wechsler, supra note 11,
at 15. He contrasted the obligations of courts and legislatures with respect to this criterion of
principle:
No leg,slature or executive is obligated by the nature of its function to support its
choice •lf values by the type of reasoned explanation that I have suggested is intrinsic
to judicial action-however much we may admire such a reasoned exposition when
we fine\ it in those other realms.
Id. at 15-16.
Although Wechsler's insistence on neutral principles might be taken simply as an apology
for judicial pursuit of normative coherence in defining legal content, the requirement of
neutrality i:; not necessarily related to a philosophical style of judicial analysis. Indeed, by
juxtaposing legislatures and courts, and suggesting that courts have a special burden of
justifying their decisions, the import of Wechsler's analysis establishes the judicial obligation to
justify the saurce of its favored values primarily, and the content of those values secondarily
and derivatively. See supra notes 398, 404. If one asks why courts should intervene in legislative
d1;cisions, one does not provide an adequate response simply by noting that courts will favor
one value more than a legi~lature would. One does provide an adequate response with a
reasoned ei:planation relating to the preferences of "the people" who want certain value5
discerned and implemented in one ~·pe of forum or another. Thus, the special psychology of
~c·lf-constraint can explain why people might want courts, rather than legislatures, to vindicate
c<•rtain values, and why "the people's" chosen concerns competing with their values of
sdf-constraint-their reservations about the ideal-suggest the limits of authorized coherence.406. In a recent article, Professor Gewirtz builds on Alexander Bickel's concerns with the
pl)s5ibility that judicial decrees could be popularly resisted. See Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance,
92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983). Although he provides an illuminating analy&is of issues central to a
construction of remedies, Gewirtz, like Bickel himself, does not distinguish between considerations that should govern the articulation of rights, applicable throughout the nation, and
those that should govern the imposition of remedies, applicable in particular contexts. One
e~:ample is Genvitz's discussion of Brown, in which he predicates the propriety of announcing
Brown's principle on the prospects for ultimate acquiescence:
The right declared in Brown I was not simply an abstract "ideal'' in the sense of a
utopian possibility; it became the sort of ideal that we call a legal light only because the
courts were convinced that it was an ideal that could become real in our society.
MoreO\er, in giving birth to Brown I, the Court took account of strategic factors much
as it did in thinking about remedies in Brown II. Before deciding Brown I, the Court
strategically prepared the country through . . . a purely instrumental strategy
designed to promote public acceptance of the rights in question.
Id. at 1)76 (tmphasis added).
Yet, as I have suggested, the definition of "principle" requires a sensitive inquiry into the
ceonstitutional values of "the people," in order to determine what constitutional ideals they
might hold, how far they want to pursue those ideals, and how quickly they want their ideals
realized aga,nst competing political concerns. Gewirtz's reference to "utopia" begs the question
of wlw~e utopia. His suggestion that this ideal properly was transformed into a "right" "only"
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If one does not define constitutional "principle" applicable in 1896 as
Bickel did-if, in other words, the Constitution, in principle, was properly
interpreted in 1896 as permitting laws that mandated racial segregationthen Bickel's notion of "Plessy v. Ferguson's Error," and his recommended
solution, become problematic and require re-examination. 407 Assuming this
applicable constitutional principle-one that permitted public policies of
racist segregation-Bickel's rationale for avoidance no longer applies.
Indeed, assuming that the Constitution of 1896 was properly interpreted as permitting segregation, a failure to "legitimate"408 this discretion,
by avoiding decision on the merits, cannot be justified consistent with the
goal of vindicating the constitutional values of "the people," and the
Hamiltonian rationale for judicial review. 40 9 Democratic discretion is the
norm, but because "the people" have values that they want to protect even
from themselves, courts, rather than decisionmakers closer to the passions
of everyday politics, have been delegated special authority to interpret and
apply values designated by "the people" through their constitutional
because the ideal might be accepted by a passive electorate, again, fails to confront the
distinction between considerations of expedience in defining principle, and such considerations
in applying principle. A court might do many unprincipled things (i.e., inconsistent with the
limits of its role), yet still enjoy the acquiescence of a quietly dissatisfied public. See supra note
111.
It is essential to note that the criteria are different for determining whether racist resistance

is a matter for the definition of constitutional principle, or for its application in particular
contexts. For the former, the question relates to national values. By "national" values, I mean
the values held by "the people." As was the case in 1868, "the people" might not encompass
the entire nation. See supra text accompanying notes 248-56; notes 306, 318, 325, 370. This
question of defining constitutional principles compares the extent of ordinary democratic pain
that "the people" today would endure from the potential constitutional principle, {Pe 1 + Pe2
+ ... +Pen + Pen+i} [1954], with the extent of ordinary democratic pain that "the people"
who actually made constitutional choices chose to endure, {Pe1 + Pc2 + ... +Pen} [1868]. See
supra text accompanying notes 302-09, 318-29, 350-79.
For the latter issue of remedies, the question is one of power and feasibility. When a principle
is applicable, based on a determination that a constitutional majority wants to constrain itself
(and others), a court, nevertheless, might be unable to impose the principle in particular local
circumstances because it does not have the cooperation of local or national authorities. Thus,
enforcing applicable principle may not be feasible in all contexts, while the imposition of all
that is feasible-all that the Court could get away with-might not necessarily reflect principle.
The difference, I suggest, is illustrated by comparing the two different questions of timing
posed by Plessy and Brown 11. Plessy posed the question of defining applicable constitutional
principle. Brown 11 posed the question of whether, where, and when previously defined
constitutional principle should be enforced. Alexander Bickel and Paul Gewirtz treat these two
separate questions as one. See A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 132 (the "deliberate-speed formula"
was a measure of accommodation to the needs of "expediency"); id. at 197 (Plessy was wrong
as a matter of"principle," yet applicable "principle" should not have been enforced as a matter
of "expediency"); cf. supra note 402.
407. It might be that constitutional principle applicable in 1896 would have invalidated
racial segregation in public transportation. See supra note 323. Such a proposition must be
established by accounting for the complex values of "the people," however, not by a simple
standard of normative coherence.
408. Bickel noted that when a court upholds a democratic choice as being consistent with
constitutional principle, or otherwise within constitutional bounds, it "legitimates" that
legislation, thereby giving it weight in the political process. See A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 69.
409. See Gunther, supra note 400, at 22-23 ("Bickel's prescription to avoid the 'grave error'
of legitimation [for contexts in which principle demands upholding an exercise of democratic
discretion] is not only unjnstifiable, it is incomprehensible.").
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choices.4 W That function of delineation, of distinguishing the permissible
from the impermissible, is left unfulfilled if a court fails to provide the
reasons for its decision and, indeed, is violated if the reasons for the court's
action are unrelated to popularly chosen constitutional constraints on
democratic discretion. 411 If a court avoids explicitly upholding democratic
discretion based on considerations unrelated to the constitutional values of "the
people,'"112 it reduces itself to playing the role of just another political
competitor whose agenda is set by judges' personal goals, thus violating its
assigned role as good faith guardian of "the people's" constitutional
ideals. 413
·UO. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
·U I. Cf A. BICKEL, supra note II, at 203 ("A constitutional adjudication, I am saying, is
required to be principled because it is binding. But its effectiveness as a binding adjudication,
and perhap~ even its capacity to bind at all, are themselves functions of its foundation in
principle.") {emphasis added). Professor Gunther views this premise as fatal to Bickel's
doctrines of avoidance:
Ultimately, it is Bickel's starting point-his rigorous insistence that constitutional
adjudication must be truly principled-that gives his thesis such importance and that
proves to be its undoing. The predilectional school of Court criticism, the vacuous
commentary which is content with reciting agreements and disagreements with
particular re5ults, would have no difficulty with the problems posed by Bickelindeed, they would hardly recognize his concerns as problems.
Gunther, suj•ra note 400, at 24.
·112. Cf C. BL\CK, supra note 56, at 52 (recognizing argument that Court's most important
role is as legitimator of the government by validating laws and thereby satisfying people that
gm•ernment has stayed within it5 bounds). Bickel has argued:
The rule that the Court must legitimate whatever it is not justified in striking down
fails to attain its intended purpose of removing the Court from the political arena;
rather, it works an uncertain and uncontrolled change in the degree of the Court's
intervention, and it shifts the direction .... At the root is the question-in the largeof the role of principle in democratic government.
A. B1ct.EL, w{Jra n•>te 11, at 131. It is this question, I suggest, that Bickel largely overlooked by
apparently defining principle simply as a matter of normative coherence.
·H3. One might make an analogy to a hypothetical variation on the question faced by the
Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Imagine that a majority
of the Justic~s believed that while the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 was a constitutionally permissible exercise of congressional discretion, such congressional programs were
bad policy. These Justices, let us say, feared that the Court's imprimatur of approval on such
legislative efforts would encourage unwise exercises of congressional power. Therefore, to
aw,id the undesirable political consequences of judicial "legitimation." the Court exercised
Bkkel's option of passive avoidance and let the statute stand without explicitly endorsing it as
constitution~lly permissible.
For one concerned about identifying the constitutional values of "the people" today, this
strategy is problematic to the extent that the Court fails to validate democratic discretion based
on consider::ction5 unrelated to "the people's" preferred constitutional principles. Although
judges cannot always control the quality of their analysis, they are the masters of their own
in1cgrity. Wechsler noted the dangers of result-oriented judgments:
The man who simply lets his judgment turn on the immediate result may not,
however, realize that his position implies that the courts are free to function as a
naked power organ, that it is an empty affirmation to regard them, as ambivalently
he so often does, as courts of law. Ifhe may know he disapproves ofa decision when
all he knows h that it has sustained a claim put fonvard by a labor union or a taxpayer,
a Negrc or a segregationist, a corporation or a Communist-he acquiesces in the
proposition that a man of different sympathy but equal information may no less
properly conclude that he approves.
Wechsler, supra note 11, at 12; see also Van Alstyne, supra note 379, at 226-27 ("If the
Constitution contains clauses not always the most noble (as of course it may), clauses that may
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The foregoing sections should suggest, however, that although racist
exceptions to the antiracism principle were intended components of the
constitutional principle adopted by "the people" in 1868, these were values
that "the people" wanted ultimately to fall to their constitutional ideal of
self-constraint.414 "The people" of 1868 manifested deep conflict within
themselves over an intellectual ideal of intrinsic racial equality and the
emotional compulsioR of racism. They apparently favored both competing
values in different ways at the constitutional level. The value of racism was
given some constitutional status-the discretion to pursue the emotion was
left undisturbed in some contexts-but, following the analysis in this
Article, could be eroded by the courts as the everyday political pain felt by
"the people" in those previously reserved contexts diminished to acceptable
levels. 415
Based on this understanding of the constitutional principle framed in
1868-warts and all-I suggest that "Plessy v. Ferguson's Error" was not that
it declared an erroneous doctrine that violated applicable (yet unenforceable) constitutional principle, but that it declared an incomplete doctrine that
was only part of applicable (and eminently enforceable) constitutional
principle. In Plessy, the Court incompletely declared applicable constitutional
principle in recognizing only one of "the people's" competing concernsdiscretion to pursue racist impulses-as constitutionally significant. The
Court ignored the constitutional ideal of self-constraint that "the people"
apparently wanted ultimately to prevail.416 By doing so, as Bickel suggested, the Court gave weight and status to the idea of racial segregation, so
that it could flourish in everyday political debate, unchallenged by constitutional aspirations. This judicially conferred weight and status was unfortunate not simply for those who did not want majorities to exercise their
racist discretion. It was unfortunate-indeed, a tragic failure-for "the
people" and their constitutional ideals.
This analysis suggests that there are four courses open to a court
exercising its function of constitutional review. 417 First, a court might strike
weigh too heavily on a judge's conscience, he or she may reassess the personal acceptability of
the judicial task.... That it is a Constitution being expounded readily explains why one should
be especially conscientious about its determination.... That because it is a Constitution being
expounded judges should therefore feel more free than otherwise to fudge its interpretation,
however, is a proposition that though argued often, has never been argued convincingly.").
414. See supra text accompanying notes 287-98.
415. See supra text accompanying notes 299-309, 318-21, 325-29, 350-79.
416. See supra text accompanying notes 287-97.
417. Cf A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 69. Bickel suggested: The essentially important fact, so
often missed, is that the Court wields a threefold power. It may strike down legislation as
inconsistent with principle. It may validate, or, in Charles L. Black's better word, "legitimate"
legislation as consistent with principle. Or it may do neither. It may do neither, and therein lies
the secret of its ability to maintain itself in the tension between principle and expediency.

Id.

.

Bickel's characterization of what a court does when it fails to strike down a statute is
revealing. Bickel suggests that when a court upholds a statute, it "validates" or "legitimates"
the statute as consistent with principle. Although this might describe Justice Brown's opinion in
Plessy, it does not have to characterize the import of upholding a statute as constitutionally
permissible. Rather, to uphold a statute is to find that it does not violate constitutional
mandates, which themselves contain elements of normative aspirations and exceptions that are
concessions to competing concerns. To recognize that constitutional principle is not phil0sophical principle, as Bickel conceives principle, is to lay the foundation for a more sensitive
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down a stltute as a violation of constitutional principle. Second, it might
uphold-and legitimate-a statute as permitted by constitutional principle.
Third, as Bickel counseled, it might do nothing. Finally, in the context of
a progressive principle of self-constraint, a court might uphold a statute as
constitutionally permissible today, while declaring that the statute violates
ultimate COilstitutional ideals and future constitutional mandates.41 8
By taking the fourth option and completely explaining the constitutional
reasons both for upholding a challenged statute and for having constitutional
reservations about the challenged statute, a court can more effectively serve the
complex constitutional values of "the people" in two important ways. 419
First, this course of action mitigates the potential costs of judicial error-of
'1udicial tyranny"4 2°-if a court en-oneously determines that the constitutional preferences of "the people" today do not yet extend to prohibiting
the exerci~e oflocal discretion in certain contexts previously reserved by the
framers and ratifiers. If a court erroneously determines that constitutional
principle today permits a challenged democratic choice, but simultaneously
discredits the choice as contrary to ultimate constitutional ideals, "the
people," r.eminded of their values of self-constraint, may be less likely to
choose to exercise their problematic discretion. This is not to say that the
route of St(ggestive judicial declaration can eliminate the costs of erroneous
judicial failures to recognize new constitutional mandates. After all, many
localities, despite judicial suggestions that the challenged statutes compromise constitutional ideals, could choose to enact-or retain-and enforce
statutes that should have been deemed constitutionally prohibited. But at
and precise manner of expressing a conclusion that a statute is not unconstitutional. See infra
note 423 and accompanying text.
418. Cf. Gtwirtz, supra note 406, at 672-73. Professor Gewirtz develops this option in the
context of impo5ing remedies for violations of established constitutional rights. He states:
Even though we may not vindicate a norm today, it is not necessaiily an exaggeration
to affirm that norm as an ideal if we understand the ideal as an aspiration-as
something that we hope to be able to vindicate more fully in the future. Preserving
the ideal maintains a tug towards a more ideal world. . . . A subterfuge that
compromises an ideal without saying so creates a risk that the ideal will be weakened,
that people will come to think that the ideal means only what has been imperfectly
realized.
Id. at 672-73.
This notion of expressing the remedial ideal, while permitting its violation, applies with
equal force to the task of defining applicable constitutional principle. See supra note 406
(di«:ussion of fundamentally different con~iderations involved in defining, as opposed to
applyinr~. constitutional principle).
419. Professor Bickel suggested that "(t]he Court does not sit to make precatory judgments."
A. BtCKf.L, su,bra note 11, at 246. This simply is not so if one accepts the notion that "the
people" have constitutional ideals of self-constraint that they have authorized the courts to
help them attain. Whether or not "the people" today would choose to endure coherent
development of constitutional mandates toward invalidating their competing everyday political
concerns, their ideal still exists. Courts can help "the people" reach that ideal not only by
imposing its coherent implications against contrary democratic discretion, but also by
declaring the ideal and reminding the electorate that their choices do compromise their own
higher concerns.
Such "precatory" judgments not only might themselves sway the opinions of political
resisters, but could encourage the forceful debate of those who would benefit from judicial
imposition of the potential principle. Cf. Gewirtz, supra note 406, at 672-73.
420. See suf.ra text accompanying notes 101-07.
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least to the extent that localities are persuaded not to exercise constitutionally problematic discretion, the erroneous judicial failure to deem such
discretion constitutionally impermissible becomes largely irrelevant.
Second, and perhaps more significant, when a court correctly determines that the constitutional preferences of "the people" today do not yet
extend to previously unrecognized constitutional mandates, the posture of
suggestive declaration enables courts to play an essential role in generating
a predicate for the development of constitutional mandates, by providing impetus
for the development of "the people's" everyday political values. Recall that
constitutional mandates chosen by "the people" are a function of both their
ideals of self-constraint and their ordinary political values, as a constitutional motive of self-constraint reflects a desire to protect certain values to
a greater extent than "the people" could achieve through ordinary national
politics.421 "The people's" choices to vindicate constitutional ideals in
particular contexts suggest both the existence, and the limitations, of their
commitment to values of self-constraint. Thus, based on the Hamiltonian
premise of constitutional continuity,422 we concluded that from "the
people's" perspective, a court cannot properly generate everyday political
pain by imposing constitutional mandates in new contexts unless "the
people" are no longer inclined to violate constitutional mandates in
previously chosen contexts.423 But by pursuing a route of suggestive

421. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92; cf. supra text accompanying notes 257-66.
422. See supra text accompanying notes 115-23.
423. Again, recall the constitutional equation, supra text accompanying notes 164-66. See also
supra text accompanying notes 306·09. A premise that Supreme Court opinions can and do
affect public values was a cornerstone of Bickel's work. Eugene Rostow also has noted the
Court's influence on public values:
The prestige of the Supreme Court as an institution is high, despite the conflicts of
the last fifteen years, and the members of the Court speak with a powerful voice.
Can one doubt, for example, the immensely constructive influence of the series of
decisions in which the Court is slowly asserting the right of Negroes to vote and to
travel, live, and have a professional education without segregation? These decisions
have not paralyzed or supplanted legislative and community action. They have
precipitated it. They have not created bigotry. They have helped to fight it.
Rostow, The Democratic Character ofjudicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REv. 193, 208 (1952).
Some might doubt that judicial opinions, especially the subtle nuances of presentation
envisioned by my fourth option, can affect crude public debate in any significant way. See, e.g.,
Gunther, supra note 400, at 8-9 (questioning significance of"legitimating" function); Levine &
Becker, The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions, in THE IMPACT OF SuPRBIE COURT DECISIONS:
EMPIRICAL STUDIES 230-36 (1973) (positing reasons explaining Supreme Court's limited impact
on public values). Some studies have suggested, nevertheless, that Supreme Court opinions do
affect public values, in large part because of a so-called "halo effect" by which the Supreme
Court's authoritative aura lends status to the values it endorses. See Dolbeare, The Supreme
Court and the States: From Abstract Doctrine to Local Behavioral Conformity, in THE h!PACT OF
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: EMPIRICAL STUDIES 202-07 (1973) (giving empirical evidence of
Court's effect on public values).
One can hardly doubt that Supreme Court opinions have a "halo effect" on some people.
Indeed, it is possible that the emotions of prejudice, centrally relevant to the equal protection
clause, are particularly sensitive to exacerbation or mitigation, according to whether authority
figures prQmote or discourage prejudiced attitudes. See, e.g., T. ADORNO, E. FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK,
D. LEVINSON & R. SANFORD, THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 222-79 (1969)' (considering
correlation between prejudice and sympathies with authority); see also G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE
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declaration when new constitutional mandates cannot be imposed as a
function ·:Jf "the people's" values, a court can augment the status of the
relevant constitutional ideal in political debate, help mitigate "the people's"
impulses w violate that ideal in previously chosen contexts, and, thus, over
time, help "the people" develop everyday political values such that judicial
enforcement of constitutional mandates in new contexts will be necessary to
satisfy the premise of constitutional continuity. 424 In short, a court can
contribute to constitutional evolution by injecting constitutional ideals into
political debate.
Thm., a cure for "Pless;• v. Ferguson's Error" was not avoidance, but
greater ai.sertiveness and completeness in explaining a rationale for the
result. In the context of a case that asks, "When should the authorized
implications of a norm of self-constraint be imposed against contrary
democratic choices?" and answers, "Not yet," a cure for "Plessy v. Ferguson's
Error" lie:; in exploring the competing values of "the people" -explaining
the significance of their constitutional ambivalence-by identifying their
ideal of self-constraint that they want ultimately to prevail, while upholding
the emotional compulsion as a permissible, but self-defeating, compromise
of that ideal.
The notion that the Court can and should engage the electorate in a
constitutional "colloquy" is hardly new. 425 Indeed, the notion has roots in
429-·13 (1958) (suggesting that Jaws prohibiting acts based on prejudice may
undermine attitudes of prejudice).
One al~o might expect that combatants in political debate will seek to exploit the "halo
effect." Indeed, New York City had recently passed a controversial ordinance prohibiting
dhcrimination against gay people in housing and employment shortly before the Supreme
Court's decbion in Hardwich. The Court's decision gave impetus for a movement to repeal the
amidisuimination ordinance.Three significant opponents of the ordinance had been the New
Y01!1 Po•t, the New l'or/1 Daily News, and City Council Member Noach Dear. The Post reported
tlw Hardw1ch deci5ion with a banner headline, "Top Court Hits Gay Lifestyle." N.Y. Post, July
I, 1986, at I. The Daily News similarly proclaimed, "Top Court OKs Gay Sex Ban." N. Y. Daily
News, July l, 1986, at I. Under a headline that read, "Ruling May Spur Drive For Gay Sex Ban
Here," the Post reported that "Brooklyn Councilman Noach Dear, a staunch opponent of the
city's recent!:• pas~ed gay rights law, said the Supreme Court action sends a message to 'all
legislative bodies and the courts that traditional family values prevail.'" N.Y. Post, supra, at 3.
Such exploit~tion of Supreme Court rulings is natural and should be expected. Although such
methods cannot ensure success, they must be recognized as an additional element of power in
the struggle for persuasive political supremacy.
Dissents are exploited as well, but must be less effective since they Jack the authoritative
force of law. Thus, Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy became a tool for both legal and political
argument. This Article advocates an alternative approach for resolving constitutional conflicts
in which the dynamic of conflict between constitutional ideals and values of political
rcs•:rvation-the dynamic of conflict within people, more than among people-is explicitly
acknowledged. This approach, in effect, places a dissent within the Court's opinion, giving the
constitutional ideal authoritative >talus, and tainting the status of the competing everyday
political value, which has been upheld merely as a permissible compromise of those
con5titutional ideak To the extent that Supreme Court opinions have any impact on public
values-and few '~ould deny that there is some impact-the opinions should be tailored to
affect public •alues in the way that best serves "the people's" preferred constitutional ideals.
424. St'e supra text accompanying notes 302-07, 318-29, 344-79.
425. See Ro stow, supra note 423, at 208 ("The discussion of problems and the declaration of
broad principles by the Court is a vital element in the community experience through which
American policy is made. The Supreme Court is, among other things, an educational body,
and the Justires arc inevitably teachers in a vital national seminar.'').
OF PRl'Jl'DKE
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the nation's beginning. From the time of Marbury v. Madison, 4 2 6 when
Justice Marshall suggested the judicial function of binding constitutional
review, the notion that the Court might protect the constitutional ideals of
"the people" through suggestive declaration, rather than through binding
decree, was a possible alternative. The significant issues in Marbury were
whether the Court had authority to address questions about the constitutionality of congressional acts, and whether the Court, based on a determination of unconstitutionality, had authority to deny legal effect to a
congressional act.Justice Marshall suggested that it "would subvert the very
foundation of all written constitutions"427 and "reduce[] [them] to nothing,"
if courts did not have authority to invalidate statutes as violating the
Constitution.428 Justice Marshall's reasoning in Marbury implicitly rested on
a premise that was addressed more explicitly by Alexander Hamilton in The
Federalist No. 78.429 In Hamilton's view, "the people" identified ideals in
their Constitution, but recognized that those ideals would be vulnerable to
everyday political passions. Thus, "the people" created federal courts,
relatively unaccountable to the electorate, to protect those ideals from being
compromised by problematic political pressures.4 3°
It is, however, at least a plausible alternative to posit that "the people"
were more confident about the democratic process-more confident in
themselves-than all that. 431 Although recognizing that their constitutional
ideals would be vulnerable in everyday politics, "the people" might well
have viewed these ideals as vulnerable primarily because they would be
forgotten, neglected, or othenvise obsw.red by the more immediately
_pressing issues of the day. "The people" might have wanted the Court to
serve their constitutional ideals simply by declaring applicable principle, by
demonstrating the relevance of their constitutional ideals to vulnerable
statutes, while retaining for themselves the ultimate discretion to determine
whether their constitutional ideals should prevail over the pressing concerns of the moment. 432 Such a scheme does give real meaning to a written
Paul Gewirtz has pursued the theme of colloquy and has advocated explicit judicial
acknowledgement that constitutional ideals may be compromised in a given situation. Gewirtz
limits the scope of his analysis, however, to the context of imposing remedies, rather than that
of defining applicable constitutional principle. See supra note 406.
Guido Calabresi also has expressed the view that courts should engage legislatures in
dialogue. Calabresi did so, however, in the context of revealing present ordinary, everyday
political preferences-legislative values-rather than that of revealing present constitutional
values. See generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 14.
426. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
427.Id. at 177.
428. Id. at 178.
429. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
430. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
431. Cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). Chief Justice Marshall
suggested that an obligation to enforce laws that courts deem unconstitutional would "reduceO
to nothing" the significance of a written constitution. Id. at 178. This, of course, is an
overstatement. The question is who should determine when constitutional concerns have been
violated. Such concerns may be written down simply as reminders to the electorate of their
favored yet vulnerable ideals, without any desire to have those concerns enforced by a
coach-like court.
432. Cf Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 355 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting)
(expressing view that "it rests with the people, in whom full and absolute sovereign power
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constitution-to purposeful and self-conscious political choices of especially
important ideals called "constitutional"-yet it denies a desire among "the
people" to bind themselves. Thus, Marshall was wrong in postulating that
binding· judicial review is a logically necessary concomitant to a written
constitution. It is entirely plausible for people to hire a coach not to
constrain them by decree, but to deter them by persuasion.
This Article has posited that "the people" adhere to values of equal
protection with a motive of self-constraint, and that they have authorized
courts to help them pursue the coherent implications of a favored constitutional ideal. 43 3 This sort of normative matrix envisions certain elements
of the ideal that "the people" want protected by constitutional mandate,
and certain elements of the ideal for which they are not yet ready to eschew
competing everyday political pleasures. Yet, despite wanting to maintain
some competing political concerns, "the people" apparently recognize the
compromised constitutional principle as a prelude to an uncompromised
ideal to be attained 434 -and ultimately to be imposed by decree. Given this
normative matrix, the judicial function is to help ''the people" achieve their
constitutional ideals, and to impose the implications of those ideals against
contrary democratic discretion only to the extent that the consequent
everyday political pain of constitutionally mandated constraint is equal todoes not fall short of and does not exceed-that which "the people" have
chosen to endure.435
This view of constitutional intent bridges the gap between the
Marshall-Hamiltonian perspective, in which "the people" want courts to
protect their constitutional ideals by decree, and the alternative just
presented, in which "the people" are willing to trust themselves to give
adequate weight to constitutional ideals in the democratic process, so long
as courts remind "the people" of those ideals, and demonstrate to "the
people" the applicability of those ideals to particular exercises of democratic
re~idcs, to rorrect abuses in legislation, by instructing their representatives to repeal the
obnoxious act"); 1ee also DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 355 (suggesting that "the Constitution
might have iJeen interpreted as laying down directions to Congress, the president, and state
officials ... , but making them their own judges").
•133. For a discussion of the vulnerability of this premise, see supra text accompanying notes
257-66. For a skeletal analysis of a premise that "the people" ratified the fourteenth
amendment with the motive of constraining the political discretion only of dissenting localities,
see supra no1 e 266.
,134. Cf. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). Here, the Court extended the antiprejudice
principle again. The equal protection clause prohibits not only governmental decisions
reJ1ecting the prejudices of officials (whether they represent the majority or not), but also
go1'ernmcntal actions pursuing permissible goals while accommodating private prejudices.
Thus, in rev<"rsing a Florida custody decision predicated on the child's mother having married
a man of a different race, the Court determined:
The q1.1estion ... is whether the reality of private biases and the possible injury they
might inflict arc permissible considerations for removal of an infant child from the
cu~tody of its natural mother. We have little difficulty concluding that they are not.
The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.
Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect.
Id. at 433.
435. The indeterminacy of this criterion is the root of the problematic i~sue of timing. See
supra text accompanying notes 299-334 & note 309 and accompanying text.
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discretion. The constitutional intent suggested by this notion of equal
protection bridges the gap because it envisions both alternative functions of
judicial review as desired by "the people." To the extent that both
alternatives were plausible in 1787, or 1868, it should not be surprising that
"the people" might want a forceful and mandatory judicial review for some
questions of constitutional principle, yet a permissive and suggestive
judicial review for oa.1iers. To the extent that the constitational choices of
1868 specifically imply a popular desire for judicial pursuit of normative
coherence beyond that which was attainable in ordinary politics, the path of
suggestive judicial review rejected by Marshall in Marbury, and by Hamilton
in The Federalist No. 78, beckons all the more strongly. Because this
interpretation of constitutional intent posits that "the people" do want to
achieve the coherent implications of their constitutional ideal, and that they
have authorized courts to help them do so, it follows that a court serves
their constitutional desires by declaring ideals compromised, even when
upholding an offensive exercise of democratic discretion as still permissible
today.
This analysis brings us back to the heart of Mr. Baker's case. Even if
one concludes that Mr. Baker is not entitled to vindication by judicial
mandate today, 436 one hardly is led to a judicial resolution brushing his
claim aside as constitutionally irrelevant. After all, the foregoing analysis
suggests that although "the people" today may not be ready to give up their
emotions of sexism in certain cherished contexts such as, perhaps, sexual
orientation, they nevertheless seem to adhere to a constitutional ideal of
intrinsic gender equality.437 If a court, in resolving Mr. Baker's claim, were
simply to uphold the challenged Texas statute, it will have repeated justice
Brown's tragic error in Plessy. Because the structure of Mr. Baker's claim is
essentially the same as Mr. Plessy's, and assuming that the time for judicial
mandate has not yet arrived, the constitutional ideals of "the people" still
beg to be vindicated-for the sake of the claimant, and for "the people" as
well.
Thus, if Mr. Baker's claim is not vindicated by judicial mandate today
because constitutionally applicable principle does not yet extend so far
toward the untainted ideal of intrinsic gender equality, "the people's"
postulated desire for the progressive development of tlieir ideal of selfconstraint can still be served by the force and clarity of a court's reasoning.438 A court can declare the following message:
Although this court finds that the nation's everyday political values
have not sufficiently developed to accommodate a constitutional
prohibition of discrimination against homosexuals, we find, nevertheless, that discrimination based on sexual orientation compromises the constitutional ideal of intrinsic gender equality, that it
offends ultimate constitutional principle, and that it someday will
fall as constitutionally impermissible.
436. See supra text accompanying notes 380-90.
437. See supra text accompanying notes 344-79.
438. By this standard, the federal courts failed Baker's test. See supra note 237.
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In this way, by more completely articulating relevant constitutional considerations, a court can protect democratic discretion that in principle still
e:dst&, while simultaneously serving the constitutional ideal of
self-constraint. By serving both the impulse for ordinary political discretion
and the constitutional ideal that views such discretion as problematic, a
court can provide impetus for the development of a national political
context in which the everyday political pain of self-constraint from a new
judicial mandate is more likely to reflect that which "the people" want to
endure. 43 fl
We can return, once more, to the analogy of Coach and her client.
Having determined that there has been no authorization to prohibit a
choice-at least for now-Coach might choose simply to leave her client
alone, fully vulnerable to the temptation of a sugary delight. Yet, perhaps
this self-indulgent client could resist, or could sooner viscerally feel the
merit in resisting, thereby better approaching his own elusive ideals, if
Coach chooses not to walk away, but instead to stay, and to pester, and to
challenge the client, making him feel guilty, and shaping his everyday
preferences.
Justice Brown, in Plessy, left to chance the development of a political
context in which racial segregation, previously reserved as a desired
•139. Such a course of judicial action does not involve an advisory opinion. A court still
dcddes a real legal controversy, determines the enforceable rights of the litigants and, beyond
ibis, acknowledge~ and serves its coach-like role in the constitutional system. Nevertheless, one
nught be concerned that a court following this suggested course of action would decide
constitutional issues more broadly than necessary, violating the commonplace that courts
should define and resoh·e constitutional issues as narrowly as possible. Justice Frankfurter
expressed such a view:
The proce5s of Constitutional adjudication does not thrive on conjuring up horrible
pos~ibilities 1ha1 never happen in the real world and devising doctrines sufficiently
comprehensive in detail to cover the remotest contingency. Nor need we go beyond wlzat
1s rcqmrtd for a reasoned dzspo~ition of tlze kind of controversy now before tlze Court.
New York\' Unilcd States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 (1946) (emphasis added).
Ye1, this riotion begs the questions of what "kind of controversy" is before the Court and,
therefore, what kind of judicial resolution is necessary. The contro\ersy before the Court
concern~ which among contending values should prevail. The matter is one of profound social
concern beyond the interests of individual litigants. The legal interests of individuals are
signifirnnt and worthy of judicial enforcement because "the people" have deemed those
individual interests to be significant. Indeed, the interests of individual litigants pale in
importance when compared with a recognition that judicial decisionmaking involves the
making of law, and therefore has systemic consequences in shaping the behavior of the many.
If "the people" have ideals of self-constraint, the same rationale underlying judicial recognition and protection of individual legal interests supports judicial protection of those constitutional ideals as well.
For constitutional values of self-constraint, determining which among contending values
should prevail has an additional dimension-the dimension of time-and with that dimension
comes the desire among "the people" for normative progress. The issue of which value is
constitutionally favored, even if not a matter of constitutional mandate today, is immediate;
tlw task of developing ordinary political values among "the people" as the prelude to the
developmem of constitutional mandates is a matter for politics today. When one views litigation
for its social significance-a battle for predominance among contending values-one must
conclude that given "the people's" constitutional ideal of self-constraint, a designation of those
values that "the people" want ultimat~Zv to prevail-despite remaining unenforced today-is
truly, in Jus1ice Frankfurter's words, an element of "the kind of controversy now before the
court." Id. al 583.
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compromise against the ideal of intrinsic racial equality, ultimately could be
invalidated in the name of authorized constitutional self-constraint.440
Justice Brown left "the people" fully vulnerable to temptation by the racist
demons in their minds. He recognized only the function ofjudicial fiat, and
failed to exercise the implicitly authorized function of suggestive judicial
declaration.
Such, at least,44 1 was Plessy's error.' It was an error that should be
committed never again.

IV.

CONCLUSION: WHO CARES?

This Article has proceeded from "the people's" perspective, and has
employed a working definition of "the people" at every step. 442 It is
understandable that "the people" would assert the "right to establish, for
their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most
conduce to their own happiness."443 From "the people's" perspective, it is
laudable that Justice Marshall adopted this value as his own.
Toward serving the goal of identifying the constitutional values of "the
people" today, the Article has examined the apparent tension between the
political process by which constitutional provisions inevitably are created,
and the quasi-philosophical process by which they often have been inter440. It is, after all, the development of everyday preferences that opens the way for
additional constitutionally mandated constraints. See supra text accompanying notes 199-214,
314-90.
441. The error might have been one of result as well. Cf supra note 323.
442. See supra text accompanying notes 248-56 ("the people" of 1868); notes 306 ("the
people" of 1872), 318 ("the people" of 1896), 370 ("the people" of 1987), 376 (same).
443. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803); see supra note 5.
This premise of popular sovereignty may simply state the inevitable reality that power is the
ultimate issue in any political system. If "the people," or a portion of them with sufficient
political power, are sufficiently displeased with government, they can topple government by
brute force, and institute a more pleasing alternative. This practical root for the fundamental
premise articulated by Justice Marshall in Marbury is consistent with the erstwhil~ colonies'
then-recent revolutionary experience. It is consistent with the Civil War as well. See supra text
accompanying notes 104-07, 248-56; cf. supra notes 306, 318, 325, 370 (considering who are
"the people").
The notion that "the people," or a physically powerful portion of them, have the "right" to
establish their preferred principles of government simply because they have the power to do
so is hardly an uplifting sentiment. Indeed, it is not necessarily consistent with the establishment or the maintenance of democracy, since the masses are not necessarily physically
powerful enough to thwart the will of certain minorities whose physical power has been
technologically augmented. Thus, assuming that there is such a powerful minority, the
existence of democracy must be a function of their belief that democracy serves their
interests-whether moral concerns for others, or considerations of expediency. Consider
South Africa.
Alexander Bickel asked: "Who will think it moral ultimately to direct the lives of men against
the greater number of them? Or wise?" A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 28. Whether a
governmental system that does not reflect the desires of a majority of "the people" is moral or
wise involves two fundamentally different issues. The question of morality must be addressed
separately from that of wisdom, if justification for a principle of self-determination is to be
more than simply power. In the end, the "foundational" norm that "the people" have a "right"
to self-determination begs the more fundamental question: Who has the "right" to determine
what rights "the people" have? See infra text accompanying notes 455-59.
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preted. The Article has suggested that the task of constitutional analysis
might be enriched, and the goal of identifying "the people's" constitutional
values better served, by exploring questions of basic political motivation: In
what forums would different people prefer their conflicts to be resolved?
Why would people prefer to have political conflict resolved by states and
localitiesi' Why would people prefer to have conflict resolved by the
national dectorate in Congress? Why would people prefer to have conflict
resolved in the Constitution itself by constitutional mandate?
Constitutionally mandated restrictions on local discretion, like
Congress' exercise of legislative discretion, reflect a national majority's
desire to prevent local majorities from having their way. More than this,
however, constitutionally mandated restrictions on local discretion also
constrain national legislative discretion, since congressional majorities may
not dilute that which the Constitution itself requires:144 Thus, constitutional restrictions on local discretion, chosen by "the people" of the nation,
may reflect a national majority's desire for self-constraint-a desire to respect
some norm to a greater extent than would be possible through ordinary,
everyday national politics. 445 If so, the essence of constitutionally mandated
restrictions on local discretion is a relationship between the everyday
political values held by a majority of the nation-values reflected in
Congress-and the national electorate's chosen constitutional ideals. 446
Given a goal of identifying the constitutional values of "the people''
today, one must evaluate different sources of evidence. The best evidence
would be a recently ratified constitution. But "the people" do not engage in
constitutional policymaking annually, or even each generation. Indeed, if
"the people" did so, constitutional politics would become more like ordinary
politics, thus undermining the possibilities for self-constraint. The United
States Code, although perhaps often reflecting more recently chosen
national policies than those framed in the Constitution, could not provide
good evidence for identifying values of self-constraint, for, by definition,
"the people" wish to protect such values to a greater extent than is possible
in ordinary national politics.447
The Hamiltonian premise of constitutional continuity provides a
possible, but far from perfect, solution. It suggests that one might infer the
constitutional values of "the people" today from the constitutional choices
made by "the people" of the past. The Hamiltonian premise of constitutional continuity does not suggest that all values remain static through time.
Rather, it posits that matters of basic political motivation, constitutional
relationships, remain stable-that political relationships generating a desire
444. See supra note 81.
445. This is so at least when constitutional choices are made under circumstances of a stable
national clenorate. Cf supra text accompanying notes 87-90. For the fourteenth amendment,
ratified under potentially significant national electoral instability, additional analysis i~
required to determine whether the choice to pursue national values by constitutional mandate,
rather than by authorizing Congress to legislate, reflected a choice of self-constraint, as well as
a desire to constrain the discretion of dissenting localities. See supra text accompanying notes
2r.7-66.
446. Again, one must modify the notion of "nation" in the context of the fourteenth
amendment, See ~upra notes 306, 371.
'147. Sec wpra text accompanying notes 91-92.
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among "the people" to have value conflicts resolved locally, or nationally by
Congress, or nationally by the Constitution itself, persist through time. 448
Thus, if "the people" have framed constitutional ideals with the motive of
self-constraint, the premise of constitutional continuity relates to a particular kind of constitutional relationship. It suggests that the competition
between an ideal, for which people are willing to endure everyday political
pain, and conflicting daily preferences, which are the very reason that pevple feel
the need for constraint, persists through succeeding generations. 449 If that
relationship persists, any development of ordinary, everyday national
political values toward the ideal must push constitutional mandates of
self-constraint toward the ideal as well. Thus is the tension between
everyday political reality and constitutional aspirations maintained. By
maintaining that tension courts might avoid Raoul Berger's fear of "transforming" the Constitution through subterfuge or error. Thus, it is the
development of ordinary, everyday political values throughout the nation,450 rather than judicial philosophizing abstracted from the four relevant forums for political conflict,451 that can provide an analytically
supportable source for developing the coherence of constitutional meaning
from "the people's" perspective.452

448. For a consideration of the premise's vulnerability, see supra note 122; cf. supra notes
208, 209, 376.
449. See supra note 208.
450. See supra text accompanying notes 164, 208-11, 301-06, 319-20, 325-28, 344-60.
451. I am speaking of the ordinary, everyday national political values existing at the time
constitutional restrictions on democratic discretion were framed, the constitutional choices of
self-constraint that actually were made, the ordinary, everyday national political values today,
and the values of potential constitutional majorities today. Thus,
[ord. nt'l prefs. : const'l choices](past) II [ord. nt'l prefs. : const'l values](pres.)
See supra note 164 and accompanying text; cf. supra notes 306, 371, 445.
452. Some might argue that courts are simply incapable of determining the precise
compromises that political majorities would reach, and therefore have no alternative to
pursuing the logical implications of certain values. When statutory language is inconclusive,
courts resolve questions of interpretation by reasoning from postulations about legislative
purpose. Thus, judicial pursuit of normative coherence in constitutional interpretation is just
another species of a pervasive phenomenon ofjudicial lawmaking. See, e.g., Cottrol, supra note
84, at 387 ("common law processes are inherent in constitutional interpretation"); Wellington,
Nature ofjudicial Review, supra note 14, at 494 ("It is standard and appropriate for courts to
employ general legal principles to construe the open texture of statutes. This is not necessarily
countermajoritarian, although sometimes statutory purpose and general legal principles pull
in different directions." (footnotes omitted)).
Even those who seek to minimize the differences between constitutional analysis and
statutory interpretation acknowledge that there are differences. Harry Wellington characterizes the matter as one of "finality," and suggests that while judicial interpretations of the
Constitution theoretically are final, and statutory interpretation theoretically is subject to
correction by Congress, any difference in fact is illusory. See Wellington, Nature of judicial
Review, supra note 14, at 487-88 ("One asks how final constitutional decisions really are ...
[and] wonders how transitory are other nonmajoritarian decisions of consequence.").
The theoretical finality of constitutional interpretations, however, is a matter of no small
consequence. See supra note 135. The issue concerns an erroneous distortion of the compromises that modern constitutional majorities would make. The concerns of modern legislative
majorities are surely relevant, but only partially and indirectly so when defining modern
constitutional values. See supra text accompanying notes 201-14, 302-07, 318-29, 344-79; ~{.
supra notes 233, 266. Thus, a court faces potential error when thwarting present political
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Finally, this development of the "the people's" ordinary, everyday
political values need not be left to chance. As suggested by the ability of
most Americans today to feel offended by PlesS)' v. Ferguson, courts can play
a role in the stagnation-and the development-of the nation's everyday
political values. More than this, a recognition that constitutionally mandated restrictions on local discretion reflect a desire among "the people" for
self-constraint- that such mandates reflect ideals to which "the people"
aspire-implies that courts, in those constitutional contexts chosen by "the people,"
are authorized-indeed required-to play a suggestive (as well as injunctive) role in shaping public values.
Thus, from "the people's" perspective, the Article has explored the
gap between Raoul Berger and Chief Justice Rehnquist, on the one hand,
who look to the past and see intricate political compromises forever
defining constitutional meaning, and Justice Brennan and Ronald
Dworkin, on the other, who look beyond politics and see philosophical
visions of constitutional nirvana. For "the people's" benefit, one might
m;uorities, ai•d wlun bowing to present political pressure at the expense of competing constitutional
norms. Deciding when to bow, and when not to bow, requires criteria independent of the
efficacy of p•Jlitical pressure.
Charles B1ack has posed a question of legal interpretation that can further illuminate
distinctions between constitutional and statutory (or common law) analysis. He asks whether a
property owner owes to one injured in his elevator the duty of a common carrier or the lesser
duty of a prnperty owner. See C. BucK, supra note 56, at 162-66. The dilemma of judicial
remoning versus political compromise exists here, as it does in constitutional analysis. For this
question of nonconstitutional policy posed by Black, a court might choose to favor either the
policy underlying the property law, or that underlying the common carrier law, based on a
view that in ,.his context, one is more important to the majority than the other. A court also
might try to imagine how this policy issue might be affected-if considered by the legislatureby other apparently unrelated community interests. In each of these approaches, the court's
go.11 is to serve the contemporary majority's legislative will. If the court errs, the majority
maintains corrective authority.
The analogous error in constitutional analysis is a distortion not of contemporary legislative
compromise~. but a distortion of the constitutional compromises "the people" today would
stnke. Of course, true constitutional correction, unlike the correction from political pressure
emisioned by Dean Wellington, is difficult and rare. This problem might be mitigated by
recognizing that the dynamic of self-constraint, to the extent manifested by "the people" of the
pa,,t, can provide at least some rough indication of the extent to which "the people" today
value the constitutional ideal, and the extent to which they value competing democratic
discretion. This dynamic of self-constraint, related to the present with the premise of
constitutional continuity, suggest~ "the people's" constitutional values in a way that statutory
compromises, whether expressed vaguely or specifically, struck by those motivated by a desire
to constrain the political discretion only of others, do not. The problem of constitutional
co1 rection mlght be further mitigated by the route of suggestive declarntion presented in this
Article, which openly recognizes the constitutional ideal, the competing desire for everyday
democratic discretion, and the curse of judicial fallibility.
Hy recognizing the creative interaction between constitutional ideals and competing
evc·ryday political preferences, and pursuing the option of suggestive- declaration, the real
difference b<'tween constitutional and statutory interpretation might be narrowed. If the
Court does follow the route of suggestive declaration, "the people" remain free to develop
their ordinar?, everyday political values as if the Court had been interpreting a statute. But my
route of sugi:estivc declaration can be invoked only with the risk of inadequately enforcing
constitutional values of self-constraint. This theoretical wrong-'.vhose actual commission may
go undetected-confirms that the difference between constitutional and statutory interpretation, though narrowed by the route of suggestive declaration, remains as real and vexing as
evc:r.
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construct a bridge between Raoul Berger and Ronald Dworkin by acknowledging that the Constitution is created from the values of people-not
those of demons, and not those of gods-to serve the values of people.4:>3
People are complicated, apparently possessing something of the demonic
and something of the divine. It should not be surprising, therefore, that
"the people's" constitutional preferences might reflect something of an
ideal aspiration, and something of a compromise to concerns which, by
comparison, are perceived as mundane and shameful.
Raoul Berger's approach makes the Constitution unrealistically irrelevant to modern conflict, because his is a Constitution of past people, and
past conflicts. What Berger views as constitutionally prohibited in the realm
of equal protection is today largely beyond the realm of credible political
debate. He has thus defined away the conflict within individuals, which
includes the essential aspirational quality of self-constraint.45 4 Ronald
Dworkin's approach similarly makes the Constitution irrelevant to modern
conflict by unrealistically abstracting analysis from the real people of the
modern era, who are not philosophers after all, but ordinary people. He too
has defined away the conflict within individuals, which compels people to
limit their pursuit of higher ideals.
In short, from "the people's" perspective, toward interpreting "the
people's" values, and given a definition of"the people"455 -if only a group's
identification of itself as "the people" -the analysis presented in this Article
could be helpful. But these qualifications suggest limitations. The analysis
does not consider from the judge's perspective whether and why any judge
should adopt "the people's" perspective, and do "the people's" bidding.456 It
does not consider from the judge's perspective the question of how a judge

453. Thaddeus Stevens, while lamenting that his high hopes for quick and radical justice
were not met by the fourteenth amendment as submitted to the states, declared, "Do you
inquire why, holding these views and possessing some will of my own, I accept so imperfect a
proposition? I answer, because I live among men and not among angels ...." CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1865).
454. Cf Cottrol, supra note 84, at 366 ("A significant failure in Berger's discussion of the
fourteenth amendment lies in his treatment of northern racism .... Berger's is in large part
a conceptual failure, an unwillingness to explore the subtle and delicate intermLxtures of
idealism and self-interest that brought about at least a temporary transformation in northern
views concerning race.'').
One must stress, however, that the idealistic component must be neither overemphasized
nor too broadly pursued-as it might be, for example, if based on Michael Perry's rationale
that Americans are a "religious" or aspirational people. See M. PERRY, supra note 11, at 97-100.
Rather, one must seek to identify "the people's" particular ideals of self-constraint, and one
must account for their competing desires for autonomy in everyday political life.
455. See supra text accompanying notes 103-09 (past or present), 248-56 ("the people" of
1868); notes 306 ("the people" of 1872), 318 ("the people" of 1896), ~25 ("the people" of
1954), 370 ("the people" of 1987), 376 (same).
456. This is essentially a matter of identifying one's ideal of constitutional analysis-one's
goal in doing whatever one does when claiming to "interpret" the Constitution. Many
apparently pursue the goal of finding "good" or ''.justice" when interpreting the Constitution.
I suggest that given the problem of conflict that underlies any constitutional question, the first
question must be: Whose notion of good or justice should the analyst be pursuing? Cf infra note
459.
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should define "the people" whose values should be served.457 Beyond this,
and most fundamentally, the analysis leaves room for conflict about who
"the people" are.4r.s
And this-the problem of conflict-brings us back toward the point at
which we began. 4 "9 Progress is difficult indeed.

·157. q: wpra text accompanying notes 103-09 (past or present), 248-56 ("the people" of
H:68); note!, 306 ("the people" of 1872), 318 ("the people" of 1896), 325 ("the people" of
1954), 370 ("the people" of 1987), 376 (same).
·158. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 248-56 ("the people" of 1868 determined by war).
•159. Sa 5i·pra note 1 and accompanying te:lt; cf. R. DwoRKIN, supra note 30, at 373 ("If the
right answer to all questions about the political rights of minorities is that there is no right
answer, then how can there be a right answer to the question of whose opinions should rule
us?"); ,,upra note 443.

